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Belief specification, as well as the identification of sources and statistical proper-
ties of uncertainty, is a crucial stage in stochastic model development. In much of
the classical literature, one would begin by pinpointing a future event whose out-
come would effectively determine the conclusion of the scenario of interest. It would
then be necessary to hypothesize a particular distribution for the event’s outcomes.
Once these decisions had been made, answering questions with both theoretical and
practical significance became a matter of careful argumentation and computation.
In this thesis, we are concerned with the following two questions, especially in
cases when they can be motivated by financial applications: What if one is unable
to select a single distribution which most appropriately characterizes the likelihoods
of future outcomes? What if one has made a choice, even the best conceivably
available choice, but it is simply wrong? For example, the first issue could naturally
arise when several distribution candidates appear equally plausible, but they all have
unique advantages and flaws. The occurrence of the second issue is nearly inevitable:
As noted by the legendary statistician George Box, “All models are wrong” ([59]).
The financial mathematics community has investigated our first question since
the seminal works of Avellaneda et al. ([28]) and Lyons ([165]). Volatility is a
1
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key parameter when pricing certain securities including options, and these papers
examine what unfolds, if the volatility is not precisely known. Roughly, an agent
faced with this problem is driven to consider several possible distributions for his
future event’s outcomes. He considers infinitely many of them, in fact, and some
may badly disagree with others. For instance, one of his distributions may deem the
occurrence of a particular outcome as certain, while another views it as impossible.
The financial implications of such a framework and its variants have been thoroughly
studied ([18], [42], [52], [53], [91], [109], [125], [126], [172], [203], and [124]). In
support of this line of research and due to its independent relevance, others have
investigated the transference of statistical properties from classical objects to their
counterparts under this new scheme ([190], [191], [223], [224], [195], [241], [181], [127],
[94]). Chapters II and III fall into the latter category. Intuitively, they primarily
focus on features of large aggregations of future events where the corresponding
distributions are uncertain.
To the best of our knowledge, our second question has attracted less scholarly
attention in the contexts of index tracking during a reconstitution, parimutuel wa-
gering, or mini-flash crashes. Briefly, index funds like the Vanguard 500 Index Fund
(VFINX) aim to replicate a chosen market benchmark such as the S&P 500 ([230]).
Parimutuel wagering is a popular betting system used in finance ([38]), sports ([7]),
lotteries ([6]), and prediction markets ([197]). Mini-flash crashes are violent, rapid
spikes or crashes in the price of some security, e.g., the 300ms swing in Qualys, Inc.
(QLYS) from $10 to $0.0001 and back, which took place on April 25, 2013 ([9]).
Chapters IV - VI can be viewed as suggesting that it is natural to make mistakes in
these situations, whether by picking a seemingly reasonable (but imperfect) objective
or relying upon a sophisticated (but faulty) model. These innocuous errors can have
3
surprising and occasionally disastrous consequences.
We conclude Chapter I with a more precise outline of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Chapter II Summary
In one dimension, the theory of the G-normal distribution is well-developed, and
many results from the classical setting have a nonlinear counterpart. Significant chal-
lenges remain in multiple dimensions, and some of what has already been discovered
is quite nonintuitive. By answering several classically-inspired questions concerning
independence, covariance uncertainty, and behavior under certain linear operations,
we continue to highlight the fascinating range of unexpected attributes of the multi-
dimensional G-normal distribution.
The material in this chapter is based upon [47], which was presented during the
Financial Mathematics: Advanced Modeling and Numerical Methods conference at
the Université Paris Diderot on June 20, 2014.
1.2 Chapter III Summary
For α ∈ (1, 2), we present a generalized central limit theorem for α-stable random
variables under sublinear expectation. The foundation of our proof is an interior
regularity estimate for partial integro-differential equations (PIDEs). A classical
generalized central limit theorem is recovered as a special case, provided a mild but
natural additional condition holds. Our approach contrasts with previous arguments
for the result in the linear setting which have typically relied upon tools that are
nonexistent in the sublinear framework, e.g., characteristic functions.
The material in this chapter is based upon [48], which was presented during the
following events: the Financial/Actuarial Mathematics Seminar at the University
of Michigan on December 3, 2014; the Methods of Mathematical Finance confer-
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ence at Carnegie Mellon University on June 2, 2015; the Mathematical Finance and
Probability Seminar at Rutgers University on November 17, 2015; and at the Joint
Mathematics Meetings: Special Session on Financial Mathematics I at the Washing-
ton State Convention Center on January 7, 2016.
1.3 Chapter IV Summary
We develop a continuous-time game to study the problem faced by an index
tracker whose benchmark is undergoing a reconstitution. Given a linear price im-
pact model, we use standard optimality conditions based on the maximum principle
to produce candidate Nash equilibria. We analyze these results numerically under
varying assumptions regarding tracking error constraints, market characteristics, and
predatory trading activity.
The material in this chapter was presented during the Financial/Actuarial Math-
ematics Seminar at the University of Michigan on March 18, 2015.
1.4 Chapter V Summary
How do large-scale participants in parimutuel wagering events affect the house and
ordinary bettors? A standard narrative suggests that they may temporarily benefit
the former at the expense of the latter. To approach this problem, we begin by
developing a model based on the theory of large generalized games. Constrained only
by their budgets, a continuum of diffuse (ordinary) players and a single atomic (large-
scale) player simultaneously wager to maximize their expected profits according to
their individual beliefs. Our main theoretical result gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Using this framework, we analyze our question in concrete scenarios. First, we study
a situation in which both predicted effects are observed. Neither is always observed in
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our remaining examples, suggesting the need for a more nuanced view of large-scale
participants.
The material in this chapter is based upon [50], which was presented during the
SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics & Engineering at the Sheraton Austin
Hotel at the Capitol on November 18, 2016. A particular application of these results
was also featured in media outlets including the Associated Press, after the layman’s
version [49] was published by the The Conversation on May 19, 2016.
1.5 Chapter VI Summary
Oft-cited causes of mini-flash crashes include human errors, endogenous feedback
loops, the nature of modern liquidity provision, fundamental value shocks, and mar-
ket fragmentation. We develop a mathematical model which captures aspects of the
first three explanations. Empirical features of recent mini-flash crashes are present
in our framework. For example, there are periods when no such events will occur.
If they do, even just before their onset, market participants may not know with cer-
tainty that a disruption will unfold. Our mini-flash crashes can materialize in both
low and high trading volume environments and may be accompanied by a partial
synchronization in order submission.
Instead of adopting a classically-inspired equilibrium approach, we borrow ideas
from the optimal execution literature. Each of our agents begins with beliefs about
how his own trades impact prices and how prices would move in his absence. They,
along with other market participants, then submit orders which are executed at a
common venue. Naturally, this leads us to explicitly distinguish between how prices
actually evolve and our agents’ opinions. In particular, every agent’s beliefs will be
expressly incorrect.
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As far as we know, this setup suggests both a new paradigm for modeling heteroge-
neous agent systems and a novel blueprint for understanding model misspecification
risks in the context of optimal execution.
The material in this chapter is based upon [46], which was presented during the
Financial/Actuarial Mathematics Seminar at the University of Michigan on April
12, 2017.
CHAPTER II
Comparing the G-Normal Distribution to its Classical
Counterpart
2.1 Introduction
The G-framework, which includes the G-normal distribution and G-Brownian
motion, was initially motivated by the study of risk measures and pricing under
volatility uncertainty. Roughly speaking, one can think of these objects as the ap-
propriate analogues of their classical namesakes in a setting of model uncertainty
where the relevant collection of probability measures may be singular.
Activity in this area has been considerable since its introduction by Peng ([189],
[192]), and developments have proceeded at a rapid pace. A great variety of standard
theorems from classical probability and stochastic analysis now have versions in the
G-setting including the law of large numbers ([190], [191]), the central limit theorem
([190], [191], [159], [130], [244]), the martingale representation theorem ([223], [224],
[195]), Lévy’s martingale characterization theorem ([242], [243], [160], [161], [225]),
and Girsanov’s theorem ([241], [181], [127]). Substantial progress and extensions of
this work have been completed in many other directions as well ([176], [93], [135],
[177], [94]). Readers interested in survey articles are referred to [188], [193], and
[194].
Fundamental issues linger, especially in multiple dimensions. Much ofG-stochastic
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analysis is built upon the G-normal distribution, and yet, many important elemen-
tary questions about this distribution remain unanswered. Some of what is known
is also rather startling. For instance, the following result about the classical normal
distribution is false in the G-setting ([194]):
For any n-dimensional random vector Z, if 〈v, Z〉 is a normal random
variable for all v ∈ Rn, then Z is a normal random vector.
Our intuition cannot be trusted when turned to G-normal random vectors. Prop-
erties such as the one just mentioned fail due to the nonlinearity of the expectation
operator in this framework. Other obstacles include the lack of well-understood
tools from the classical theory (e.g., characteristic functions and density functions).
Also, the distributional uncertainty associated to a G-normal random vector is far
more complex than its initial appearance suggests, since viewing a G-normal random
vector as having some fixed but unknown covariance matrix is usually incorrect.
Faced with these challenges, we asked to what extent additional properties of
the classical normal distribution hold for its G-counterpart, particularly focusing on
behaviors under various linear operations and the relationship between coordinate
independence and the covariance matrix. We present our findings concerning the
following classical theorems:












then U and V are independent.
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(ii) Let Z1, . . . , Zn be independent normal random variables. For any m × n real
matrix A, if
Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn)
> ,
then AZ is an m-dimensional normal random vector.
(iii) The covariance matrix of a normal random vector is diagonal if and only if its
coordinates are (mutually) independent normal random variables.
(iv) If Z is an n-dimensional normal random vector, then there exists an invertible
n× n matrix A such that the coordinates of AZ are independent.
Theorem II.14 reveals that (i) is no longer true in the G-setting. We show in The-
orem II.15 that (ii) no longer holds either. While this was already known in a few
special cases ([194]), our work explores a broad new class of examples and illuminates
a surprising dichotomy depending on the rank of the matrix. Theorems II.17 and
II.18 indicate that while (iii) is partially true for the G-normal distribution, unex-
pected new constraints on the coordinates are introduced. We end by demonstrating
with Theorem II.19 that the analogue of (iv) is false.
Our proofs often take advantage of a strange phenomenon in this setting: inde-
pendence can be asymmetric, i.e., Y can be independent from X even if X is not
independent from Y . The general strategy is to show that this is incompatible with
the symmetry relations imposed by the G-heat equation associated to the G-normal
distribution, given a careful choice of parameters.
These insights expand our knowledge of the remarkable series of behaviors exhib-
ited by the multidimensional G-normal distribution. While the ultimate goal is to
use these results to broaden our knowledge of G-stochastic analysis and its related
financial applications, we believe that many more surprises lurk in the answers to
10
further theoretical questions about this object.
Readers unfamiliar with this area can find a short treatment of relevant back-
ground material in Section 2.2. The specific setup necessary for the statement of our
results is in Section 2.3. Our main results are contained in Section 2.4.
2.2 Background
We begin with a brief survey of the theory of sublinear expectation spaces and
the G-normal distribution. Our focus will be restricted to only those results that are
directly needed for our work in the sequel. Readers interested in a more thorough
treatment can find further details in [188], [193], [194], [128], or [163], the references
from which our discussion is adapted.
Throughout, we let Ω be a given set and H be a space of real-valued functions
defined on Ω. One should understand H as a space of random variables on Ω. We
will only place minimal emphasis on Ω and H, but we suppose that H
(i) is a linear space,
(ii) contains all constant functions, and
(iii) contains ϕ (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) for every X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈ H and
ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (Rn), where Cl.Lip (Rn) is the set of functions such that there exists
C > 0 and m ∈ N (depending on ϕ) satisfying
|ϕ (x)− ϕ (y)| ≤ C (1 + |x|m + |y|m) |x− y|
for all x, y ∈ Rn.
Our specific choice of test functions, Cl.Lip (Rn), is only a matter of convenience.
Other spaces are also commonly used.
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Definition II.1. A sublinear expectation is a function Ê : H −→ R which is
(i) Monotonic: Ê [X] ≤ Ê [Y ] if X ≤ Y ,
(ii) Constant-preserving: Ê [c] = c for any c ∈ R,
(iii) Sub-additive: Ê [X + Y ] ≤ Ê [X] + Ê [Y ], and





is called a sublinear expectation space.





, and when we have random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈
H, we will say that X is an n-dimensional random vector and write X ∈ Hn.
Great caution is required when manipulating expressions with sublinear expec-
tations due to (iii) and (iv). Most familar operations from the classical theory are
simply no longer valid. One situation where a standard technique can be applied is
the following.
Lemma II.3. Consider two random variables X, Y ∈ H such that
Ê [Y ] = −Ê [−Y ]. Then
Ê [X + αY ] = Ê [X] + αÊ [Y ]
for all α ∈ R.
In the literature, random variables such as Y above are said to have no mean-
uncertainty, a notion which also arises in the context of symmetric G-martingales.
We will resort to a notable consequence of this result again and again: if Ê [Y ] =
Ê [−Y ] = 0, then for all α ∈ R,
Ê [X + αY ] = Ê [X] . (2.1)
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Definition II.4. An n-dimensional random vector Y ∈ Hn is said to be independent
from an m-dimensional random vector X ∈ Hm if for all ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (Rm+n), we have
Ê [ϕ (X, Y )] = Ê
[
Ê [ϕ (x, Y )]x=X
]
.
As we mentioned previously, independence can be asymmetric when Ê is not a
linear expectation. A now standard example which we will refer to later illustrates
this concretely.
Example II.5. Consider random variables X, Y ∈ H such that
(i) Ê [X] = −Ê [−X] = 0,
(ii) Ê [|X|] > 0, and
(iii) Ê [Y 2] > −Ê [−Y 2].












A broad class of situations where (i) , (ii), and (iii) are satisfied occurs when X ∼
N (0, [σ21, σ21]) for 0 < σ21 and Y ∼ N (0, [σ22, σ22]) for σ22 < σ22 (see below for notation).
Ignoring trivial cases, one can actually characterize the distribution of X and Y if
X is independent from Y and vice versa (see Proposition II.13 below). Still, observe
that if Ê is a linear expectation, this definition is equivalent to the classical one.
Definition II.6. Let X be an n-dimensional random vector, i.e., X ∈ Hn.
(i) The distribution of X, FX , is defined on Cl.Lip (Rn) by
FX (ϕ) = Ê [ϕ (X)] .
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(ii) X has distributional uncertainty if FX is not a linear expectation
( (Rn, Cl.lip (Rn) ,FX) is always a sublinear expectation space).
(iii) If Y ∈ Hn is another n-dimensional random vector, then X and Y are identically
distributed, denoted X ∼ Y , if
FX = FY .
(iv) If X and Y are identically distributed and Y is independent from X, then Y is
an independent copy of X.
This notion of being identically distributed is also equivalent to the classical defin-
tion if Ê is a linear expectation. The sublinear case possesses many interesting new
features, but we will only need to know about those pertaining to the G-normal
distribution and the maximal distribution.
Definition II.7. An n-dimensional random vector X ∈ Hn is said to be G-normally
distributed if for any independent copy of X, say X̄, we have
aX + bX̄ ∼
√
a2 + b2X
for all a, b ≥ 0.
“G” refers to the sublinear function defined on the space of n × n symmetric




Ê [〈AX,X〉] . (2.2)
For each such function, there exists a unique bounded, closed, convex subset Γ of






tr [AB] . (2.3)
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Conversely, given any Γ with these properties, there exists a G-normal random vector
X such that (2.2) and (2.3) hold.
Γ completely determines the distribution of a G-normal random vector X, and in
fact, one can loosely interpret Γ as describing the covariance uncertainty of X. As
we remarked above, some care must be exercised since viewing X as possessing a
classical normal distribution with some fixed but unknown covariance matrix selected
from Γ is not generally correct. However, if Γ contains only one element, then X is
a classical normal random vector with mean zero and covariance Γ.











We will frequently use the following important basic properties of a G-normal
random vector.
Lemma II.9. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be an n-dimensional G-normal random vector,
i.e., X ∼ N (0,Γ). Then
(i) Ê [Xi] = Ê [−Xi] = 0 for all i;
(ii) −X and X are identically distributed, i.e., −X ∼ N (0,Γ);















Perhaps the deepest known property of a G-normal random vector is its intimate
connection to the so-called “G-heat equation”, a parabolic PDE generalizing the
classical heat equation.
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Proposition II.10. Let X be an n-dimensional G-normal random vector, i.e., X ∼
N (0,Γ). For all ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (Rn), the function








, (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× Rn





= 0, (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× Rn







We will not need the full theory of viscosity solutions in our development, as the
solution to the equation above is actually a classical solution if G is non-degenerate.
We will use the remainder of this section only for the proof of Theorem II.18.
Notation II.11. We let Cb.Lip (Rn) denote the space of bounded Lipschitz functions
on Rn.
We recall that [128] uses Cb.Lip (Rn) as the space of test functions instead of
Cl.Lip (Rn). This technicality does not matter for our proof of Theorem II.18, as we
will explain later.
Definition II.12. An n-dimensional random vector X ∈ Hn is called maximally
distributed if there exists a closed set Γ ⊂ Rn such that
Ê [ϕ (X)] = sup
x∈Γ
ϕ (x)
for all ϕ ∈ Cb.Lip (Rn).
One can understand random variables of this kind as analogues of constants in
the sublinear setting. In particular, if X is a G-normal random variable with X ∼
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N (0, [σ2, σ2]) for some σ2 < σ2, then X is not maximally distributed. Observe that
we have presented the definition from [128] rather than the original version in [194],
as we will need the following theorem from [128].
Proposition II.13. Suppose that the random variable W ∈ H has distributional
uncertainty and that the random variable W ′ ∈ H is not a constant. If W is inde-
pendent from W ′ and vice versa, then W and W ′ must be maximally distributed.
2.3 Basic Setup
Throughout our work below, we consider random vectors X, Y ∈ Hn such that
(i) X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a G-normal random vector, i.e., X ∼ N (0,Γ); and
(ii) Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where
(a) Y1 ∼ N (0, [σ2, σ2]) for some 0 < σ2 < σ2;
(b) Yi+1 and Yi are identically distributed, i.e., Yi+1 ∼ Yi; and
(c) Yi+1 is independent from (Y1, . . . , Yi).
Although a seemingly innocent construction, we will see that Y is a rich source of
counterexamples when evaluating whether or not standard classical theorems about
the normal distribution hold in the G-framework. The inequality
σ2 < σ2
is critical for us, as it implies that the coordinates of Y are not classical normal
random variables. Because our objective is to compare the properties of the classical
normal distribution with its G-counterpart, we have added the assumption
0 < σ2
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for convenience. As observed above, this condition ensures that the solution to the
G-heat equation is actually classical.
Whenever restating classical results to facilitate our comparisons, we will always
call classical random vectors “Z”.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Behavior Under Linear Combinations
Recall that in the classical setting, we have the following result:












then U and V are independent.
The corresponding statement does not hold in the G-framework.
Theorem II.14. Let a1 = 1, a2 = 1, b1 = 1, and b2 = −1. Set the remaining
constants equal to zero, i.e.,





but U is not independent from V and vice versa.
In fact, it is not yet known if any non-trivial linear combination of this kind will
produce independent random variables. An important classical characterization of
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the normal distribution, the Skitovich-Darmois theorem, is related to the indepen-
dence of such linear combinations, and whether or not a G-version of this holds is
also unknown.
Proof. Our strategy will be to show that the random vectors (U, V ) and (V, U) are
identically distributed. On the other hand, if U were independent from V or vice
versa, the resulting destruction of symmetry would make this impossible.










by Definition II.7. The same is true for U .
























Hence, exactly one of these must hold:
(i) U is independent from V but V is not independent from U .
(ii) V is independent from U but U is not independent from V .
(iii) U is not independent from V and V is not independent from U .
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Let S : R2 → R2 be defined by
S (x, y) = (x− y, x+ y) for all (x, y) ∈ R2.
Observe that ϕ ◦ S ∈ Cl.Lip (R2) for any ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (R2). Since Y2 and −Y2 are each
independent copies of Y1, for any ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (R2),
Ê [ϕ (V, U)] = Ê [ϕ (Y1 − Y2, Y1 + Y2)]
= Ê [(ϕ ◦ S) (Y1, Y2)]
= Ê
[




Ê [(ϕ ◦ S) (x̄,−Y2)]x̄=Y1
]
= Ê [(ϕ ◦ S) (Y1,−Y2)]
= Ê [ϕ (Y1 + Y2, Y1 − Y2)]
= Ê [ϕ (U, V )] .










which implies that U is not independent from V and vice versa.
2.4.2 Behavior Under General Linear Transformations
Allowing the degenerate case, we have another important property of the classical
normal distribution:
Let Z1, . . . , Zn be independent normal random variables. For any m × n
real matrix A, if
Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn)
> ,
then AZ is an m-dimensional normal random vector.
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The situation in the G-framework is far more delicate.
Theorem II.15. For any m× n real matrix A,
(i) 〈v,AY 〉 is a G-normal random variable with




for all v ∈ Rm;
(ii) if A has rank less than or equal to one, AY is an m-dimensional G-normal
random vector, or more precisely, AY ∼ N (0,Γ′), where
Γ′ =
{
uru> : r ∈
[
‖w‖2 σ2, ‖w‖2 σ2
]}
and A = uw> for u ∈ Rm, w ∈ Rn; and
(iii) if A is invertible, AY is not G-normally distributed. (In particular, Y is not
G-normally distributed.)
One would expect (i) and (ii); however, (iii) is quite surprising both because of the
bifurcation it reveals and its relation to classical theorems. While it was previously
known that the classical property above failed to be true in the G-setting ([194]),
our result provides an expansive new series of cases illustrating this failure. It serves
the same purpose with respect to the following classical statement as well:
For any n-dimensional random vector Z, if 〈v, Z〉 is a normal random
variable for all v ∈ Rn, then Z is an n-dimensional normal random vector.
Whether or not AY is a G-normal random vector if A is non-invertible but has rank
strictly greater than one remains unclear.
The most difficult part of the proof is the following lemma, which is a small
extension of Exercise 1.15 in [194]. This lemma will be critical for our proof of
Theorems II.17, II.18, and II.19 as well.
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Lemma II.16. Let α > 0. Suppose that W1 and W2 are two G-normal random
variables such that
(i) W1 ∼ N (0, [σ2, σ2]); and
(ii) W2 ∼ N (0, [ασ2, ασ2]).
If either W2 is independent from W1 or vice versa, then W = (W1,W2)
> is not a
2-dimensional G-normal random vector.
Proof. We first consider the case where W2 is independent from W1. Suppose instead
that W is a 2-dimensional G-normal random vector. Our initial step will be to com-
pute the corresponding G-heat equation, which we will use to establish an identity
relating the distributions of the random vectors W = (W1,W2)
> and (W2,W1)
>.
The conclusion will be reached by showing that this “symmetry” contradicts the
asymmetry induced by our independence assumption.
We can find a bounded, closed, convex subset Γ ⊂ S+ (2) such that
1
2































































































































= Ḡ (a11) + αḠ (a22) ,


















 : r1 ∈ [σ2, σ2] , r2 ∈ [ασ2, ασ2]
 .
Let ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (R2). Define the function u by


















= 0, (t, x, y) ∈ (0,∞)× R2
u (0, x, y) = ϕ (x, y) , (x, y) ∈ R2.
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In fact, since 0 < σ2, u is a classical solution.
Let the functions S and S̃ be given by








for all (x, y) ∈ R2 and









for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0,∞)× R2. Define a function v by
v = u ◦ S̃.









= 0, (t, x, y) ∈ (0,∞)× R2
v (0, x, y) = (ϕ ◦ S) (x, y) , (x, y) ∈ R2.
Hence,











































= Ê [ϕ (W1,W2)] .
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a contradiction. It follows that W is not a 2-dimensional G-normal random vector
in this case.
To finish the proof, assume that W1 is independent from W2. If W = (W1,W2)
>









would be a 2-dimensional G-normal random vector by Lemma II.9. This is impossible
by what we just considered, so the result holds.
The proof of the theorem is now straightforward.
Proof. Let A = (aij). To prove (i), suppose v = (v1, . . . , vm)
> ∈ Rm. For all
ϕ ∈ Cl.Lip (R),





















































which directly follows from Definition II.7. By Lemma II.9,
〈v,AY 〉 ∼
∥∥v>A∥∥Y1 ∼ N (0, [∥∥v>A∥∥2 σ2,∥∥v>A∥∥2 σ2]) .
For (ii), since A has rank less than or equal to one, we can find
u = (u1, . . . , um)







Y1 ∼ N (0, [‖w‖2 σ2, ‖w‖2 σ2]) .






another application of Lemma II.9 implies the result.
To see that (iii) holds, let B be the 2× n matrix
B =
 1 0 · · · · · · 0









Lemmas II.9 and II.16 show that AY cannot be an n-dimensional G-normal random
vector.
2.4.3 Connections Between Covariance Uncertainty and Independence
Classically, there is a tight relationship between the covariance matrix of a normal
random vector and the independence of its coordinates:
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The covariance matrix of a normal random vector is diagonal if and only
if its coordinates are (mutually) independent normal random variables.
Once again, the analogous situation is more subtle in the G-setting. For instance,






 : r1, r2 ∈ [σ2, σ2]
 ,
so X = (X1, X2)
> and X ∼ N (0,Γ). X1 is not independent from X2 and vice versa.
Proof. We will proceed by computing the distributions of the random variables X1
and X2. Then we will invoke Lemma II.16, the impetus for our choice of this specific
Γ.
Recall that for A ∈ S (2),
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By Lemma II.9, X1 and X2 are both G-normal random variables and







Lemma II.16 implies that X1 cannot be independent from X2 and vice versa.
The backward direction bears a stronger resemblance to the classical case, al-
though with a few unforeseen twists.
Theorem II.18. Suppose that there exists a permutation π ∈ Sn such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, Xπ(i+1) is independent from
(
Xπ(1), . . . , Xπ(i)
)
. Then
(i) for σ2i , σ
2
i such that Xi ∼ N (0, [σ2i , σ2i ]),
Γ =
{




















for all j 6= i and α > 0; and
(iii) for any i < j, Xπ(i) is not independent from Xπ(j) if either of the following hold:
(a) σ2π(i) < σ
2
π(i) and 0 < σ
2
π(j), or
(b) σ2π(j) < σ
2




(i) is exactly as expected, but (ii) and (iii) are highly nonintuitive: no remotely
similar conditions are present in the classical theory. Observe that while this theo-
rem places substantial restrictions on Γ if the coordinates of X satisfy appropriate
independence conditions, it does not address the existence of such an X. This issue
is still unresolved.









for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, for any A = (aij) ∈ S (n),
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By repeated application of (2.1),
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for any A = (aij) ∈ S (n). One easily verifies that
Γ =
{







To prove (ii), suppose that i 6= j and 0 < σ2i < σ2i . Let Bij be the 2 × n matrix
of 0’s and 1’s such that  Xi
Xj
 = BijX.
Lemma II.9 implies that  Xi
Xj

is a 2-dimensional G-normal random vector. By Lemma II.16, since either Xj is
independent from Xi or vice versa, (ii) holds.
(iii) is an immediate consequence of Proposition II.13. One might object that the
space of test functions in [128] is Cb.Lip (Rn) instead of Cl.Lip (Rn), but this issue is
addressed in Example 21 of that reference.
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An additional classical result bridging the form of a normal random vector’s co-
variance matrix and the independence of its coordinates is as follows:
If Z is an n-dimensional normal random vector, then there exists an in-
vertible n× n matrix A such that the coordinates of AZ are independent.
The related statement is false for a G-normal random vector. There are several
possible approaches here. For example, by Lemma II.9 and Theorem II.18, it suffices
to construct a Γ such that AΓA> contains non-diagonal matrices for all invertible







 : r1, r2 ∈ [σ2, σ2]
 .
There is no invertible 2 × 2 real matrix A such that the coordinates of AX are
independent.
Proof. Suppose that for some invertible 2 × 2 real matrix A = (aij), either W2 is
independent from W1 or vice versa, where (W1,W2)











 r1a211 + r2a212 r1a11a21 + r2a12a22











 : r1 ∈ [σ21, σ21] , r2 ∈ [σ22, σ22]

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where Wi ∼ N (0, [σ2i , σ2i ]).
This is only possible if
a11a21 = a12a22 = 0.









 for nonzero a12, a21 ∈ R.
























by Lemma II.9, which is impossible by Lemma II.16.
Similarly, A cannot have the latter form, so the result holds.
CHAPTER III
An α-Stable Limit Theorem Under Sublinear Expectation
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this manuscript is to prove a generalized central limit theorem
for α-stable random variables in the setting of sublinear expectation. Such a result
complements the limit theorems for G-normal random variables due to Peng and
others in this context and answers in the affirmative a question posed by Neufeld
and Nutz in [173] (see below).
When working with a sublinear expectation, one is simultaneously considering a
potentially uncountably infinite and non-dominated collection of probability mea-
sures. A construction of this kind is motivated by the study of pricing under volatil-
ity uncertainty. Needless to say, a variety of frequently called upon devices from the
classical setting are unavailable. The complications encompass further issues as well:
new behaviors are occasionally observed like those outlined in [47].
Analogues of significant theorems from classical probability and stochastic analysis
are nevertheless moderately abundant. For instance, versions of the law of large
numbers can be found in [190] and [191]; the martingale representation theorem
is given in [223], [224], and [195]; Girsanov’s theorem is obtained in [241], [181],
and [127]; and a Donsker-type result is shown in [94]. To conduct investigations
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along these lines, standard proofs must often be reimagined. For instance, Peng’s
proof of the central limit theorem under sublinear expectation in [190] resorts to
interior regularity estimates for fully nonlinear parabolic partial differential equations
(PDEs). His idea has since been extended to prove a number of variants of his original
result, e.g., see [191], [159], [130], and [244].
We will operate in the sublinear expectation framework unless explicitly indicated
otherwise. The objects of our special attention here, the α-stable random variables
for α ∈ (1, 2), were introduced in [173]. The authors pondered whether or not these
could be the subject of a generalized central limit theorem. Classical generalized
central limit theorems ordinarily come in one of three flavors:
(i) a statement indicating that a random variable has a nonempty domain of at-
traction if and only if it is α-stable such as Theorem 2.1.1 in [136],
(ii) a characterization theorem for the domain of attraction of an α-stable random
variable such as Theorem 2.6.1 in [136], or
(iii) a characterization theorem for the domain of normal attraction for an α-stable
random variable such as Theorem 2.6.7 in [136].
Recall that an i.i.d. sequence (Yi)
∞
i=1 of random variables is in the domain of attrac-










converges in distribution to X as n → ∞. (Yi)∞i=1 is in the domain of normal




for some b > 0.
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We confine our search to the direction suggested by (iii) because of the particular
importance classically of results of this type (cf. the central limit theorem). Our main
findings are summarized in Theorem III.11, which details sufficient conditions for
membership in the domain of normal attraction of a given α-stable random variable.
While the initial appearance of our distributional hypotheses is perhaps forbidding,
in point of fact, our assumptions are manageable. This is illustrated by the discussion
immediately following Theorem III.11, as well as Examples III.13 and III.14.
Example III.13 establishes that the α-stable random variables under consideration
are in their own domain of normal attraction. Although one need not apply Theorem
III.11 for this purpose, the writeup serves a clarifying role and any credible result
clearly must pass this litmus test.
Example III.14 is more substantive. Setting aside a few mild “uniformity” con-
ditions which arise due to the supremum, this example can be understood in an
intuitive manner (see Section 3.4). This falls out of our analysis just below Theorem
III.11, where we describe the relationship between our work and the classical result
noted in (iii) above. More specifically, Theorem III.11 detects all classical random
variables in this collection with mean zero and a cumulative distribution function
(cdf) that satisfies a small differentiability requirement. An extra regularity condi-
tion on the cdf is unavoidable, as one must translate its form into properties that
can be stated only in terms of expectation.
The strategy of our proof is to reduce demonstrating convergence in distribu-
tion to showing that a certain limit involving the solution to the backward version
of our generating PIDE is zero. Upon breaking up our domain and summing the
corresponding increments of the solution, regularity properties of this function are
employed to argue that size of the terms being added together decay rapidly enough
35
in the limit to furnish the desired conclusion. This general scheme is similar to that






+ − σ2 (∂xxu)−
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× R
u (0, x) = ψ (x) , x ∈ R
for some 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2 and appropriate function ψ. Recall that this equation is
known as the Barenblatt equation if σ2 > 0 and has been studied in [37] and [28], for
instance. Ours is given by (3.1), a difference that leads to a few difficulties as reflected
by the increased complexity of our hypotheses. To overcome these difficulties, we
use the technology from [157], [156], and [64].
The work in this paper offers a step toward understanding α-stability under sublin-
ear expectation. The simple interpretation admitted by Example III.14 is promising,
as developing intuition in this environment is usually a tough undertaking for the
reasons mentioned previously.
A brief overview of necessary background material can be found in Section 3.2.
We prove our main result and discuss its connection to the classical case in Section
3.3. Examples highlighting the applications of our main result are contained in
Section 3.4. We give some prerequisite material for the proof of the essential interior
regularity estimate for our PIDE in Section 3.5. The proof of this estimate is in
Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
We now offer a concise account of those aspects of sublinear expectations, α-stable
random variables, and PIDEs which are required for the sequel.1 References for more
comprehensive treatments of these topics are also included for the convenience of the
1Further information on PIDE interior regularity theory is contained in Section 3.5.
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interested reader.
Definition III.1. Let H be a collection of real-valued functions on a set Ω. A
sublinear expectation is an operator E : H −→ R which is
(i) monotonic: E [X] ≤ E [Y ] if X ≤ Y ,
(ii) constant-preserving: E [c] = c for any c ∈ R,
(iii) sub-additive: E [X + Y ] ≤ E [X] + E [Y ], and
(iv) positive homogeneous: E [λX] = λE [X] for λ ≥ 0.
The triple (Ω,H, E) is called a sublinear expectation space.
One views H as a space of random variables on Ω. Typically, it is assumed that
H
(i) is a linear space,
(ii) contains all constant functions, and
(iii) contains ψ (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) for every X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈ H and ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (Rn),
where Cb.Lip (Rn) is the set of bounded Lipschitz functions on Rn;
however, we will expend little attention on either Ω or H. Delicacy needs to be
exercised while computing sublinear expectations. A rare instance when a classical
technique can be justly employed is the following.
Lemma III.2. Consider two random variables X, Y ∈ H such that E [Y ] = −E [−Y ].
Then
E [X + αY ] = E [X] + αE [Y ]
for all α ∈ R.
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This result is notably useful in the case where E [Y ] = E [−Y ] = 0.
Definition III.3. A random variable Y ∈ H is said to be independent from a random
variable X ∈ H if for all ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R2), we have
E [ψ (X, Y )] = E [E [ψ (x, Y )]x=X ] .
Observe the deliberate wording. This choice is crucial, as independence can be
asymmetric in our context. Note that this definition reduces to the traditional one
if E is a classical expectation. The same is true for the next three concepts.
Definition III.4. Let X, Y , and (Yn)
∞




(i) X and Y are identically distributed, denoted X ∼ Y , if
E [ψ (X)] = E [ψ (Y )]
for all ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R).
(ii) If X and Y are identically distributed and Y is independent from X, then Y is
an independent copy of X.
(iii) (Yn)
∞
n=1 converges in distribution to Y , which we denote by Yn
d−→ Y , if
lim
n→∞
E [ψ (Yn)] = E [ψ (Y )]
for all ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R).
Random variables need not be defined on the same space to have appropriate
notions of (i) or (iii). In this case, the above definitions require the obvious notational
modifications. Further details concerning general sublinear expectation spaces can
be found in [188] or [194].
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Definition III.5. Let α ∈ (0, 2]. A random variable X is said to be (strictly)




are identically distributed, where Y is an independent copy of X.
Three examples of α-stable random variables exist in the current literature. For
α = 1, there are the maximal random variables discussed in references such as [191],
[194], and [128]. When α = 2, we have the G-normal random variables of Peng.
Resources on this topic are plentiful and include [188], [193], [194], [163], and [47]. If
α ∈ (1, 2), we can consider X1 for a nonlinear α-stable Lévy process (Xt)t≥0 in the
framework of [173]. Our focus shall be restricted to the last situation.
The construction of nonlinear Lévy processes in [173] extends that studied in
[129], [208], [186], and [185] and is much more general than our present objectives
demand. We limit our presentation to a few key ideas. Let
(i) α ∈ (1, 2);
(ii) K± be a bounded measurable subset of R+;















One can then produce a process (Xt)t≥0 which is a nonlinear Lévy process whose
local characteristics are described by the set of Lévy triplets Θ. This means the
following.
(i) (Xt)t≥0 is a real-valued càdlàg process.
(ii) X0 = 0.
(iii) (Xt)t≥0 has stationary increments, i.e., Xt − Xs and Xt−s are identically dis-
tributed for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
(iv) (Xt)t≥0 has independent increments, i.e., Xt −Xs is independent from
(Xs1 , . . . , Xsn) for all 0 ≤ s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sn ≤ s ≤ t.
(v) If ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R) and u is defined by
u (t, x) = E [ψ (x+Xt)]
for all (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× R, then u is the unique2 viscosity solution3 of




δzu (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}
= 0, (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× R
u (0, x) = ψ (x) , x ∈ R. (3.1)
2The uniqueness of a viscosity solution of (3.1) can be viewed as a special case of Theorem 2.5 in [173].
3We take the following definition from Section 2.2 of [173]. Let C2,3b ((0,∞)× R) denote the set of functions on
(0,∞)× R having bounded continuous partial derivatives up to the second and third order in t and x, respectively.
A bounded upper semicontinuous function u on [0,∞)× R is a viscosity subsolution of (3.1) if
u (0, ·) ≤ ψ (·)
and for any (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× R,




δzϕ (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}
≤ 0
whenever ϕ ∈ C2,3b ((0,∞)× R) is such that
ϕ ≥ u
on (0,∞)× R and
ϕ (t, x) = u (t, x) .
To define a viscosity supersolution of (3.1), one reverses the inequalities and semicontinuity. A bounded continuous
function is a viscosity solution of (3.1) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution. Viscosity solutions of
the other PIDEs appearing in this paper, e.g., see Lemma III.18, are defined similarly.
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Here we use the notation
δzu (t, x) := u (t, x+ z)− u (t, x)− ∂xu (t, x) z
since the right hand side of this equation as well as similar expressions will frequently
occur throughout the paper.
A critical feature of this setup is that if Θ is a singleton, (Xt)t≥0 is a classical
Lévy process with triplet Θ. That X1 actually is an α-stable random variable is not
immediately obvious. We give a brief argument in Example III.13, but the core of
this observation is a result from [173] (see Example 2.7).
Lemma III.6. For all β > 0 and t ≥ 0, Xβt and β1/αXt are identically distributed.
The dynamic programming principle in Lemma III.7 (see Lemma 5.1 in [173]) and
the absolute value bound in Lemma III.8 (see Lemma 5.2 in [173]) also play a central
role when using our main result to check that X1 is in its own domain of normal
attraction.
Lemma III.7. For all 0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞ and x ∈ R,
u (t, x) = E [u (t− s, x+Xs)] .
Lemma III.8. We have that
E [|X1|] <∞.
The remaining essential ingredients for our purposes describe the regularity of u.
The first result describes properties of u which are valid on the whole domain. It is
a special case of Lemma 5.3 in [173].
Lemma III.9. The function u is uniformly bounded by ‖ψ‖L∞(R) and jointly con-
tinuous. More precisely, u (t, ·) is Lipschitz continuous with constant Lip(ψ), the
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Lipschitz constant of ψ, and u (·, x) is locally 1/2-Hölder continuous with a constant





|z| ∧ |z|2 Fk± (dz)
}
<∞.
We will require even stronger regularity estimates for u. To obtain these, we must
restrict our attention to the interior of the domain.
Proposition III.10. Suppose that for some λ, Λ > 0, we know λ < k± < Λ for all
k± ∈ K±. For any h > 0,
(i) ∂tu and ∂xu exist and are bounded on [h, h+ 1]× R;
(ii) there are constants C, γ > 0 such that
|∂tu (t0, x)− ∂tu (t1, x)| ≤ C |t0 − t1|γ/α
|∂tu (t, x0)− ∂tu (t, x1)| ≤ C |x0 − x1|γ
for all (t0, x), (t1, x), (t, x0), (t, x1) ∈ [h, h+ 1]× R;
(iii) u is a classical solution of (3.1) on [h, h+ 1]× R; and
(iv) if K± contains exactly one pair {k±}, then ∂2xxu exists and is bounded on
[h, h+ 1]× R.
The proof of Proposition III.10 can be found in Section 3.6.
3.3 Main Result
To facilitate our discussion in the sequel, we now fix some notation. Compared
with Section 3.2, we make only one alteration to our nonlinear α-stable Lévy process
(Xt)t≥0: additionally assume that K± is a subset of (λ,Λ) for some λ, Λ > 0. We
will make use of this in conjunction with Proposition III.10.
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We also consider a sequence (Yi)
∞
i=1 of random variables on some sublinear ex-
pectation space. The only aspect of this space that we will invoke directly is the
sublinear expectation itself, say E ′. Distinguishing between E and E ′ will be conve-
nient for Example III.14. We further specify that (Yi)
∞
i=1 is i.i.d. in the sense that






will be the sequence attracted to X1.
Theorem III.11. Suppose that
(i) E ′ [Y1] = E ′ [−Y1] = 0;
(ii) E ′ [|Y1|] <∞; and
(iii) for any 0 < h < 1 and ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R),
n









δzv (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}∣∣∣∣∣→ 0 (3.2)
uniformly on [0, 1]× R as n→∞, where v is the unique viscosity solution of




δzv (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}
= 0, (t, x) ∈ (−h, 1 + h)× R





Admittedly, a cursory glance over our hypotheses leaves one with the impression
that they are intractable. The opposite is true. Before presenting the proof of
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Theorem III.11, let us demonstrate that when our attention is confined to the classical
case, we are imposing only a mild and natural supplementary restriction on the
attracted random variable. In addition to being a significant remark in itself, this
work also underlies Example III.14.





, the characteristic function of X1, denoted ϕX1 , is given by














for all t ∈ R. In the case where Y1 is a classical random variable with mean zero,
Theorem 2.6.7 from [136] implies that
BnSn
d−→ X1
as n→∞ if and only if the cdf of Y1, denoted FY1 , has the form
FY1 (z) =
 [b
α (k−/α) + β1 (z)]
1
|z|α z < 0
1− [bα (k+/α) + β2 (z)] 1zα z > 0
for some functions β1 and β2 satisfying
lim
z→−∞
β1 (z) = lim
z→∞
β2 (z) = 0.
As there is no appropriate counterpart of the cdf in the sublinear setting, we must
recast this condition using expectation. To do so requires FY1 to possess further
regularity properties. For convenience, say that after an extension, the βi’s are
continuously differentiable on their respective closed half-lines. This is the lone extra














bαk+ + αβ2 (z)
zα













and similarly for the integral along the negative half-line. One could have cited
Theorem 2.6.4 of [136] instead, but (3.4) will be helpful in Example III.14. We also
get
n
∣∣∣∣E [δBnY1v (t, x)]− ( 1n
)∫
R























for all (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× R and n ≥ 1 by changing variables.
A careful application of elementary estimates shows that this last expression tends
to zero uniformly on [0, 1] × R as n → ∞. To see this, note that we can choose an
upper bound, say M1, for |∂xxv|, |∂xv|, and |v| on [0, 1] × R by Lemma III.9 and

















[∂xv (t, x+ z)− ∂xv (t, x)] dz
∣∣∣∣
≤ 3M1



































































































































as n→∞ by integration by parts, the dominated convergence theorem, and the mean
value theorem. The integrals along the negative half-line are handled similarly.
Having established the connection between Theorem III.11 and the classical case,
we finally present its proof.
Proof of Theorem III.11. We need to show that
lim
n→∞
E ′ [ψ (BnSn)] = E [ψ (X1)] (3.10)
for all ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R). Our initial step will be to reduce proving (3.10) to proving
(3.13). The advantage of doing so is that we can then incorporate the regularity
properties described in Lemma III.9 and Proposition III.10. These properties alone
do much of the heavy lifting in the estimates at the heart of the argument, and our
distributional assumptions do the rest.
Let ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R), and define u by
u (t, x) = E [ψ (x+Xt)] (3.11)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0,∞) × R. We know from Section 3.2 that u is the unique viscosity
solution of (3.1).
It will be more convenient for our purposes to work with the backward equation.
Since we will soon rely on the interior regularity results of Proposition III.10, we also
let 0 < h < 1 and define v by
v (t, x) = u (1 + h− t, x) (3.12)
for (t, x) ∈ (−h, 1 + h]× R. Then v will be the unique viscosity solution of (3.3).
Observe that v inherits key regularity properties from u. At the moment, it is
enough to note that for any (t, x) ∈ (−h, 1 + h]×R, v (·, x) is 1/2-Hölder continuous
with some constant K1 and v (t, ·) is Lipschitz continuous with constant Lip(ψ) by
47
Lemma III.9. Because the t-domain has length 1+2h and 0 < h < 1, the 1/2-Hölder
continuity is uniform, and we can assume that K1 does not depend on h. It follows
by (3.11) and (3.12) that
lim sup
n→∞
|E ′ [ψ (BnSn)]− E [ψ (X1)]|
≤ lim sup
n→∞
(|E ′ [ψ (BnSn)]− E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]|+ |E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]− v (0, 0)|
+ |v (0, 0)− E [ψ (X1)]|)
= lim sup
n→∞
(|E ′ [v (1 + h,BnSn)]− E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]|+ |E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]− v (0, 0)|



















|E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]− v (0, 0)| .
As h is arbitrary, it is sufficient to show that
lim
n→∞
E ′ [v (1, BnSn)] = v (0, 0) . (3.13)
The required estimates are intricate, so we will give them in Lemma III.12 below.
Lemma III.12. In the setup of Theorem III.11,
lim
n→∞
E ′ [v (1, BnSn)] = v (0, 0) .
Proof of Lemma III.12. For all n ≥ 3,
v (1, BnSn)− v (0, 0)




























− v (0, 0) . (3.14)
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Our analysis now becomes delicate. We would like to show that when we apply E ′
to (3.14) and let n→∞, the result goes to zero. Since the number of terms in this
decomposition is growing with n, we must prove that our v-increments are decaying
quite rapidly. The properties of v arising from Lemma III.9 are only enough to
manage the first and last terms. By the 1/2-Hölder continuity of v (·, x),
E ′
[∣∣∣∣v (1, BnSn)− v(n− 1n ,BnSn












If we also use the Lipschitz continuity of v (t, ·) and the fact that Y2 is independent









− v (0, BnS2)













+ 2Lip (ψ)BnE ′ [|Y1|] . (3.16)
We remark that although we only referred to Cb.Lip (R) in our definition of indepen-
dence, our manipulations are still valid by Exercise 3.20 in [194].
Proposition III.10 allows us to control the remaining terms. Again, this motivates
our requirement that K± ⊂ (λ,Λ) for some 0 < λ < Λ. We can find a constant
K2 > 0 such that ∂tv exists on [0, 1]× R and
|∂tv (t0, x)− ∂tv (t1, x)| ≤ K2 |t0 − t1|γ/α
|∂tv (t, x0)− ∂tv (t, x1)| ≤ K2 |x0 − x1|γ (3.17)
for all (t0, x), (t1, x), (t, x0), and (t, x1) ∈ [0, 1]×R. We then break down the rest of
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Hence, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,











since Yi+1 and Y1 are identically distributed. Note that hypothesis (ii) gives that
E ′ [|Y1|γ] <∞.
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While we need (3.17) to bound the Dni ’s, we finally use (3.2) too. Let ε > 0. By
(3.2), we can find N such that n ≥ N implies
n









δzv (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}∣∣∣∣∣ < ε






































































































































































































for 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, x ∈ R, and n ≥ N .
Since Yi+1 is independent from (Y1, . . . , Yi), repeated application of (3.19) shows





































We only need to combine our bounds above and invoke hypothesis (ii) to finish
the proof. By (3.15), (3.16), (3.18), (3.20), and (3.21),
E ′ [v (1, BnSn)]− v (0, 0)
= E ′
[


















− v (0, 0)
]
≤ E ′
[∣∣∣∣v (1, BnSn)− v(n− 1n ,BnSn
)∣∣∣∣]+ n−1∑
i=2








































+ 2Lip (ψ)BnE ′ [|Y1|]
)
and






























+ 2Lip (ψ)BnE ′ [|Y1|]
)
for n ≥ N . Since ε > 0 is arbitrary and lim
n→∞
Bn = 0, we have
lim
n→∞
E ′ [v (1, BnSn)] = v (0, 0) .
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3.4 Examples
Example III.13. X1 is in its own domain of normal attraction. While this follows
directly from the α-stability of X1, we will demonstrate this using Theorem III.11 as
well in order to unpack our main result.
Let ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R) and u be defined by
u (t, x) = E [ψ (x+Xt)]



















= E [u (bα, aX1)]









for any a, b ≥ 0 by Lemmas III.6 and III.7, i.e., X1 is α-stable. Exercise 3.20 in












= E [X1 + E [X1]]
= 2E [X1] ,
so
E [X1] = 0.
It follows similarly that





To check the final hypothesis, let 0 < h < 1 and v be the unique viscosity solution
of (3.3). Then for all (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× R,
n









δzv (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}∣∣∣∣∣
= n





















− v (t, x)
1/n













Example III.14. Up to some “uniformity” assumptions, this example has a straight-
forward interpretation.
Let the uncertainty subset of distributions (see [194]) of Y1 be given by
{Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}. If for all θ ∈ Θ, a classical random variable with distribution
Pθ is in the domain of normal attraction of a classical α-stable random
variable with triplet θ, then Y1 is in the domain of normal attraction of X1.
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Let b, M > 0 and f be a nonnegative function on N tending to zero as n → ∞.
For each k± ∈ K±, let Wk± be a classical random variable such that
(i) Wk± has mean zero;




bα (k−/α) + β1,k± (z)
]
1
|z|α z < 0
1−
[










β1,k± (z) = lim
z→∞
β2,k± (z) = 0;











∣∣∣∣ , ∫ 0
−1













∣∣∣∣ , ∫ 1
0
∣∣∣−β′2,k± (z) z + αβ2,k± (z)∣∣∣
zα−1
dz; and
(iv) the following quantities are less than f (n) for all n:




















Note that by (ii) alone, the terms in (iii) are finite and the terms in (iv) approach
zero as n→∞. In other words, the content of (iii) and (iv) is that uniform bounds
and minimum rates of convergence exist.
Define an operator E ′ on a space H of suitable functions by




ϕ (z) dFWk± (z)
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for all ϕ ∈ H. The exact composition of H is irrelevant for our purposes here.
Clearly, (R,H, E ′) is a sublinear expectation space.
Let Y1 be the random variable on this space defined by
Y1 (x) = x
for all x ∈ R. We will use Theorem III.11 to show that
BnSn
d−→ X1
as n→∞. Most of the difficulties have already been addressed during our discussion
of the classical case in Section 3.3.
Since each Wk± has mean zero,




z dFWk± (z) = 0
and




−z dFWk± (z) = 0.
After recalling that K± ⊂ (λ,Λ), (iii) gives
E ′ [|Y1|] <∞
using (3.4) and (3.22). Observe that we are solving (3.22) for the obvious expressions
to obtain uniform bounds on the terms
∣∣β2,k± (1)∣∣ , ∣∣β1,k± (−1)∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0











To check the remaining hypothesis, let 0 < h < 1, ψ ∈ Cb.Lip (R), and v be the
unique viscosity solution of (3.3). The techniques of (3.5) demonstrate that
n





































for (t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × R and n ≥ 1. Combining (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) with (iii)
and (iv) proves that this last expression approaches zero in the required way.
3.5 Appendix: Interior Regularity Theory Background
Interior regularity theory for fully nonlinear integro-differential equations is rich
and well-developed. Before describing the results that we need for our proof, we
provide a short discussion of the literature. Readers new to this field are encouraged
to first consult [12] for an introduction.
Some results and methods from the interior regularity theory for PDEs can be
imported to the nonlocal case after minor modifications. For other aspects of the
theory, this is false. As described in Section 2 of [217], a Hölder estimate and the
Harnack inequality appear together in the local setting; however, there are nonlocal
equations for which a Hölder estimate holds in the absence of the Harnack inequality.
A partial list of other ways that nonlocal results can significantly differ from their
local counterparts can be found in [12].
Early work on the regularity of integro-differential equations focused on equations
in divergence form. A survey of these results is contained in [146]. For equations in
nondivergence form, [39] contains the first Harnack inequality and Hölder estimate.
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The equations studied in [39] are of the form∫
Rd
[w (x+ z)− w (x)− z∇w (x) 1B1 (z)] k (x, z) dz = 0,
where k is a kernel such that




≤ k (x, z) ≤ Λ1
|z|d+α1
(3.24)
for some constants λ1, Λ1 > 0 and α1 ∈ (0, 2). For a review of the extensions of this
initial work, see [146].
The Hölder estimate in [39] blows up as α1 → 2. Many other early estimates
share this feature. The first paper to prove a Hölder estimate and Harnack inequality







[w (x+ z)− w (x)− z∇w (x) 1B1 (z)] krs (z) dz
}
= 0 (3.25)
for kernels krs depending only on z and satisfying (3.23), (3.24), and an additional
smoothness condition. More precisely, for some fixed positive constants ρ and C,∫
Rd\Bρ







The paper culminates in a C1,γ estimate for the solution of (3.25).
These findings have been extended in a number of ways. For instance, references
such as [221], [218], [155], [157], and [156] study equations with nonsymmetric kernels,
i.e., kernels that do not satisfy (3.23). Other examples of recent work include [66],
[219], and [153].
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We now collect the definitions and results from [157] and [156] that we need for
our proof. These references describe properties of the solutions to a broad class of
nonlocal fully nonlinear parabolic equations of the form
∂tw (t, x)− Iw (t, x) = f (t) .
Due to the general nature of these equations, [157] and [156] are quite technical.
Since (3.1) is an easy case of the equations studied in these papers, we will simplify
this material and present only the version that we need for our argument.
Notation III.15. Let
Cτ,r (t, x) := (t− τ, t]× (x− r, x+ r) .
We write Cτ,r for the cylinder Cτ,r (0, 0). For suitable functions w, let









[w]C0,1((t0,t1] 7→L1(ν)) := sup
(t−τ,t]⊆(t0,t1]









for all k± ∈ K±.
In the literature, one also works frequently with cylinders of the form
(t− τα, t]× (x− r, x+ r)




[ · ]C0,1((t0,t1] 7→L1(ν))
due to their role in upcoming Hölder estimates, namely, Lemmas III.18 and III.19.
The symbols δ̃z and bk± facilitate the identification of (3.1) with the equations studied
[157] and [156]. Observe that for all k± ∈ K± and suitable functions w,∫
R
δzw (t, x)Fk± (dz) = bk± ∂xw (t, x) +
∫
R
δ̃zw (t, x)Fk± (dz) . (3.26)














Let L0 be the family of operators






















and an operator in L1 is in L2 if
∣∣∂2zzk (z)∣∣ ≤ Λ|z|2 .
The stronger regularity requirements on the kernels (in L2, say, compared to those
in L0) give rise to stronger regularity results. All of the operators
w (t, x) 7→ bk± ∂xw (t, x) +
∫
R
δ̃zw (t, x)Fk± (dz)
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are in each of these families. As we will soon see in (3.27), we will be especially
interested in the operator I defined by
Iw (t, x) = inf
k±∈K±
{
bk± ∂xw (t, x) +
∫
R
δ̃zw (t, x)Fk± (dz)
}
.
I is a specific case of an extremal operator.
Definition III.17. For a collection of operators L ⊆ L0, define the extremal opera-





L and M−L = inf
L∈L
L.
I has a number of other key properties including the following.4
(i) I0 = 0.
(ii) I is uniformly elliptic with respect to Lj, i.e.,
M−Lj (w1 − w2) ≤ Iw1 − Iw2 ≤M
+
Lj (w1 − w2) .
(iii) I is translation invariant, i.e.,
I (w (t0 + ·, x0 + ·)) (t, x) = (Iw) (t0 + t, x0 + x) .
(i) is trivial. See Section 2 of [156] for (ii). Since I has constant coefficients, we get
(iii). We highlight these classes of operators and properties of I for the convenience
of the reader comparing the next three results to their original versions (see Theorem
2.3 in [156] for Lemma III.18; Theorems 1.1, 2.4, and 2.5 in [156] for Lemma III.19;
and Theorem 3.3 in [157] for Lemma III.20).5
4Though we will not emphasize this point, we remark in passing that Iw (t, x) is well-defined for any w (t, ·) ∈
C1,1 (x) ∩ L1 (ν) (see Section 2 of [156]).
5A number of related results exist in the literature. We mention only a small sample. Theorem 12.1 in [65],
Theorem 1.1 in [217], and Theorem 7.1 in [218] are Cγ estimates along the lines of Lemma III.18. Theorem 8.1 in
[218], Theorem 13.1 in [65], Theorem 1.1 in [66], and Theorem 1.1 in [219] contain C1,γ or Cα+γ estimates similar
to those in Lemma III.19. Like Lemma III.20, Theorem 5.9 in [65] and Lemma 3.2 in [220] investigate the difference
of viscosity solutions.
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Lemma III.18. Let w satisfy
∂tw −M+L0w ≤ 0
∂tw −M−L0w ≥ 0
in the viscosity sense on C1,1. There is some γ ∈ (0, 1) and C > 0 depending only
on λ, Λ, and β such that for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2,
|w (t0, x0)− w (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ C ‖w‖L1((−1,0] 7→L1(ν)) .
Lemma III.19. Let w satisfy
∂tw − Iw = 0
in the viscosity sense on C1,1 . There is some γ ∈ (0, 1) and C > 0 depending only
on λ, Λ, and β such that for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2,
|∂xw (t0, x0)|+
|∂xw (t0, x0)− ∂xw (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ C ‖w‖L1((−1,0]7→L1(ν))
and
|∂tw (t0, x0)|+
|∂tw (t0, x0)− ∂tw (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|











Lemma III.20. Let w1, w2 satisfy
∂twi − Iwi = 0
in the viscosity sense on some domain Ω. Then
∂t (w1 − w2)−M+L0 (w1 − w2) ≤ 0
∂t (w1 − w2)−M−L0 (w1 − w2) ≥ 0
also holds in the viscosity sense on Ω.
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We will need one more result (for the original version, see Lemma 5.6 and the proof
of Corollary 5.7 in [64]). It is the key to a standard technique from the literature
allowing one to repeatedly apply an estimate such as Lemma III.18 in order to obtain
a higher regularity estimate.
Lemma III.21. Let 0 < β1 ≤ 1, 0 < β2 < 1, L > 0, and w ∈ L∞ ([−1, 1]) satisfy
‖w‖L∞([−1,1]) ≤ L.
For 0 < |h0| ≤ 1, define wβ1,h0 by
wβ1,h0 (x) =
w (x+ h0)− w (x)
|h0|β1
for all x ∈ Ih0, where Ih0 = [−1, 1− h0] if h0 > 0 and Ih0 = [−1− h0, 1] if h0 < 0.
Suppose that
wβ1,h0 ∈ Cβ2 (Ih0)
and
‖wβ1,h0‖Cβ2(Ih0) ≤ L
for any 0 < |h0| ≤ 1.
(i) If β1 + β2 < 1, then
w ∈ Cβ1+β2 ([−1, 1])
and
‖w‖Cβ1+β2 ([−1,1]) ≤ CL.
(ii) If β1 + β2 > 1 and β1 6= 1, then




(iii) If β1 = 1, then w ∈ C1,β2 ([−1, 1]) and
‖w‖C1,β2 ([−1,1]) ≤ CL.
In any of these cases, C depends only on β1 + β2.
We will often apply these results on different domains than we have listed above
without comment. For instance, we might use Lemma III.19 on C1,1 (t, x) or Lemma
III.21 on an arbitrary closed interval. These “new” results are obtained merely by
translating or rescaling, both standard routines in the literature. As an example of
such an operation, notice that if w satisfies
∂tw − Iw = 0
in the viscosity sense on (t1, t2]× Ω, then w̃ defined by
w̃ (t, x) = w (rαt+ t0, rx+ x0)
satisfies
∂tw̃ − Iw̃ = 0









(see Section 2.1.1 of [157]). Further information can be found in [157], [156], and
[64].
3.6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition III.10
In the hope of keeping the number of constants in our argument at a reasonable
level, we will not issue a new subscript each time we introduce a new constant B
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below. Also, we will write ū instead of −u. From (3.1) and (3.26), ū is a viscosity
solution of
∂tū (t, x)− Iū (t, x) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× R
ū (0, x) = −ψ (x) , x ∈ R. (3.27)
It suffices to show that parts (i)-(iv) of Proposition III.10 hold for ū and (3.27).
The quantities
[ū]C0,1((t0,t1]7→L1(ν))
play a crucial role in Lemma III.19, so our first goal will be to control them for t0
greater than some positive number. We will do this by showing that ū is uniformly
Lipschitz as a function of time for times above some lower bound. Achieving a
Lipschitz estimate can be done using a standard strategy. Specifically, we will begin
by obtaining an initial Cγ/α estimate from Lemma III.18. Lemma III.20 will allow
us to apply Lemma III.18 to get a Cγ/α estimate for the incremental quotients of ū.
Then Lemma III.21 will give that ū is C2γ/α in time. We will repeat these steps to
show that ū is C3γ/α in time, C4γ/α in time, and so on until we conclude that ū is
Lipschitz in time.
Since







in the viscosity sense on (0,∞)× R. For any t̄ > 1,




















by Lemma III.9. Lemma III.18 implies that for some B, γ > 0,
|ū (t0, x0)− ū (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ B. (3.28)
for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2 (t̄, x̄) with t̄ > 1.
For 0 < |h0| < 1/2, define ūγ/α,h0 by
ūγ/α,h0 (t, x) =
ū (t+ h0, x)− ū (t, x)
|h0|γ/α
for all (t, x) ∈ [1/2,∞)× R. Then
∥∥ūγ/α,h0∥∥L∞((1,∞)×R) ≤ B
by (3.28). Hence,







for any t̄ > 2.
Notice that
∂tū (·+ h0, ·)− Iū (·+ h0, ·) = 0
in the viscosity sense on (1/2,∞)×R because (3.27) has constant coefficients. Lemma
III.20 implies that
∂tūγ/α,h0 −M+L0ūγ/α,h0 ≤ 0
∂tūγ/α,h0 −M−L0ūγ/α,h0 ≥ 0
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in the viscosity sense on (1/2,∞)× R. For some B,∣∣ūγ/α,h0 (t0, x0)− ūγ/α,h0 (t1, x1)∣∣(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ B
for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2 (t̄, x̄) with t̄ > 2 by Lemma III.18.
Lemma III.21 shows that for a small r1 (less than 1/4), we can find B such that
ū (·, x̄) ∈ C2γ/α ([t̄− r1, t̄+ r1])
and
‖ū (·, x̄)‖C2γ/α([t̄−r1,t̄+r1]) ≤ B (3.29)
for t̄ > 2.
Due to Lemma III.21, assume without loss of generality that α/γ is not an integer.
Starting from the incremental quotient
ū (t+ h0, x)− ū (t, x)
|h0|2γ/α
,
we can use these steps to produce a C3γ/α estimate for ū in time. By continuing to
repeat this procedure, we will obtain a C4γ/α estimate, a C5γ/α estimate, and so on
until we obtain a Lipschitz estimate for ū in time. More precisely, we will find B and
a small rn such that
ū (·, x̄) ∈ C0,1 ([t̄− rn, t̄+ rn])
and
‖ū (·, x̄)‖C0,1([t̄−rn,t̄+rn]) ≤ B
for t̄ > dα/γe.
For t0, t1 > dα/γe,
|ū (t0, x0)− ū (t1, x0)| ≤ |ū (s0, x0)− ū (s1, x0)|+ · · ·+ |ū (sN−1, x0)− ū (sN , x0)|
≤ B |s0 − s1|+ · · ·+B |sN−1 − sN |
= B |t0 − t1|
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where t0 = s0, t1 = sN , and si < si+1 ≤ si + 2rn. This indicates that
ū (·, x̄) ∈ C0,1 ((dα/γe,∞))
and
‖ū (·, x̄)‖C0,1((dα/γe,∞)) ≤ B.


















Lemma III.19 gives that for t̄ > dα/γe,
|∂xū (t0, x0)|+
|∂xū (t0, x0)− ∂xū (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ B (3.30)
and
|∂tū (t0, x0)|+
|∂tū (t0, x0)− ∂tū (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ B (3.31)
for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2 (t̄, x̄). It also shows that
‖ū‖Cα+γ(C1/2,1/2(t̄,x̄)) ≤ B. (3.32)
After suitably rescaling, we see that these inequalities actually hold for t̄ > (1 +
h)/2. Part (i) of Proposition III.10 then follows from (3.30) and (3.31), while part
(iii) follows from (3.32). From (3.31) and a simple covering argument, we know that
as long as the distance between x0 and x1 is under some arbitrary bound, we can
find B such that
|∂tū (t, x0)− ∂tū (t, x1)| ≤ B |x0 − x1|γ
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for t ∈ [h, h+ 1]. Since ∂tū is bounded on [h, h+ 1] × R, we can drop the distance
constraint and get the second inequality in part (ii). A similar covering argument
finishes the proof of the first inequality and yields part (ii) of Proposition III.10.
It remains to prove part (iv). In this case, the equation for ū is
∂tū (t, x)− bk± ∂xū (t, x)−
∫
R
δ̃zū (t, x)Fk± (dz) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0,∞)× R
ū (0, x) = −ψ (x) , x ∈ R. (3.33)
Since ū is a classical solution of this equation on [h,∞)×R, ū (·, x̄+ ·) also classically
satisfies
∂tū (·, x̄+ ·)− bk± ∂xū (·, x̄+ ·)−
∫
R
δ̃zū (·, x̄+ ·)Fk± (dz) = 0
on [h,∞)× R. Then
ûh0 (t, x) :=
ū (t, x+ h0)− ū (t, x)
|h0|
is a classical solution of (3.33) on [h,∞)× R as well.
Lemma III.9 implies that








for t̄ > 1. By Lemma III.19, it follows that for some B,
|∂xûh0 (t0, x0)|+
|∂xûh0 (t0, x0)− ∂xûh0 (t1, x1)|(
|t0 − t1|1/α + |x0 − x1|
)γ ≤ B
for every (t0, x0), (t1, x1) ∈ C1/2,1/2 (t̄, x̄) with t̄ > 1. Rewriting this in terms of ū, we
see that we have found a γ-Hölder estimate for
∂xū (t0, x+ h0)− ∂xū (t0, x)
|h0|
.
By Lemma III.21, ∂2xxū exists and is bounded on (1/2,∞)×R. By rescaling, we get
that this actually holds on [h, h+ 1]× R.
CHAPTER IV
Index Tracking Near Rebalance Dates
4.1 Introduction
An index fund is distinguished by its objective. In the words of [230], “the goal of
an index fund is to track the performance of a specific market benchmark as closely
as possible”. One might think that the difference between the fund’s return and the
benchmark’s return, also known as the tracking difference, should be the key metric
here. The most important metric in practice is actually the tracking error, i.e., the
standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s return and the benchmark’s
return.
Despite its significance, this measurement possesses a few curious features. A
purely theoretical remark is that a fund which maintains a constant difference be-
tween its return and the benchmark’s return has a tracking error of zero, regardless
of the value of the difference. Of more practical significance is the observation that
tracking error penalizes outperformance. In fact, “index funds do not attempt to
outperform their benchmark” according to [105].
Regardless, index funds are enormously popular: [236] estimates that nearly 20%
of what is invested in stock funds lies in an index fund. Endorsements come from
luminaries including Warren Buffett. In [63], he writes that “most investors, both
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institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is
through an index fund that charges minimal fees”. Empirical studies support this
strategy too, for example, [104] finds that index funds beat comparable actively
managed porfolios over 80% of the time. Their tax efficiency, broadly diversified
portfolios, low fees, and clear investment objectives are some of their most frequently
cited advantages.
Managers of index funds still face significant difficulties, one of the biggest of which
is that indexes occasionally rebalance or reconstitute. During a reconstitution, the
securities in an index can be reweighted, current securities can be removed (index
deletions), or new securities can be added (index additions). Rebalancing procedures
among indexes vary widely, both in the specifics of the procedures and even their
transparency to the public.
The Russell Indexes use the especially well-understood construction methods de-
tailed in [14]. For instance, the Russell 3000 Index includes the top 3,000 U.S. stocks
based on market capitalization. To complete this year’s reconstitution, Russell In-
vestments will begin an initial ranking of all U.S. stocks after the close on May 29,
2015. A preliminary list of index deletions and additions will be released to the
public on June 12, 2015. Updated lists will be released on the next two Fridays, and
the reconstitution will take effect after the close on June 26, 2015.
The strategies employed by many index fund managers are also quite well-understood.
In [148], Kim and Oikonomou write that
“with a primary objective of replicating the performance of any given
benchmark, managers have a much higher incentive to minimize track-
ing error than to take greater risks to improve returns. [...] Passive index
funds with the tightest tracking error allowances typically choose to wait
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until the last moment on the effective day of change before trading, leading
to inflated prices on the purchases of those stocks being added to the index
(and substantially lower prices on those to be removed)”.
The combination of widely known index rebalancing methods and index tracking
strategies presents ripe opportunities for predatory traders. Some funds such as
the Aviva Investors Index Opportunities Fund are very open about their intentions
in this regard and are openly designed to profit from the behavior of index funds
near rebalance dates. It is determined in [83] that investors in funds tracking the
S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 lose between one and two billion dollars per year to
predatory trading of this kind. Perhaps even more startling is the finding in [67] that
a buy-and-hold portfolio outperforms the annually rebalanced index by an average
of 17.29% over five years.
The goal of this paper is to construct a model for the problem faced by an index
tracker during a reconstitution. We want to take into account varying tracking
error constraints, market characteristics, and predatory trading activities. We hope
to understand how these variables affect the returns and optimal strategies for the
index tracker and a potential predator, as well as the prices of the index securities.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first predatory trading model to explicitly
incorporate tracking error considerations.
In our model, the index tracker’s tracking error constraint winds up being an
extremely strong condition. As this bound becomes tighter, the index tracker’s
strategy approaches an instantaneous liquidation at the terminal time, regardless
of the market conditions. Consequently, the price of an index deletion during the
reconstitution is significantly deflated. This appears to reflect practical experience.
As we will see, the index tracker in our model sometimes benefits from the presence
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of the predator. The intuition behind this observation is that the negative effects due
to the “predator’s role as a predator” are outweighed by the positive effects due to
the “predator’s role as a liquidity provider”, as long as the index tracker is eventually
selling rapidly enough. This is never the case in the related one-period models of
[69] and [216].
We give a short overview of the literature in Section 4.2. Our model is described
in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we describe the mathematical details underlying our
numerical work. Section 4.5 contains our numerical examples.
4.2 Previous Work
A number of empirical studies have been completed on various aspects of index
rebalancing. Some of the key papers include [164], [82], [179], [84], [166], [180], [67],
[83], [119], and [112]. Another helpful reference is the undergraduate thesis [240]. In
Section 4.1, we have discussed the findings in these papers that we are most interested
in reproducing with our model.
Many theoretical studies of predatory trading in general have also been done.
Early models are proposed in [62] and [26]. In [69] and [216], risk-neutral agents
maximize expected revenues, and open-loop Nash equilibria are determined using
an Almgren-Chriss market impact model. This framework is extended to the case
of multiple assets in [86]. Schied and Zhang study an open-loop Nash equilibrium
where the players conduct either a CARA utility maximization or a certain mean-
variance optimization in [213]. Carmona and Yang numerically analyze a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium with one distressed trader and one predator, where the predator
can trade over a longer time horizon in [72]. In [215], Schöneborn derives both open-
loop and closed-loop strategies for two players using a discrete-time limit order book
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model extending that of [178]. Unlike previous studies, [170] investigates a game
with asymmetric information.
4.3 Our Model
We work on some finite time horizon, say [0, T ]. One index tracker and some noise
traders are active in the market throughout this period. Another strategic trader,
who we will view as a predator, is also sometimes present. It will occasionally be
convenient to refer to the index tracker and the predator as Player 1 and Player 2,
respectively. The description of our model will be less awkward if we act as if the
predator is always active. The case where the index tracker and the noise traders are
alone in the market can be obtained by merely dropping all of the quantities related
to the predator.
Our market contains only two assets: one risky asset and one risk-free asset (cash).
We assume that the risk-free interest rate is zero. Of course, an index consists of
many securities in practice, but we will assume for simplicity that our index consists
of only a single asset. More precisely, at t = 0, only the risky asset is a member
of the index. At t = T , the following reconstitution takes effect: the risky asset is
deleted and the risk-free asset is added.
We assume that the index is guaranteed to rebalance in this way and that both
the index tracker and the predator are aware of this at t = 0. This means that
our time horizon should be viewed as being fairly short, say the last day of trading
before the reconstitution. We remark that even with a transparent index such as the
Russelll 2000, no such guarantee actually exists in practice. Also, while we could have
replaced the risky asset with another risky asset to make our model more realistic,
we opt against this for convenience. 1
1Still, our preliminary (unpublished) investigations into the two risky asset case actually suggest that the results
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Let X1 (t) and X2 (t) denote the risky asset holdings at time t of the index tracker
and the predator, respectively. We require X1 (t) and X2 (t) to be continuously
differentiable. The price at time t of the risky asset, P (t), is given by the linear
price impact model
P (t) = P̃ (t) +
2∑
i=1




for t ∈ [0, T ], where P̃ is an arithmetic Brownian motion without drift starting from
p̄. Here, γi is Player i’s permanent price impact parameter, while λi is Player i’s
temporary price impact parameter.
This model for the asset price dynamics is identical to that used in many sources,
e.g., [69] and [216], except that we allow the index tracker and the predator to have
potentially different price impact parameters. One reason for this choice is that we
can recover a simple version of the N -predator model in [69] and [216] by letting
γ2 = Nγ1 and λ2 = Nλ1.
Index trackers do not necessarily own all of the securities in the index they are
tracking. We strive to avoid such complications, so we require the index tracker to
hold only the risky asset at t = 0 and only cash at t = T . We denote the index
tracker’s initial holdings in the risky asset by x̄, so we have
X1 (0) = x̄ (4.2)
and
X1 (T ) = 0. (4.3)
For the predator, we enforce the conditions
X2 (0) = 0 (4.4)
are easily understood from our setup here anyway, at least when the assets are independent.
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and
X2 (T ) = 0. (4.5)
The first condition seems justified by the observation that the predator only trades
in the risky asset to take advantage of the index tracker’s distressed circumstances.
This suggests that the predator should not have any initial holdings in the asset.
Because many index reconstitutions take effect at the market close on the effective
date, it is reasonable to view T as a market closing time. The second condition then
reflects the fact that predatory traders often eschew having open positions at the
end of the trading day.
At t = 0, both the index tracker and the predator will choose their deterministic
trading rates over the entire time horizon. We denote these functions by Ẋ1 and Ẋ2,






p̄+ γ1 (X1 (t)− x̄) + γ2X2 (t) + λ1Ẋ1 (t) + λ2Ẋ2 (t)
]
dt.
Observe that this is deterministic as well.
In many predatory trading models, e.g., [69] and [216], the traders maximize their
expected revenues. We will assume that the predator has this objective throughout;
however, this might not be an appropriate assumption for the index tracker. Let us
examine this claim more carefully.
In our setup, the index tracker’s tracking error on [0, T ] is√√√√√√√Var
P (T )− p̄p̄ +
∫ T
0
Ẋ1 (t)P (t) dt+ x̄p̄
x̄p̄
. (4.6)
As an aside, to avoid an artificial jump in the benchmark’s value, we consider the
index’s holdings in the risk-free asset to be worth P (T ) after time T . A similar
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Figure 4.1: Depiction of the index tracker’s tracking error (see Section 4.3).
normalization occurs in practice for the same reason. The issue is that (4.6) may not
be small enough if the index tracker is maximizing expected revenue. In the plastic
market case from [216], i.e., letting
x̄ = 1, p̄ = 10, T = 1,
γ1 = γ2 = 3, and λ1 = λ2 = 1,
we have √√√√√√√Var
P (T )− p̄p̄ +
∫ T
0
Ẋ1 (t)P (t) dt+ x̄p̄
x̄p̄
 = 0.05.
Tracking error allowances can be much smaller.
An obvious remedy is to shorten the time horizon. This appears to reflect how
index trackers deal with this issue in practice. Figure 4.1 shows the index tracker’s
tracking error as a function of T using the rest of the parameter values just mentioned.
Unfortunately, the index tracker’s new strategy is only guaranteed to be optimal on
the shortened time horizon, not the original time horizon. Also, arbitrarily shortening
the index tracker’s time horizon should not necessarily shorten the predator’s time
horizon as well.
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One could allow the predator to trade in a period before the index tracker enters
the market. This is the approach taken in [240]. The index tracker’s strategy is still
not guaranteed to be optimal on the original time horizon, so we feel an alternative
setup is needed.
A second remedy might be to assume that the index tracker’s objective is to
minimize (4.6). After attempting to carry out the program in Section 4.4, we found
that the only possible solution features
X1 (t) = x̄H (T − t) ,
where H is the Heaviside step function. Intuitively, this solution means that the
index tracker instantaneously liquidates the risky asset at the terminal time. While
this solution also appears to reflect the behavior of index trackers in practice, it is
problematic in our setup. The main concern is that P (T ) is no longer defined: the
index tracker’s trading rate is
Ẋ1 (t) = −x̄δ (T − t) ,
after all. Another objection is that the index tracker’s risky asset position is not
continuously differentiable.
In an attempt to avoid the occurrence of delta functions, a third remedy might be
to assume that the index tracker’s objective is to minimize (4.6) and that all trading
rates are valued in a given compact set, say [−M,M ]. After attempting to apply
the techniques of Section 4.4, we found that the only possible solution is as follows:
the index tracker initially does not trade at all and then sells the risky asset at the
maximum allowable speed. Intuitively, the index tracker uses the strategy which
most closely approximates the strategy from the previous setup, which is perhaps
not a surprise. The primary concern about this approach is that many important
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quantities in the problem now depend on a fairly arbitrary trading speed bound. A
secondary issue is that the index tracker’s risky asset position is not continuously
differentiable.
We have now arrived at the remedy which we use in this paper. For some α > 0,










P (T )− p̄p̄ +
∫ T
0
Ẋ1 (t)P (t) dt+ x̄p̄
x̄p̄
 = α. (4.7)
The interpretation here is that the index tracker is maximizing expected revenue
while maintaining a specific tracking error. Based on Section 4.5, we suspect that if
we replace “=” in (4.7) with “≤”, we will get an equivalent problem.
A nice feature of this setup is that the solutions in the one-period models of [69]
and [216] are recovered as special cases. Of course, the value of α which allows us to
recover their result depends on the values of all of the other parameters.
4.4 Mathematical Details
As it stands, our game is formulated in a rather unusual way due to (4.7). This
problem is easily solved. We introduce the extra state variables X3 and X4 satisfying
Ẋ3 (t) = tẊ1 (t)
Ẋ4 (t) = X3 (t) Ẋ1 (t) (4.8)
with initial data
X3 (0) = 0
X4 (0) = 0. (4.9)
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These variables are defined precisely so that we can rewrite the tracking error in
terms of the terminal values of the state variables. Specifically, a quick calculation










4.4.1 No Predator Case
We begin by analyzing the case when the predator is absent from the market.
Note that we merely drop the quantities related to the predator throughout this
discussion and retain all of the other notation. We will use standard necessary
optimality conditions based upon the maximum principle, e.g., see [31], to produce
a candidate strategy for the index tracker.
Introduce the costate function
p (t) = (p1 (t) , p3 (t) , p4 (t))
for t ∈ [0, T ] and the constant multipliers ν1, ν2. The Hamiltonian for the index
tracker is given by
H
(




p̄+ γ1 (X1 (t)− x̄) + λ1Ẋ1 (t)
+ p1 (t) + tp3 (t) +X3 (t) p4 (t)
]
on [0, T ]. The costate function satisfies the equations
ṗ1 (t) = −γ1Ẋ1 (t)
ṗ3 (t) = −p4 (t) Ẋ1 (t)
ṗ4 (t) = 0
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with terminal data
p1 (T ) = ν1
p3 (T ) =
2ν2
x̄p̄2





p1 (t) = −γ1X1 (t) + ν1







for t ∈ [0, T ].
By the stationarity condition,
0 = p̄+ γ1 (X1 (t)− x̄) + 2λ1Ẋ1 (t) + p1 (t) + tp3 (t) +X3 (t) p4 (t)





[t− s] Ẋ1 (s) ds.
Hence,








[t− s] Ẋ1 (s) ds.
This is a non-homogeneous Volterra integral equation of the second kind. From


























































If B = 0, then integrating (4.11) gives
X1 (t) = x̄+ At
on [0, T ]. By (4.3),

























Now assume that B 6= 0. Integrating (4.11) gives
X1 (t) = x̄+
A sinh (Bt)
B
on [0, T ]. By (4.3),




After simplifying, (4.8) implies that









X3 (t) = −
x̄ [Bt sinh (Bt)− cosh (Bt) + 1]




2Bt cosh2 (Bt)− 3 sinh (Bt) cosh (Bt) + 4 sinh (Bt)− 3Bt
]
2B [cosh (2BT )− 1]
By substituting our new expressions into (4.10) and simplifying again, we arrive at
α2 = −4BT exp (2BT )− exp (4BT ) + 1
2Bp̄2 [exp (2BT )− 1]2
. (4.15)
From (4.12), (4.14), and (4.15), we see that Ẋ1 does not depend on the price
impact parameters γ1 and λ1.
Notice that (4.12) would also be the optimal strategy if the index tracker maxi-
mized expected revenue and did not face a tracking error constraint, e.g., see page
2244 of [69]. The solution in that case depends only on x̄ and T . While our solution
also depends on x̄ and T , in general, it depends on p̄ (and α) as well.
The intuition here seems to be roughly as follows. As p̄ increases, the effect
of the index tracker’s choices on both her own return and the return of the risky
asset should decrease. Assuming the index tracker has a tracking error constraint,
this should make the constraint easier to satisfy and give the index tracker greater
flexbility when selecting a strategy. In particular, the index tracker should take p̄
into account. On the other hand, if the index tracker is only trying to maximize her
expected revenue, she should be primarily worried about how much her trading causes
the price of the risky asset to drop in an absolute sense. Because this is independent
of the risky asset’s initial price (in our model, at least), the index tracker’s strategy
should be independent of p̄ in this case.
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Figure 4.2: Depiction of f (·) (see Subsection 4.4.1).
Whether the index tracker maximizes expected revenue (only) or maximizes ex-
pected revenue with a tracking error constraint, the values of the price impact pa-
rameters γ1 and λ1 do not affect the optimal solution when the predator is absent
from the market.
To the best of our knowledge, (4.15) cannot be solved explicitly for B. Since we
believe it reveals all of the salient features of the problem, we will only informally




= −2y exp (y)− exp (2y) + 1
y [exp (y)− 1]2
. (4.16)
for y. Denote by f the map
y 7→ −2y exp (y)− exp (2y) + 1
y [exp (y)− 1]2
.
Based on our work above, the only relevant arguments for f lie along either the
positive real axis or the positive imaginary axis.
Figure 4.2 is a graph of f (y) for positive real y, while Figure 4.3 is a graph of
f (iy) for positive real y. We can draw the following conclusions:
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f (iy) = +∞,
(iv) f (y) decreases as y increases for y on the positive real axis, and
(v) f (iy) increases as y increases for y ∈ (0, 2π).












=⇒ B ∈ R+ =⇒ ν2 > 0.
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is merely a curiosity. The index tracker would have a higher expected revenue and
a lower tracking error by setting B = 0 instead, a far more preferable outcome in
practice (this case corresponds to the strategy which maximizes expected revenue).
4.4.2 Predator Case
We now study the case where the predator is active in the market. We will use
the same approach as in the previous subsection. The resulting expressions and
equations are far more complicated here due to the appearance of the predator. For
this reason, our discussion will be limited.
For j = 1, 2, we introduce the costate function
pj (t) = (pj,1 (t) , pj,2 (t) , pj,3 (t) , pj,4 (t))
on [0, T ]. We also let ν1, ν2, and ν3 be constant multipliers. The Hamiltonian for
Player j is defined by
Hj
(




p̄+ γ1 (X1 (t)− x̄) + γ2X2 (t) + λ1Ẋ1 (t) + λ2Ẋ2 (t)
]
+ Ẋ1 (t) [pj,1 (t) + tpj,3 (t) +X3 (t) pj,4 (t)] + Ẋ2 (t) pj,2 (t)
for j = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ]. The costate function j satisfies
ṗj,1 (t) = −γ1uj
ṗj,2 (t) = −γ2uj
ṗj,3 (t) = −Ẋ1pj,4
ṗj,4 (t) = 0
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subject to the terminal conditions
p1,1 (T ) = ν1
p1,2 (T ) = 0
p1,3 (T ) =
2ν2
x̄p̄2




p2,1 (T ) = 0
p2,2 (T ) = ν3
p2,3 (T ) = 0
p2,4 (T ) = 0.
In particular,
p1,1 (t) = −γ1
∫ t
0
Ẋ1 (s) ds− γ1x̄+ ν1









p2,2 (t) = −γ2
∫ t
0
Ẋ2 (s) ds+ ν3
on [0, T ].
From the stationarity condition, we get
0 = p̄+ γ1 (X1 (t)− x̄) + γ2X2 (t) + 2λ1Ẋ1 (t) + λ2Ẋ2 (t) + p1,1 (t) + tp1,3 (t) +X3 (t) p1,4 (t)
= p̄− γ1x̄+ ν1 + γ2
∫ t
0





[t− s] Ẋ1 (s) ds
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and




Ẋ1 (s) ds+ λ1Ẋ1 (t) + 2λ2Ẋ2 (t) + ν3 (4.17)












[t− s] Ẋ1 (s) ds.
We can think of Ẋ2 as the solution to a non-homogeneous Volterra integral equation
of the second kind involving Ẋ1. By Section 2.1 of [202], we have
Ẋ2 (t) =









































[r − s] Ẋ1 (s) ds
]
dr (4.18)
on [0, T ].






for t ∈ [0, T ]. We can write (4.17) as
0 = p̄+ γ1
∫ t
0
Ẋ1 (s) ds+ λ1Ẋ1 (t) + ν3
+ 2λ2
(

























































































Let L denote the Laplace transform of Y . By taking Laplace transforms and








4λ2ν2 − γ2p̄3x̄− γ2ν3p̄2x̄+ λ2p̄3sx̄+ γ2γ1p̄2x̄2 + γ2λ1p̄2sx̄2
−γ1λ2p̄2sx̄2 − 3λ2λ1p̄2s2x̄2 + 2λ2ν1p̄2sx̄− λ2ν3p̄2sx̄
]
.
We will only state the next steps. The reason is that the expressions involved
are enormous. While they can be easily obtained by following the procedure below
using software such as MATLAB, they are so complicated that we believe it would
not be beneficial for the reader to actually see them. We will see their important
qualitative features during our discussion of the numerical examples soon.
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Step 1: Find Y by taking the inverse Laplace transform of L.
Step 2: Differentiate Y to obtain X1.
Step 3: Differentiate X1 to obtain Ẋ1.
Step 4: Use (4.8), (4.9), and the formula for Ẋ1 to obtain X3 and X4.
Step 5: Use (4.18) and the formula for Ẋ1 to obtain Ẋ2.
Step 6: Integrate Ẋ2 to obtain X2.
All of the formulas above will be in terms of the constants ν1, ν2, and ν3. It only
remains to find these constants, which can be done numerically as follows.
Step 7: Use (4.3) and the formula for X1 to obtain a formula for ν1 in terms of ν2
and ν3.
Step 8: Use (4.5), the formula for X2, and the formula for ν1 from Step 7 to obtain
a formula for ν3 in terms of ν2 alone.
Step 9: Use (4.10), the formulas for X3 and X4, and the formulas from Steps 7 and
8 to obtain an equation relating ν2 to α, p̄, x̄, T , and the price impact
parameters.
As in (4.15), it is not clear if the equation in Step 9 can be solved explicitly for
ν2; however, it is easy to do so numerically after selecting values for α, p̄, x̄, T , and
the price impact parameters. We then use Steps 7 and 8 to get numerical values for
ν1 and ν3. These values allow us to compute the remaining quantities of interest.
Before moving on to the numerical examples, we remark that Ẋ1 and Ẋ2 are of
the form
Ẋ1 (t) = exp (C1t) [C2 sinh (C3t) + C4 cosh (C3t)]
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and
Ẋ2 (t) = exp (C1t) [C5 sinh (C3t) + C6 cosh (C3t)] + C7
for some constants C1, . . . , C7.
4.5 Numerical Examples
For simplicity, we will first examine the case when the index tracker and the
predator have the same price impact parameters. More precisely, we will use the
parameters from the plastic market case in [216], i.e., we let
x̄ = 1, p̄ = 10, T = 1,
γ1 = γ2 = 3, and λ1 = λ2 = 1.
Recall that predatory trading has been observed in plastic markets (and in other
types of markets as well). We will later vary the price impact parameters to under-
stand their influence.
In all of our figures below, we will write “N = 1” or “N = 0” to indicate whether
the predator is active or not, respectively. We only considered values of α that were
below the value of α corresponding to the one-period model solution from [69] or
[216], as these are the only solutions with potential relevance in practice. We also
restricted ourselves to values of α for which the expected price process is positive on
[0, T ], given our parameters.
4.5.1 Effects Due to the Tracking Error Constraint
Question IV.1. What is the effect of the tracking error constraint α on the players’
trading rates?
Figure 4.4 shows the index tracker’s trading rate in the case where the predator
is active as a function of t for various values of α. The index tracker sells more
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α = 0.03, N = 1
α = 0.04, N = 1
α = 0.05, N = 1
Figure 4.4: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.1).

















α = 0.03, N = 1
α = 0.04, N = 1
α = 0.05, N = 1
Figure 4.5: Depiction of the predator’s trading rate (see Question IV.1).
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rapidly for small times and more slowly for large times as α increases. By continuing
to shrink α, the index tracker’s trading rate appears to converge in an appropriate
sense to
Ẋ1 (t) = −x̄δ (T − t) ,
i.e., an instantaneous liquidation at the terminal time. This reflects practical expe-
rience, where tight tracking error constraints effectively force index fund managers
to rebalance their portfolios at the close on the effective date of the reconstitution.
Observe that the index tracker’s trading rate retains the general features of the one-
period model solution in [69] and [216], e.g., it is negative, concave, and has its
maximum at an intermediate time.
In Figure 4.5, we have the predator’s trading rate as a function of t for a few
values of α. The predator sells more rapidly for (very) small times and buys more
slowly for large times as α increases. The predator sells for a shorter period of time
as α increases. Note that the predator’s trading rate also retains important features
of the one-period model solution in [69] and [216]. For instance, it is increasing,
negative for small times, positive for large times, and convex. The predator’s buying
rate near the terminal time also rapidly increases when the index tracker’s selling
rate rapidly decreases near the terminal time, as in [69] and [216].
Question IV.2. What is the effect of the tracking error constraint α on the expected
price process?
Figure 4.6 depicts the expected price process as a function of t in the case where
the predator is active for several values of α. The expected price process decreases
for small times but increases for large times as α increases. We also see a concavity
changes as α increases. Specifically, as α decreases, it appears that the expected
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α = 0.03, N = 1
α = 0.04, N = 1
α = 0.05, N = 1
Figure 4.6: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.2).




















Figure 4.7: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.3).
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Figure 4.8: Depiction of the predator’s expected revenue (see Question IV.3).























Figure 4.9: Depiction of the total expected revenue (see Question IV.3).
price process becomes concave. To the best of our knowledge, the expected price
process in the one-period model of [69] and [216] is convex.
Question IV.3. What is the effect of the tracking error constraint α on the players’
expected revenues?
Figure 4.7 shows the index tracker’s expected revenue when the predator is active
as a function of α. It appears to be increasing and concave.
In Figure 4.8, we have the predator’s expected revenue as a function of α. It
seems to be decreasing and convex.
Figure 4.9 depicts the sum of the index tracker’s expected revenue (in the case
where the predator is active) and the predator’s expected revenue as a function of
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N = 0, α = 0.03
N = 1, α = 0.03
N = 0, α = 0.05
N = 1, α = 0.05
Figure 4.10: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.4).


















N = 0, α = 0.03
N = 1, α = 0.03
Figure 4.11: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.4).
α. It appears to be a concave function of α with a maximum roughly near α = 0.04.
Comparing this graph to Figures 4.7 and 4.8, we see that although the predator’s
expected revenue increases and the index tracker’s expected revenue decreases as α
gets smaller, the index tracker loses more than the predator gains for α small enough.
4.5.2 Effects Due to the Predator’s Appearance
Question IV.4. What is the effect of the predator’s appearance?
Figure 4.10 shows the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of time for various
values of α and N . For the values of α we considered, the entry of the predator causes
the index tracker to sell more rapidly at small and large times and more slowly
at intermediate times. We qualify this statement because for these price impact
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Figure 4.12: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.4).


















α = 0.03, N = 0, All γ
1
Figure 4.13: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.5).
97
parameters, the index tracker (distressed trader) sells more slowly for small times
and more rapidly for large times in the one-period model of [69] and [216]. We did
not attempt to find the smallest value of α for which this change in behavoir occurs.
Also, while the index tracker’s trading rate is decreasing when the predator is absent,
it is only eventually decreasing after the predator’s appearance.
In Figure 4.11, we have the expected price process as a function of t both in the
predator’s absence and presence. For the α we considered, the expected price process
when the predator is in the market is initially smaller but is eventually much higher
than it is in the absence of the predator. The same is true in the one-period model
of [69] and [216].
Figure 4.12 depicts the index tracker’s expected revenue as a function of α both in
the predator’s absence and presence. The entry of the predator increases the index
tracker’s expected revenue for small α and decreases the index tracker’s expected
revenue for large α. Observe that transition occurs roughly near α = 0.04. It would
be interesting to study whether or not this is the same value of α which maximizes
the sum of the expected revenues in Figure 4.9 and, if so, why this is the case. Recall
that in the one-period model of [69] and [216], the index tracker (distressed trader)
always loses expected revenue as a result of the predator’s entrance to the market.
4.5.3 Effects Due to the Price Impact Parameters
We will now try to understand the influence of the price impact parameters. We
will vary each parameter one at a time, while keeping the remaining parameters as
they were previously. We remark that all of the properties that we just observed still
hold.
Question IV.5. How does varying γ1 affect our solution?
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α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.75
Figure 4.14: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.5).

















α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.75
Figure 4.15: Depiction of the predator’s trading rate (see Question IV.5).
Figure 4.13 shows the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t when the
predator is not active. In this case, the index tracker’s trading rate does not depend
on γ1. Recall that the distressed trader’s trading rate in the predator’s absence is
also independent of the permanent price impact parameter in the one-period model
of [69] and [216].
In Figure 4.14, we see the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t after the
predator’s appearance for various γ1. The index tracker now responds to changes
in γ1. Specifically, the index tracker sells (slightly) more rapidly for small and large
times and (slightly) more slowly for intermediate times as γ1 increases.
Figure 4.15 depicts the predator’s trading rate as a function of t for several values
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α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
1
 = 3.75
Figure 4.16: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.5).






















α = 0.03, N = 0
Figure 4.17: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.5).
of γ1. The predator sells more rapidly for small times and buys more rapidly for
large times as γ1 increases. The predator appears to sell for a slightly longer period
of time as γ1 increases. Comparing this graph to Figure 4.14, the predator’s trading
rate appears to be more sensitive to γ1 than the index tracker’s trading rate.
Figure 4.16 shows the expected price process as a function of t when the predator is
active for various γ1. It appears that the expected price process decreases for all times
as γ1 increases and that the magnitude of the drop increases with time. Apparently
the upward price pressure due to the predator’s increased trading rate for large times
is outweighed by the downward price pressure due to the index tracker’s liquidation
(and the predator’s short-selling) as γ1 increases.
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α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.18: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.5).























α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.19: Depiction of the predator’s expected revenue (see Question IV.5).
In Figure 4.17, we have the index tracker’s expected revenue as a function of γ1
when the predator is not active. This quantity decreases linearly with γ1, which is
also clear from Figure 4.13, since the index tracker’s trading rate does not depend
on γ1.
Figure 4.18 depicts the index tracker’s expected revenue as a function of γ1 when
the predator is active. After a close inspection, it appears that this is a decreasing
concave function. The fact that this function is decreasing seems clear given Figures
4.14 and 4.16, since the index tracker’s trading rate seems to only minimally change
and the expected price process noticeably drops as γ1 increases.
Figure 4.19 shows the predator’s expected revenue as a function of γ1. It appears
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α = 0.03, N = 0, All λ
1
Figure 4.20: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.6).



















α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 0.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.75
Figure 4.21: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.6).
to be an increasing convex function γ1. Considering Figures 4.15 and 4.16, one
might have guessed that this function is increasing: the predator is initially short-
selling more rapidly and the drop in the expected price process grows with time as
γ1 increases.
Question IV.6. How does varying λ1 affect our solution?
In Figure 4.20, we have the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t when
the predator is absent from the market. This trading rate does not depend on λ1,
so the index tracker’s trading rate does not depend on either of the price impact
parameters in the predator’s absence (see Figure 4.13). Again, the same is true of
the distressed trader’s trading rate in the one-period model of [69] and [216].
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α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 0.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.75
Figure 4.22: Depiction of the predator’s trading rate (see Question IV.6).





















α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 0.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, λ
1
 = 1.75
Figure 4.23: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.6).
Figure 4.21 depicts the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t after the
predator’s apperance. It appears that the index tracker sells more slowly for small
and large times and more rapidly for intermediate times as λ1 increases. Recall that
this is the opposite of what we observe as γ1 increases in Figure 4.14. Comparing
these two figures, it also appears that the index tracker’s trading rate might be more
sensitive to λ1 than γ1.
Figure 4.22 shows the predator’s trading rate as a function of t for several values
of λ1. The predator sells more rapidly for small times and buys more rapidly for
large times as λ1 increases. This is the same effect that we observe in Figure 4.15
as γ1 increases, although it appears that the predator’s trading rate may be more
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α = 0.03, N = 0
Figure 4.24: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.6).























α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.25: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.6).
sensitive to λ1 than to γ1.
In Figure 4.23, we have the expected price process as a function of time when
the predator is active for various λ1. It appears that this function decreases for
all times as λ1 increases and that the magnitude of the drop increases with time.
We observe the same phenomenon as γ1 increases in Figure 4.16. Also, it appears
that the concavity of the expected price process may change for small times as λ1
decreases.
Figure 4.24 depicts the index tracker’s expected revenue as function of λ1 when
the predator is not in the market. The expected revenue decreases linearly with λ1.
As we observed with γ1 in Figure 4.17, the linear decrease is clear from Figure 4.20,
104




















α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.26: Depiction of the predator’s expected revenue (see Question IV.6).



















α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.75
Figure 4.27: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.7).
since the index tracker’s trading rate does not depend on λ1.
Figure 4.25 shows the index tracker’s expected revenue as function of λ1 when the
predator is present. In this case, a close inspection suggests that the index tracker’s
expected revenue is a decreasing concave function of λ1. Recall that we observe the
same thing when γ1 increases in Figure 4.18. Also, notice that as λ1 increases from
0.25 to 1.75, the index tracker loses much more in expected revenue when there is
no predator than when the predator is active.
In Figure 4.26, we have the predator’s expected revenue as a function of λ1. It
appears to be an increasing convex function. While we observed that the preda-
tor’s expected revenue is also an increasing convex function of γ1 in Figure 4.19, a
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comparison of these two figures suggests that it might be more sensitive to λ1.
Question IV.7. How does varying γ2 affect our solution?
Figure 4.27 depicts the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t for several
values of γ2. The index tracker sells (slightly) more rapidly for small and large times
and (slightly) more slowly for intermediate times as γ2 increases. Recall that we
observe the same effect as γ1 increases in Figure 4.14 and the opposite effect as λ1
increases in Figure 4.21. Also, changing γ2 appears to have the greatest effect on the
index tracker’s trading rate for very small times and very large times.
Figure 4.28 shows the predator’s trading rate as a function of t for various γ2. The
predator sells (slightly) more slowly for small times and buys (slightly) more rapidly
for large times as γ2 increases. As λ1 and γ1 increase, we see the same phenomenon
for large times; however, increasing these parameters has the opposite effect on the
predator’s trading rate for small times (see Figures 4.15 and 4.22). Note that the
predator’s trading rate seems to be less sensitive to γ2 than it is to γ1 and λ1.
In Figure 4.29, we have the expected price process as a function of t for a few
values of γ2. This process decreases for all times as γ2 increases, and the magnitude
of the drop is the largest for intermediate times and fairly negligible for small and
large times. While we also observe that the expected price process decreases as γ1
and λ1 increase, the magnitude of the drop appears to increase with time in those
cases (see Figures 4.16 and 4.23).
Figure 4.30 depicts the index tracker’s expected revenue as a function of γ2. A
close inspection suggests that it is a decreasing convex function of γ2. From Figures
4.18 and 4.25, we observe that while the expected revenue still decreases with γ1
and λ1, it does so in a concave manner in those cases. The index tracker’s expected
revenue also appears to be less sensitive to γ2 than to either γ1 or λ1.
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α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.75
Figure 4.28: Depiction of the predator’s trading rate (see Question IV.7).



















α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 2.25
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.00
α = 0.03, N = 1, γ
2
 = 3.75
Figure 4.29: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.7).
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α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.30: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.7).


















α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.31: Depiction of the predator’s expected revenue (see Question IV.7).
Figure 4.31 shows the predator’s expected revenue as a function of γ2. It appears
to be a decreasing convex function of γ2. While the predator’s expected revenue is
also a convex function of γ1 and λ1, it is an increasing function in each of those cases
(see Figures 4.19 and 4.26). Still, the fact that the expected revenue is decreasing
here is not too surprising given Figures 4.28 and 4.29, since the predator’s trading
rate changes minimally but the expected price process drops as γ2 increases.
Question IV.8. How does varying λ2 affect our solution?
In Figure 4.32, we have the index tracker’s trading rate as a function of t for
various λ2. The index tracker sells more slowly for small and large times but more
rapidly for intermediate times as λ2 increases. Recall that we observe exactly the
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Figure 4.32: Depiction of the index tracker’s trading rate (see Question IV.8).
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Figure 4.33: Depiction of the predator’s trading rate (see Question IV.8).
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same effects when λ1 increases but the opposite effects when γ1 or γ2 increase (see
Figures 4.14, 4.21, and 4.27). In general, it appears that the index tracker’s trading
rate is more sensitive to changes in the temporary price impact parameters than to
changes in the permanent price impact parameters.
Figure 4.33 depicts the predator’s trading rate as a function of t for several values
of λ2. The predator sells more slowly for small times and buys more slowly for large
times as λ2 increases. This is exactly the opposite relationship that the predator’s
trading rate has with γ1 and λ1 (see Figures 4.15 and 4.22). We see the same effect for
small times but the opposite effect for large times when γ2 increases. As is the case
with the index tracker, it seems that the predator’s trading rate is more sensitive
overall to changes in the temporary price impact parameters than changes in the
permanent price impact parameters.
Figure 4.34 shows the expected price process as a function of t for a few values
of λ2. The expected price process increases for all times as λ2 increases. For large
times, the concavity changes as λ2 increases. Compared to the changes we observe
when increasing γ1, λ1, and γ2 in Figures 4.16, 4.23, and 4.29, these observations
are somewhat surprising. For instance, in all other cases, the expected price process
drops as the price impact parameter increases. Also, we did not notice any concavity
change in the expected price process when varying γ1 or γ2. The concavity change
we notice while varying λ1 occurs for small times and is much less pronounced.
In Figure 4.35, we have the index tracker’s expected revenue as a function of
λ2. It appears to be an increasing concave function. This is the only instance
when we observe that the index tracker’s expected revenue increases with a price
impact parameter (see Figures 4.18, 4.25, and 4.30), although this observation is
not too surprising given our observations about the expected price process in Figure
110
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Figure 4.34: Depiction of the expected price (see Question IV.8).
4.34. Generally, it seems that the index tracker’s expected revenue is much more
sensitive to the temporary price impact parameters than to the permanent price
impact parameters.
Figure 4.36 depicts the predator’s expected revenue as a function of λ2. It appears
to be a decreasing convex function of λ2. When varying any of the other price impact
parameters, the predator’s expected revenue has always appeared to be convex as
well (see Figures 4.19, 4.26, and 4.31). The expected revenue seems to decrease
when the predator’s price impact parameters increase and increase when the index
tracker’s price impact parameters increase. As in the case of the index tracker, the
predator’s expected revenue appears to be much more sensitive to the temporary
price impact parameters than to the permanent price impact parameters.
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α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.35: Depiction of the index tracker’s expected revenue (see Question IV.8).























α = 0.03, N = 1
Figure 4.36: Depiction of the predator’s expected revenue (see Question IV.8).
CHAPTER V
High-Roller Impact: A Large Generalized Game Model of
Parimutuel Wagering
5.1 Introduction
Suppose that a collection of bettors are wagering on an upcoming event. The
payoffs are determined via a (frictionless) parimutuel system if whenever Outcome i
occurs, Bettor A receives
(Total Amount Wagered)
(
Bettor A’s Wager on Outcome i
Total Amount Wagered on Outcome i
)
.
The idea is that players with correct predictions will proportionally share the final
betting pool. Prizes are reduced in practice by transaction costs such as the house
take, a percentage fee collected by the betting organizer (or house). For example,
Bettor A might only win
κ (Total Amount Wagered)
(
Bettor A’s Wager on Outcome i
Total Amount Wagered on Outcome i
)
(5.1)
when Outcome i occurs, if the house take is (1− κ) % for some 0 < κ < 1.
This mechanism was invented in the context of horse race gambling by Oller in the
late 1800’s ([68]) and remains widely employed in that setting: In 2014, worldwide
parimutuel betting on horse races totaled around seventy-five billion euros ([7]). It
also typically determines wagering payoffs for other sports such as jai alai and races
112
113
involving bicycles, motorcycles, motorboats, and greyhounds ([38]). Certain prizes
for major lotteries such as Mega Millions, Powerball, and “EuroMillions” are com-
puted in a parimutuel fashion ([6]). Parimutuel systems are increasingly popular
methods for distributing payoffs in online prediction markets as well ([197]). Gold-
man Sachs Group, Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, CME Group Inc., Deutsche Börse AG,
and ICAP have even facilitated the development of parimutuel derivatives on eco-
nomic indicators ([38]).
The first scholarly publication on parimutuel wagering was written by Borel in
1938 ([57]), and more recent surveys and anthologies ([228]; [122]; [121]) attest to
the substantial academic interest garnered by this topic since. A vast range of issues
from optimal betting ([138]; [209]; [56]) to market efficiency ([123]; [25]; [134]) to
market microstructure ([154]; [197]; [196]) has been extensively studied. Significant
attention has been paid to strategic interactions among bettors ([205]; [184]; [151];
[227]; [201]).
Similar to the rise of high-frequency and algorithmic traders in financial mar-
kets, a growing number of parimutuel wagering event participants are organizations
employing large-scale strategies based upon advanced mathematical, statistical, and
computational techniques ([145]). There are fundamental differences between these
bettors and more traditional wagerers. The new firms typically have access to vast
budgets, making their betting totals orders of magnitude beyond the amounts wa-
gered by regular players. Often, they can place their wagers at speeds impossible for
ordinary bettors to match. Presumably, their use of complex methods also makes
their forecasts and corresponding wagering strategies generally superior.
The house collects a percentage of the total amount wagered and, therefore, may
initially benefit from the presence of large-scale wagering firms. After all, their
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activities should increase the size of the pool, at first anyway. The factors just
described are thought to put ordinary bettors at an extreme disadvantage, though.
Since payouts are calculated according to (5.1), ordinary bettors’ profits may even
directly decline as a result of the large-scale firms’ wagers. If this discourages enough
regular players from betting, then pool sizes may eventually dwindle, hurting the
house’s revenue. In fact, many betting organizers have publicly expressed strong
concerns about the new breed of wagerers. Betting organizers have even occasionally
banned these participants from parimutuel wagering events ([145]).
How reasonable is this narrative? Our goal is to quantify the impact of large-scale
participants in parimutuel wagering events on the house and ordinary bettors.
First, using the theory of large generalized games, i.e., games with a continuum of
diffuse (or non-atomic/minor) players and finitely many atomic (or major) players, we
develop a model of parimutuel betting. The bets made by individual atomic players




Total Amount Wagered on Outcome i
)
. (5.2)
Aggregate decisions made by the diffuse players also affect every player for the same
reason. A key feature is that an individual diffuse player cannot change (5.2) by
revising her wagers. In fact, her specific choices have no effect whatsoever on the
rest of the game’s participants.
We view diffuse and atomic players as stand-ins for ordinary bettors and large-
scale wagering firms, respectively. The approximation is motivated by the obser-
vation that the total amount wagered by a single traditional bettor is generally
negligible compared to the total amount wagered by an entire betting firm.
Our main theoretical result, Theorem V.7, provides necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Other
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scholars have shown the existence of equilibria in a broad class of large generalized
games ([32]; [33]; [70]; [206]). Such results often rely upon sophisticated technol-
ogy including variants of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem. We choose to employ a
more elementary fixed-point argument instead. Advantages of our approach include
its simplicity and the possibility of proving the equilibrium’s uniqueness. A simple
algorithm for computing relevant equilibrium quantities immediately presents itself
as well.
Having such an algorithm allows us to analyze our problem in specific scenarios.
In accordance with the prevailing narrative, we observe that because of the atomic
player, the house is temporarily better off and the diffuse players are worse off in
Example V.12. For varying reasons, at least one of these effects is not observed in
each of the remaining situations.
In Example V.13, the diffuse players are better off in the presence of the atomic
player. Intuitively, when the event is too close to call, the atomic player can bet on
the wrong outcome even if her prediction is assumed to be quite accurate. Such an
error is to the advantage of the diffuse players.
In Example V.14, the diffuse players believe that they are better off when there
is an atomic player. Roughly, if the diffuse players’ beliefs are too homogeneous but
the atomic player disagrees with them, the diffuse players’ expected profits per unit
bet rise when the atomic player takes the other side of their wagers.
In Example V.15, we argue that the diffuse players are better off but the house
is (immediately) worse off because of the atomic player, exactly the opposite of the
prevailing narrative.1 To make this point, we recast our model as a two-stage game
taking into account the house’s strategic decisions. Effectively, because the atomic
1Recall that the alleged decline in the house’s revenue is thought to occur over time.
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player considers her impact on (5.2), she has a lower tolerance for unfavorable betting
conditions than the diffuse player. When she is absent, this means that the house
can more easily prey upon the diffuse players.
Before offering further details, we more thoroughly discuss related literature in
Section 5.2. We carefully present our model in Section 5.3 and our main theoretical
result in Section 5.4. We numerically investigate our concrete examples in Section
5.5. Section 5.6 highlights a few technical aspects of Section 5.4’s work. We give our
longer formal proofs in Appendices 5.7 and 5.8.
5.2 Related Literature
The individual states of our diffuse players are only coupled via the empirical
distribution of controls. Since each diffuse player is too small to influence this distri-
bution, she treats it as fixed when determining her own strategy. Assumptions like
these have appeared in the literature on continuum games ([27]; [214]; [168]; [207])
and mean-field games ([158]; [133]).2
Our paper bears a stronger resemblance to work in the former category. For
instance, we model parimutuel wagering as a static game. Such a choice is quite
common in a continuum game study; however, stochastic differential games are more
often the focus in mean-field game theory. Also, we restrict ourselves to an intuitive
argument for viewing ordinary bettors as diffuse players. Papers on mean-field games
often rigorously present their continuum model as a limit of finite population models,
while those on continuum games typically emphasize other issues.
General mean-field interactions among players can be described by complex func-
tions of the empirical distributions of states and/or controls. On the other hand,
2Originally, players were coupled via the empirical distribution of states, not controls, in the mean-field game liter-
ature. Recent advances have shown that models with additional interactions through the controls also have promising
applications, say in the contexts of price impact, optimal execution, high-frequency trading, and oligopolistic energy
market problems ([117]; [71]; [115]; [81]; [80]).
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parimutuel wagerers affect one another through (5.2) alone, a comparatively simple
scenario. This makes parimutuel wagering an especially strong candidate for model-
ing by either theory. Continuum games have already been applied in this way ([182];
[234]).
Watanabe considered a two-stage game with a betting organizer and a continuum
of risk-neutral diffuse players with heterogeneous beliefs ([234]). First, the betting
organizer selects a value for the house take. The diffuse players then determine
whether to place a unit bet on one of two outcomes or bet nothing at all. Using
techniques from set-valued analysis, Watanabe showed that an equilibrium always
exists, provided the house take is not too large. As long as each player can only
bet negligible amounts, Watanabe also found that equilibria in parimutuel wagering
games are regular. That is, if a player wagering on Outcome i believes that Outcome
i will occur with probability p, all players who believe that Outcome i will occur
with probability p′ > p also wager on Outcome i. The paper’s results on the betting
organizer’s optimal strategy were in the context of specific examples.
Ottaviani and Sørenson developed their continuum game to explain two phenom-
ena frequently observed in the context of parimutuel wagering on horse races: late
informed betting and the favorite-longshot bias ([182]). The first states that more ac-
curate information about a race’s outcome can be gleaned from late bets than early
bets. The second says that the public tends to excessively bet on unlikely outcomes
and wager too little on likely outcomes. A continuum of privately informed risk-
neutral players decide when to place their individual bets in a discrete-time setting.
They can wager a unit amount on one of two outcomes or abstain from betting.
The paper gave conditions under which all of these players simultaneously wager at
the terminal time, and the corresponding equilibrium is shown to always feature the
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favorite-longshot bias.
Others have more implicitly created infinite-player parimutuel wagering models
by assuming that there are many bettors ([134]; [183]). These references have sought
to identify other possible causes of the favorite-longshot bias.
The most important new feature of our setup is that, in addition to the diffuse
bettors, we introduce an atomic bettor. The parimutuel wagering studies we just
discussed only incorporate diffuse players. We would not be able to understand the
effects of large-scale wagering organizations on ordinary bettors, if we made a similar
assumption.
Because of this addition, our model belongs to the class of continuum game models
known as large generalized games. Games that include both diffuse and atomic play-
ers can be found in mean-field game theory as well under the heading major-minor
player models ([132]; [174]; [175]; [141]; [232]). Applications of large generalized
games are known to be diverse and already include a collection of problems from
politics ([90]) to oligopolistic markets ([238]). General results on the existence of
equilibria in large generalized games have also been obtained ([32]; [33]; [70]; [206]).
We choose not to rely upon these, as the simple structural aspects of parimutuel wa-
gering just discussed, combined with a convenient modeling assumption (see Section
5.3), allow us to use elementary arguments.
Ultimately, we employ a mean-field approximation for the standard reason: By
doing so, we make our model tractable, hopefully while preserving the critical macro-
scopic properties of our original problem. Issues other than the impact of large-scale
wagering organizations have been resolved in finite-player settings, though such stud-
ies have usually invoked other strong assumptions.
Weber gave sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in a simultane-
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ous parimutuel betting game with N atomic players, each of whom is risk-neutral and
must bet a specific total amount ([237]). Watanabe, Nonoyama, and Mori’s setup
and goals are similar to those in Watanabe’s continuum game paper, except that the
diffuse players in the latter are replaced by finitely many atomic players ([235]; [234]).
Explanations of the favorite-longshot bias have been offered using equilibrium results
for N -player parimutuel wagering games ([77]; [151]; [184]; [204]). Games in which
finitely many bettors wager sequentially have also been investigated for various pur-
poses ([103]; [85]; [152]; [151]; [229]). For example, Thrall showed that if risk-neutral
atomic bettors with homogeneous beliefs wager sequentially, their profits tend to
zero as the number of bettors increases ([229]). Note that some of these works do
consider limiting cases in which the population of wagerers grows arbitrarily large to
complement their other insights ([229]; [184]).
5.3 Model Details
Our players have the opportunity to wager on an event that can unfold in two
mutually exclusive ways: Outcome 1 might occur. If not, Outcome 2 will occur. For
now, we view κ ∈ (0, 1) to be exogenously given. Inspired by Watanabe et al. ([235];
[234]), we later informally consider what happens when we allow the house take to
be optimally selected by the betting organizer in the first stage of a two-stage game
(see Example V.15). Our results in Section 5.4 are unaffected by such a shift.
The unit interval describes the diffuse bettors’ views on the likelihood of Outcome
1: the bettors whose views are indexed by p ∈ [0, 1] believes that Outcome 1 will
occur with probability p. Initially, each diffuse bettor has some (negligible) unit
wealth. A finite Borel measure µ with a continuous everywhere positive density
characterizes the distribution of the diffuse bettors. More precisely, the total initial
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wealth of all diffuse bettors whose views are contained in a Borel set A is µ (A).
That µ has a continuous everywhere positive density is our convenient modeling
assumption from Section 5.2. It is similar to a key hypothesis in Ottaviani and
Sørenson’s work, although the posterior beliefs of their diffuse bettors are obtained
after updating a common prior belief using a private signal and Bayes’ rule ([182]).
Effectively, Watanabe assumed that µ need not have a density, and even when it
does, the density need not be positive everywhere ([234]). These choices necessitated
a set-valued approach, which we are able to avoid.
Continuity merely simplifies a few of our arguments, e.g., see Step 6 of Theorem
V.7’s proof. The rest of the assumption plays a more critical role. Results on the
existence of equilibria in parimutuel wagering games often include a hypothesis such
as the following: for any given outcome, at least two bettors believe that the outcome
will occur with positive probability.3 By supposing that the density is positive, we
assume this as well. Watanabe has shown that an equilibrium may not be unique,
if µ ({p}) > 0 for some fixed p ([234]). Obviously, this situation is prevented by the
density’s existence.
Our atomic player believes that Outcome 1 will occur with probability q ∈ [0, 1].
She has (non-negligible) finite initial wealth w > 0.
Throughout, we treat all players’ beliefs as exogenously determined. We do not
address how the players generate their estimates; however, this process is of great
interest both practically and academically ([122]; [121]). For our theoretical results
in Section 5.4, we also do not specify how the players’ estimates compare to the
actual probability that Outcome 1 will occur. Since large-scale betting organization
allegedly produce highly accurate forecasts, we could choose q to be some small
3This is true of Weber’s work, for instance ([237]). Roughly, if only one player believes that a particular outcome
will occur with positive probability, she should wager an arbitrarily small amount on that outcome. In the absence
of a positive minimum bet size constraint, it follows that an equilibrium does not exist.
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perturbation of the actual probability of Outcome 1. We informally experiment with
this extra assumption in Examples V.12 and V.13.
All players decide how much to wager on each outcome. Their choices are con-
strained only by their initial wealth: a betting strategy is feasible (or admissible) for
an individual bettor as long as the sum of her wagers is no more than her wealth.
For example, a bettor could choose to wager 100% of her wealth on Outcome 1, 55%
of her wealth on Outcome 1 and 30% of her wealth on Outcome 2, or not wager at
all. We formalize this as follows.4
Definition V.1. A feasible strategy profile for the diffuse players is a measurable
function
f = (f1, f2) : (0, 1) −→
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2≥0 : x1 + x2 ≤ 1
}
.
A feasible strategy profile for the atomic player is a vector a = (a1, a2) ∈ R2≥0 such
that
a1 + a2 ≤ w.
We call the pair (f, a) a feasible strategy profile.
Under (f, a), the atomic player wagers ai on Outcome i. Each diffuse player who
believes that Outcome 1 will occur with probability p wagers fi (p) × 100% of her
(negligible) unit initial wealth on Outcome i.
Our space of feasible strategy profiles is slightly atypical. Previously, diffuse
players in parimutuel wagering games have only been able to place unit bets, if they
bet at all ([182]; [234]). We could have made this restriction as well without loss
of generality due to Proposition V.5. Watanabe allowed groups of diffuse players
to wager differently, even if they held identical beliefs ([234]). In equilibrium, such
4In practice, concerns about large-scale wagering firms are also driven by their alleged ability to bet faster than
ordinary players. Our static game only has two outcomes, so it does not make sense to model this feature here. We
hope to revisit the issue in a future work.
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a discrepancy could only arise among the diffuse players who believed that their
expected profits would be zero. We encounter a related ambiguity in our framework
(see our discussion of Proposition V.5). For us, the µ-measure of this set of bettors is
zero, and we anticipate that all of our main results would remain the same, if we were
to relax the diffuse bettors’ same beliefs-same bets restriction. More significantly,
atomic players have been frequently constrained to wager a fixed amount in total
or a unit amount on a single outcome when they bet ([237]; [235]; [77]; [184]).5
Proposition V.6 suggests that imposing these restrictions would have a severe effect.





fi (p)µ (dp) .
Since µ has a density, we immediately confirm that the bets placed by any given
diffuse player are too small to affect the amount wagered on any specific outcome.
Of course, if she revises her strategy, then a particular diffuse player affects neither
the total amount wagered nor (5.2). All of these quantities could change when
aggregations of diffuse players, that is, collections of diffuse players whose beliefs are
contained in a Borel set A with positive µ-measure, revise their wagers.
Payoffs are determined according to (5.1). Each player selects her wagering strat-
egy simultaneously in order to maximize her expected profit according to her beliefs.
We implicitly assume that every bettor knows κ, µ, q, and w, so that she can select
the best response to her opponents’ collective actions. Similar assumptions can be
found in many other equilibrium studies on parimutuel wagering ([237]; [235]; [234];
[77]; [184]).6
5An exception is Cheung’s thesis, though that work’s focus is quite different from our own ([85]).
6Even so, our players might seem unrealistically knowledgeable and confident in their beliefs. Real bettors would
presumably have a more complex prior for the outcomes’ likelihoods. They probably would not have access to such
comprehensive information about their opponents. If they somehow had a sense of these details, they might also
wish to update their own forecasts.
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Since each diffuse player starts out with negligible unit wealth, technically, we
should only discuss the expected profits of diffuse bettors whose views lie in some
Borel set A. We nevertheless compute and refer to the expected profits of an indi-
vidual diffuse bettor in an obvious, but admittedly informal, way. Doing so helps
motivate our definition of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (see Definition V.3) and
highlight the intuition underlying our results.
A seemingly more formidable concern is how to handle (5.1) in pathological cases.
It is trivial to produce a feasible strategy profile (f, a) such that for some p, we have
fj (p) > 0 but
dj = aj = 0.












whenever Outcome j occurs.
If
d1 = d2 = a1 = a2 = 0,
then the total amount wagered is zero. Practically, the betting organizer would
probably cancel such an event, which suggests that it is natural to set all players’
payoffs to zero in this scenario.
An ad-hoc but simple way to address these objections could be to consider κ as some (publicly known) negative
perturbation of the true κ (abusing notation). The idea is that each player would model transaction costs as being
higher than their actual value, artificially lowering their perceived edge and encouraging them to bet more cautiously
than they would otherwise.
A more thorough study could begin by determining whether or not approximating parimutuel wagering using the
Nash equilibrium solution concept is, indeed, reasonable. If it is, one might endow the bettors with more sophisticated
priors and enable them to update their beliefs using the equilibrium implied probabilities (see Definition V.2). This
would lead to an extra condition in Definition V.3.
If the solution concept is unreasonable, one could devise a new scenario in which players independently determine
their betting strategies according to individual reference models and appropriately penalized alternative models for
outcome likelihoods, as well as their opponents’ parameters. Broadly speaking, this treatment of a single player’s
optimization problem has seen widespread use across macroeconomics and finance ([124]). One might then investigate
what unfolds when all players simultaneously participate in the same parimutuel wagering event.
We leave further consideration of these topics for a future work.
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Alternatively, we might have
di + ai > 0
for i 6= j. There are now two appealing options for the diffuse player’s payoff. First,
we might choose to set the payoff to zero. Practically, no bettor would receive a
payout, if Outcome j occurred but no one wagered on it. We also might set the
payoff to +∞, as in Watanabe’s work ([234]). In practice, if the amount wagered
on Outcome j were zero, each player who believed that Outcome j would occur
with positive probability would want to place an arbitrarily small bet on Outcome
j. Setting the payoff to +∞ captures this intuition.
We choose the first option, but selecting the second instead would not change
our results. Only equilibrium payoffs need to be computed, and in an equilibrium,
positive amounts are always wagered on both outcomes. Essentially, the scenario
we describe never arises. One reason is that we do not allow the trivial (or null)
equilibrium in which no player wagers. We could,7 but as Watanabe observed, that
case is comparatively uninteresting and practically unimportant ([234]). Roughly,
the other reason is the same as our justification for possibly setting the payoff to
+∞.
Before making this discussion precise, we introduce some notation.
Definition V.2. Given a feasible strategy profile (f, a) such that at least one of
the di’s or ai’s is positive, the implied (or subjective) probability that Outcome 1 will
occur, denoted P f,a, is defined by
P f,a =
d1 + a1∑2
i=1 (di + ai)
.
7This situation could be considered an equilibrium because if any single player unilaterally revised her wagers,
intuitively, she should incur a loss of at least (1− κ) %.
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We refer to
1− P f,a = d2 + a2∑2
i=1 (di + ai)
as the implied (or subjective) probability that Outcome 2 will occur.
P f,a is the ratio of the amount wagered on Outcome 1 to the total amount wagered,
assuming the latter is positive. Our previous discussion implies that P f,a ∈ (0, 1) in
equilibrium.8 Since the argument was informal, we do not yet take this as fact. In
particular, the amount received by a diffuse player who believes that Outcome 1 will
























κf2 (p)1{P f,a 6=1}
1− P f,a
when Outcomes 1 and 2 occur, respectively. Hence, this diffuse player believes that
her expected profit is
f1 (p)
(











Similarly, the atomic player thinks that her expected profit is
a1
(











Definition V.3. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a feasible strategy profile (f ?, a?)
such that
(i) at least one of the d?i ’s or a
?
i ’s is positive;
8We later observe that P f,a ∈ (1− κ, κ) in equilibrium (see Step 4 of Theorem V.7’s proof).
9Of course, we still abuse notation here. When one of our indicator functions is equal to zero, the corresponding
fraction is actually of the form 0/0, not zero as we suppose.
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(ii) for any p ∈ [0, 1],
f ?1 (p)
(




+ f ?2 (p)
(






















































(i) formally excludes the case in which the total amount wagered is zero. (ii) and
(iii) ensure that each player maximizes her expected profit according to her beliefs,
given her opponents’ wagers.10
First, observe that each player requires very little information about her oppo-
nents’ strategies. For a given diffuse bettor, knowing P f
?,a? alone is enough. The
atomic player must be able to compute P f
?,b for all of her feasible strategy profiles
b, so it is sufficient for her to know d?1 and d
?
2. The difference for the two kinds of
players reflects that an individual diffuse player cannot affect the implied probability
of Outcome 1, while the atomic player can. These remarks explain why we infor-
mally claim that only the atomic player and aggregations of diffuse players affect the
other participants. Notice that each player’s strategy depends anonymously on her
opponents’ bets: how, specifically, her opponents wagers produced P f




Although we only optimize over b in (iii), the apparent possibility that d?1 = d
?
2 = 0
10In (ii), we determine the equilibrium wagers for all diffuse bettors whose beliefs are indexed by p; however, a
single diffuse bettor with these beliefs solves the same maximization problem.
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motivates our use of the extra constraint
d?1, d
?
2, b1 or b2 > 0.
One might be concerned that we do not consider the feasible strategy b1 = b2 = 0
for the atomic player, if d?1 = d
?
2 = 0. Recall that all players receive a payoff of zero
in such a situation. A simple calculation shows that the supremum is then also zero,
so no issue is caused by our omission.
The last important concept for our modeling framework is uniqueness.
Definition V.4. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (f ?, a?) is unique if for any other
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (f , a), we have f ? = f  µ-a.s. and a? = a.
We allow f ? and f  to disagree on a set of µ-measure zero since, ultimately, all
relevant equilibrium quantities such as the implied probabilities are unaffected by
such a difference. Soon, we see that f ? (p) and f  (p) must be equal for all but two
points, at most. There is only uncertainty about the behavior of the diffuse bettors
who believe that their expected profits are zero (cf. our discussion about our space
of feasible strategy profiles).
5.4 Theoretical Results
We now state and prove11 our theoretical results, beginning with Propositions V.5
and V.6. The former describes how the diffuse players should wager in response to
the atomic player’s strategy. The latter tells us how the atomic player should bet,
given the diffuse players’ wagers. We use these observations to prove Theorem V.7,
our main result.12 Recall that it offers necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
11We describe the ideas underlying all of our proofs in Section 5.4; however, we delay our formal arguments for
Proposition V.6 and Theorem V.7 until Appendices 5.7 and 5.8, respectively.
12Roughly, this suggests that our large generalized game can almost be viewed as a game with two players: the
mean-field of diffuse players and the atomic player.
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We conclude Section 5.4 with Corollaries V.8, V.9, and V.10. Corollary V.8 says
that the atomic player wagers on a particular outcome if and only if the final expected
profit per unit bet on that outcome is positive. The next corollary states that our
equilibria are regular in a particular sense, while Corollary V.10 says that the implied
probability of Outcome 1 tends to 0.5 uniformly as the house take approaches 50%.





























for all p ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
f1 (p) =

1 if p > P f,a/κ
0 if p < P f,a/κ
f2 (p) =












First, notice that P f,a ∈ (0, 1) since both d1 and d2 are positive. Comparing (5.6)
and (ii) of Definition V.3, we find that Proposition V.5 provides a simple characteri-
zation of the diffuse players’ equilibrium strategies in this case, given the bets of the
atomic player. Our assumption is not too restrictive, as Step 1 of Theorem V.7’s
proof says that d1 and d2 are always both positive in equilibrium.
Three distinct groups of diffuse bettors emerge: The first group, containing the
diffuse bettors who believe that Outcome 1 will occur with probability greater than
P f,a/κ, wager all of their initial wealth on Outcome 1. Diffuse bettors who think that




/κ make up the second
group. These players bet their entire fortunes on Outcome 2. The remaining diffuse
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The proof’s underlying intuition is easy to explain. It is equivalent to show that





− 1 > 0
0 if κp
P f,a




1−P f,a − 1 > 0
0 if κ(1−p)





− 1 and κ (1− p)
1− P f,a
− 1
describe the expected profit per unit bet on Outcomes 1 and 2, respectively, from
the perspective of the diffuse player who believes that Outcome 1 will occur with
probability p. Individual diffuse players are risk-neutral and do not affect these
quantities, so they wager on an outcome only if the corresponding term is positive.
For a particular diffuse player, this is true of at most one outcome as κ ∈ (0, 1).
Consequently, if a diffuse player has identified a profitable wagering opportunity, she
bets her entire fortune on it.
Despite their large space of feasible strategies, the diffuse players, aside from




/κ, wager either 100%






is ambiguous because, if a given diffuse player’s expected profit per unit bet on
Outcome i is zero, then she is indifferent to the size of her bet on Outcome i.13
13Since µ has a density, the µ-measure of a set with two points is zero. It follows that this ambiguity has no bearing
on an equilibrium’s uniqueness. A more serious concern is that we could have feasible strategy profiles satisfying
Definition V.3 with different implied probabilities. Precluding this possibility is a key part of Theorem V.7’s proof.
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Though their setups differed from our own (see Sections 5.2 - 5.3), Ottaviani,
Sørenson, and Watanabe found similar groupings of diffuse players in equilibrium
([182]; [234]). We return to this observation during our discussion of Corollary V.9,
which roughly says that these groupings persist even when we take into account the
atomic player’s wagers.
Proof. There is little to formalize beyond our heuristic discussion above. We only
comment that rearranging (5.7) shows that we can never have both
κp
P f,a
− 1 > 0 and κ (1− p)
1− P f,a
− 1 > 0.


































κ (d1 + d2)
, (5.9)











1− q > d2
κ (d1 + d2)
, (5.11)





κ (1− q) d1d2







κ (d1 + d2)
and 1− q ≤ d2
κ (d1 + d2)
, (5.13)
a satisfies (5.8) if and only if a1 = a2 = 0.
As in our discussion of the last result, P f,a ∈ (0, 1) and that we only study the
case in which d1, d2 > 0 does not matter. Proposition V.6 can be interpreted as
the complement of Proposition V.5: It characterizes the atomic player’s equilibrium
strategy, given the diffuse players’ bets.
A calculation similar to that in (5.7) shows that (5.9) and (5.11) never hold



























Hence, under (i), the atomic player wagers on Outcome 1 alone. The atomic player
only bets on Outcome 2 in (ii), while she does not wager at all in (iii). Despite having
the opportunity to do so, she never simultaneously wagers on both possibilities.
Proposition V.5 revealed similar behavior for diffuse bettors.
Important ideas in the proofs of Propositions V.5 and V.6 are closely related. By
rearranging (5.9) and (5.11), we get
κ (d1 + d2) q
d1
− 1 > 0 and κ (d1 + d2) (1− q)
d2
− 1 > 0,
respectively. Given the wagers of the diffuse players, the first term describes the
expected profit per unit bet on Outcome 1 according to the atomic player. The
second term has the analogous interpretation for Outcome 2.
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As in our analysis for the diffuse players, the atomic player is risk-neutral and
bets only when one of these inequalities holds,14 leading directly to (iii). Isaacs first
proved this while modeling parimutuel wagering as the control problem faced by a
single risk-neutral atomic player unconstrained by a budget ([138]). We include (iii)
in Proposition V.6 merely to assist with our presentation.
Unlike our previous analysis, we cannot conclude that the atomic player bets her
entire fortune on an initially profitable wagering opportunity. The reason is simple:
the atomic player’s choices affect (5.2). In fact, all else being equal, the payoffs
per unit bet on an outcome decrease as the atomic player raises her wager on that
outcome. Balancing the desires to increase her expected profit by betting more and
keep her expected profit per unit bet high by betting less leads to (5.10) and (5.12),
not the all-or-nothing wagers of Proposition V.5.
More precisely, if (5.9) holds and we relax our wealth constraint, this trade-off




on Outcome 1. This solution was also first discovered by Isaacs ([138]).15 The
idea behind (5.10) is then clear: If the atomic player cannot afford to bet (5.15) on
Outcome 1, she instead wagers as much as she can. This seems reasonable, intuitively,
since up to (5.15), the positive impact of raising her Outcome 1 bet on her expected
profit should outweigh the negative impact. The interpretation of (ii) is similar. We
present the formal proof of Proposition V.6 in Section 5.7.
14The outcome, if any, on which the atomic player wagers can be identified based upon her opponents’ wagers
alone. In particular, this identification can be made without knowledge of the implied probability of Outcome 1.
Still, from (5.8), it is clear that the atomic player bets on Outcome i in equilibrium if and only if the expected profit
per unit bet on Outcome i is positive. We rigorously prove and discuss this further in Corollary V.8.
15Related expressions are also seen in equilibrium studies with N risk-neutral atomic players constrained to wager
a specific total amount ([77]). In an obvious way, Proposition V.6 fills the small gap between these two settings.
Recall that no explicit solutions are available for Cheung’s atomic player, who faces a budget constraint like ours
but is risk-averse ([85]).
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Theorem V.7. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists if and only if κ > 0.5.16
When an equilibrium exists, it is unique.
The connection between low transaction costs (or large κ) and the existence of
non-trivial equilibria has been observed in other parimutuel wagering studies. For
example, a non-trivial equilibrium exists in Watanabe’s model only if the house
take is sufficiently small ([234]). Ottaviani and Sørenson make a similar observation
([182]).
Intuitively, κ > 0.5 is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium in our frame-
work because there are only two possible outcomes. Suppose that (f ?, a?) is a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Regardless of her type, if a player believes that Outcome
1 will occur with probability p and wagers on Outcome 1, it should be true that her
final expected profit per unit bet on Outcome 1 is positive:
κ p
P f?,a?
− 1 > 0.
Similarly, if she wagers on Outcome 2, then
κ (1− p)
1− P f?,a?
− 1 > 0.
Positive amounts are wagered on both outcomes (see Section 5.3), implying that
κ
P f?,a?
− 1 > 0 and κ
1− P f?,a?
− 1 > 0. (5.16)
Rearranging (5.16) shows that κ > 0.5. More generally, it is easy to see that in a
parimutuel betting game with n outcomes and risk-neutral players who can elect not
to bet, κ > 1/n is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium.
Parimutuel wagering games in the literature occasionally possess multiple equilib-
ria. For instance, Watanabe et al. adapt the work of Harsanyi and Selten to select
16In practice, this inequality almost always holds.
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one equilibrium out of several that arise in their atomic player model ([235]). As
mentioned in Section 5.3, Watanabe’s continuum game model can feature multiple
equilibria when µ ({p}) > 0 for some fixed p. We suspect that our equilibrium would
no longer be unique, if we incorporated additional atomic players or relaxed our
assumption that µ had a density, but we leave this issue to a future study.
We break our proof into 4 steps. Step 1 allows us to use Propositions V.5 and V.6.
It says that in an equilibrium, the total amount wagered by the diffuse players on
each outcome is always positive. Step 2 formalizes our discussion above and shows
that κ > 0.5 is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium.
To finish, we find an equivalent formulation of our original problem. More pre-
cisely, after presenting some preliminary notation in Steps 3 - 4, we define our so-
called implied probability map ϕ in Step 5. Our work in Steps 6 - 7 shows that this
map has a unique fixed-point. Due to its construction, its fixed-point corresponds
to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and vice versa. We can then conclude that our
game has a unique equilibrium when κ > 0.5 in Steps 3 - 4.
Our approach is motivated by the following observation: an equilibrium is es-
sentially determined by the implied probability of Outcome 1. Given this quantity,
we immediately recover the diffuse players’ wagers from Proposition V.5. Techni-






/κ behave, but this does not matter. By Proposition V.6, we then
identify the atomic player’s wagers.
This observation leads to the definition of ϕ in Step 5. In a certain sense, our
recipe is only meaningful at a fixed-point of ϕ, which underlies the correspondence
just discussed. Our complete proof of Theorem V.7 can be found in Section 5.8.
We close Section 5.4 with Corollaries V.8, V.9, and V.10. The first result says that
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the atomic player wagers on a particular outcome if and only if her final expected
profit per unit bet on that outcome is positive. This is fairly obvious from (iii)
of Definition V.3, and we basically assume this to be true during our discussion of
Theorem V.7.
Still, recall that Proposition V.6 identifies the outcome, if any, on which the atomic
player wagers based upon only the diffuse players’ bets. For instance, according to












≥ q > d
?
1




The specific form of a?1 in (5.10) ultimately prevents this.
Notice that Proposition V.5 already almost implies the corresponding result for
diffuse players. We say almost because of the undetermined behavior of the diffuse
bettors whose final expected profit per unit bet on some outcome is 0. From that
perspective, the atomic and diffuse players identify profitable wagering opportuni-
ties using the same criteria. Strategically, they just differ in how they size their
equilibrium wagers.
Corollary V.8. Suppose that (f ?, a?) is an equilibrium. Then a?1 > 0 if and only if
κq
P f?,a?
− 1 > 0,
while a?2 > 0 if and only if
κ (1− q)
1− P f?,a?
− 1 > 0.
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Proof. We present the argument for the first case. The other is similar.
Recall that d?1, d
?
2 > 0 (see Step 1 of Theorem V.7’s proof). Assume that a
?
1 > 0.
According to Proposition V.6, (5.9) holds and a?2 = 0. Using the notation from Step

















− 1 > 0 (5.18)
follows from Isaacs’ work ([138]).
To prove the remaining direction, assume that (5.18) is satisfied. Exactly one of
(5.9), (5.11), and (5.13) holds. We cannot have (5.11), since it would follow that
a?2 > 0. Arguing as we just did, we would get
κ (1− q)
1− P f?,a?
− 1 > 0,
which would lead to
κq
P f?,a?
− 1 < 0.












Hence, (5.9) holds and a?1 > 0.
To explain our next result, suppose that some player is wagering on a particular
outcome. If another player believes that this outcome will occur with higher prob-
ability than the original player, Corollary V.9 says that the new player also wagers
on the outcome. Recall from Section 5.2 that Watanabe called an equilibrium with
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this property regular ([234]). All equilibria in Watanabe’s framework and Ottaviani
and Sørenson’s framework are regular ([182]; [234]).
One might suspect that such a result generally holds, but this is not the case
([235]). To the best of our knowledge, regularity has only been consistently observed
in the literature when each player’s initial wealth is negligible ([182]; [234]). Corollary
V.9 shows that our model is an example of a parimutuel wagering game in which
the equilibrium is regular, even when an atomic player is active. It is an immediate
consequence of our observation that both atomic and diffuse players decide to wager
on some outcome by determining whether or not the final expected profit per unit
bet on that outcome is positive.
Corollary V.9. An equilibrium (f ?, a?) is always regular.
Proof. Since d?1, d
?
2 > 0 by Step 1 of Theorem V.7’s proof, the result directly follows
from Proposition V.5 and Corollary V.8.
Section 5.4’s last result says that the implied probability of Outcome 1 tends to
0.5 as the house take approaches 0.5, regardless of the other parameters that we
choose for our model. In fact, the convergence is uniform.
Initially, this finding may appear rather odd. For example, it is easy to ensure
that P f
?,a? lies between 49.9% and 50.1% when q = 0 and the µ-mass of [0, 1] is
almost entirely concentrated near p = 0. If essentially the whole population believes
that Outcome 2 is guaranteed to occur, how can the total amounts wagered on each
outcome be roughly equal?
Our discussion of Theorem V.7 outlines the key intuition. Simply notice that
instead of rearranging (5.16) to show that κ > 0.5, we can show that P f
?,a? ∈
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(1− κ, κ). This holds even in the extreme scenario where virtually all of the initial
wealth is held by those who believe that Outcome 2 is a sure bet. Still, our first
instinct has some merit: Here, P f
?,a? ≈ 1− κ for all κ (see Section 5.6).
Corollary V.10. Fix µ, q, and w and consider the map defined on (0.5, 1) by
κ 7→ P f?,a? .
As κ ↓ 0.5, the values of the map approach 0.5.
Proof. Simply notice that the map is well-defined by Theorem V.7 and that P f
?,a? ∈
(1− κ, κ) by Step 4 of its proof.
5.5 Numerical Results
The theoretical results from Section 5.4 allow us to return to our central question:
How do large-scale participants in parimutuel wagering events affect the house and
ordinary bettors? We explore this issue by analyzing several concrete scenarios (see
Examples V.12 - V.15).
We use the house’s revenue to quantify the atomic player’s impact on the house.
Given an equilibrium (f ?, a?), the house’s revenue is simply the product of the house
take and the total amount wagered:
(1− κ) (d?1 + d?2 + a?1 + a?2) . (5.19)
Notice that this quantity is deterministic and does not depend on the actual proba-
bility of Outcome 1, as the house collects (5.19) regardless of which outcome occurs.
To quantify the atomic player’s effect on diffuse bettors, we use one of two quanti-
ties. In Examples V.12 - V.13, we select values for the actual probability of Outcome
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1. Making this choice lets us compute the actual total expected profit of the diffuse
players. If (f ?, a?) is an equilibrium and the actual probability of Outcome 1 is p̄,














While we use (5.20) to describe how the atomic player affects the diffuse players
in Examples V.12 - V.13, we cannot do so in Examples V.14 - V.15. The reason
is that we make no assumption about the actual probability of Outcome 1 in the
latter situations. Instead, we quantify the impact on diffuse bettors using their total
















in an equilibrium (f ?, a?). Here, we merely compute each diffuse player’s expected
profit according to her beliefs and aggregate the results over all diffuse players.
From Section 6.1, recall that the standard narrative says that the presence of the
atomic player should increase the house’s revenue but decrease the diffuse players’
total expected profit (actual or subjective, as applicable). The eventual decline in
the house’s revenue should only be seen over time, not in our static game model.
Technically, since we specified that w > 0 in Section 5.3, the atomic player can
never be absent in our framework. Still, we can model the atomic player’s absence
by choosing an extremely low value for w, say w = 10−10. Her wagers are then too
small to materially affect any equilibrium quantities. We do this for all of the Case
1’s in Examiples V.12 - V.15. The atomic player is present, that is, w >> 0, in all
of our upcoming Case 2’s.
The following collection of measures is convenient for our purposes.
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Definition V.11. For n ≥ 1, let µn be the Borel measure on [0, 1] whose density gn
is defined by
gn (p) =
 −2n (n− 1) p+ 2 (n− 1) + 1/n if p < 1/n1/n if p ≥ 1/n .
In Figure 5.1, we give the plots of gn for n = 1, 3, and 9. Here are the key
observations:
(i) gn is continuous and positive on [0, 1].
(ii) µn ([0, 1]) = 1 for all n.
(iii) µ1 is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
(iv) gn converges in distribution to the Dirac delta function as n ↑ ∞.
(i) and (ii) ensure that µn is a suitable candidate for the measure describing the initial
wealth of the diffuse bettors, that is, all of our results apply when µ = µn. In this
case, (iii) says that the initial wealth of the diffuse bettors is uniformly distributed
when n = 1. (iv) says that their initial wealth is increasingly concentrated among
those who believe that Outcome 2 will occur with high probability as n increases.
Another key feature is that the diffuse bettors’ total initial wealth is always equal to
1 (see (ii)).
Before we proceed, we remark that all of our figures are generated with the help
of the ideas in Theorem V.7’s proof. More precisely, assume that κ ∈ (0.5, 1). The
function ϕ defined in Step 5 has a unique fixed-point. Since ϕ is also continuous and
decreasing, we can efficiently approximate this value with arbitrary precision using
binary search. Step 3 shows how to reconstruct the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(f ?, a?), given such an estimate.
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Figure 5.1: Depiction of gn for n = 1, 3 and 9.
Example V.12. We now show that both effects predicted by the usual narrative
can be observed.
In Cases 1 and 2, we set µ = µ1 and q = 0.9. We assume that the atomic player’s
beliefs are exactly correct, i.e., the actual probability that Outcome 1 will occur is
also 0.9. The only difference between Cases 1 and 2 is that w = 10−10 in the former
but w = 1 in the latter.
Recall that choosing µ = µ1 means that the diffuse bettors’ initial wealth is
uniformly distributed. Since q = 0.9, the atomic player (correctly) believes that
Outcome 1 is quite likely.
In Figure 5.2, we plot the diffuse players’ actual total expected profit. Collectively,
the diffuse players beliefs are rather inaccurate, so it is not surprising that their expect
profit is negative. Still, as κ ↑ 1, the diffuse players become increasingly worse off in
Case 2. Intuitively, the atomic player quickly raises her bet on Outcome 1 as κ ↑ 1.
The implied probability of Outcome 1 rises,17 causing more diffuse players to bet on
Outcome 2 and less to bet on Outcome 1. Since the actual probability of Outcome
1 is 0.9, this transition negatively affects the diffuse players.
17We remark that P f
?,a? ∈ [0.5, 0.7] for all κ ∈ (0.5, 1) in Example V.12. In particular, the favorite-longshot bias
results, regardless of the house take.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.2: Depiction of the diffuse players’ actual total expected profit in Example V.12.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.3: Depiction of the house’s revenue in Example V.12.
We plot the house’s revenue in Figure 5.3. The house’s revenue is higher in Case
2 than in Case 1 for all κ ∈ (0.5, 1), as a result of the higher wagering totals in Case
2.
Example V.13. Still, there are cases in which diffuse players are positively affected
by the activities of the atomic player.
We now choose µ = µ1 and q = 0.57 for Cases 1 and 2. The actual probability of
Outcome 1 is 0.47. The only difference between the two scenarios is that w = 10−10
in Case 1, while w = 1 in Case 2.
Compared to Example V.12, Outcome 1 is slightly less likely here. Also, we still
assume that the atomic player’s forecast is quite accurate, but her prediction is no
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.4: Depiction of the diffuse players’ actual total expected profit in Example V.13.
longer perfect.
We plot the diffuse players’ actual expected profit in Figure 5.4. The graphs for
Cases 1 and 2 are the same for most values of κ; however, we see that the diffuse
players’ expected profit is higher in Case 2 when κ is large enough. Roughly, the
atomic player does not start betting (on Outcome 1) until the house take is low, since
she is nearly ambivalent. This explains why the curves are initially identical. When
the atomic player begins to wager on Outcome 1, the diffuse players reshuffle their
bets as in Example V.12.18 The shift benefits them, essentially because the atomic
player wagers on the wrong outcome.
In Figure 5.5, we plot the house’s revenue. We see an extremely small improvement
in Case 2 when κ is large, but the graphs are almost indistinguishable, visually. As in
Example V.12, the increase corresponds to the increase in the total amount wagered.
It is slight, as the atomic player’s uncertainty about what will occur causes her to
bet very little in Case 2, even for κ ≈ 1.
Example V.14. We can argue that the diffuse players are better off in the presence
of the atomic player, even without making assumptions about the actual probability
of Outcome 1.
18Like Example V.12, we see the favorite-longshot bias here because P f
?,a? ∈ [0.5, 0.53] for all κ ∈ (0.5, 1).
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.5: Depiction of the house’s revenue in Example V.13.
In Cases 1 and 2, we now choose µ = µ10 and q = 0.95. As in Examples V.12 -
V.13, we set w = 10−10 in Case 1 and w = 1 in Case 2. The atomic player believes
that Outcome 1 is highly likely. Collectively, the diffuse players believe that Outcome
2 will probably happen: over 90% of their initial wealth is held by those who believe
that the probability of Outcome 2 is at least 0.9. We make no judgment about the
accuracy of the players’ beliefs.
We plot the diffuse players’ subjective expected profit in Figure 5.6. The graphs
are the same for low κ, but eventually, the diffuse players’ subjective expected profit
is much higher in Case 2. Intuitively, the atomic player raises her wager on Outcome
1 as κ ↑ 1, since she believes that Outcome 1 will occur. The implied probability of
Outcome 1 then rises, a boon to those who believe that Outcome 2 will occur. This
includes most of the diffuse players.
In Figure 5.7, we plot the house’s revenue. The house’s revenue in Case 2 is at
least as large as its revenue in Case 1 for all values of κ. Often, the improvement is
significant. Roughly, there is too much agreement among the diffuse bettors. They
wager more in the presence of the atomic player, believing that they can profit from
her supposed wagering mistakes. The pool size increases, leading to greater revenue
for the house in Case 2.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.6: Depiction of the diffuse players’ subjective total expected profit in Example V.14.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.7: Depiction of the house’s revenue in Example V.14.
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Example V.15. In keeping with the standard narrative, it seems like the house is
always immediately better off because of the atomic player. We can cast some doubt
on this too.
We used the same µ for Cases 1 and 2 in Examples V.12 - V.14. This choice
captures the idea that the presence of the atomic player should not affect the diffuse
players’ initial wealth in a static parimutuel wagering game.19
Alternatively, it might be reasonable to fix the distribution of initial wealth across
the entire population, not just the diffuse population. For instance, we could specify
that the amount held by those who believe that Outcome 1 will occur is roughly the
same as the amount held by those who believe that Outcome 2 will occur. We could
then compare the situations in which the wealth is held by only diffuse players and
in which some wealth is held by the atomic player. This is the approach we now
take.
In Case 1, w = 10−10 and the density of µ is defined by
p 7→ g100 (p) + g100 (1− p)
2
.
For Case 2, we set w = 1 and µ = µ100. We choose q = 1 for both scenarios and,
again, make no assumption about Outcome 1’s actual probability.
Intuitively, half of the diffuse players in Case 1 believe that Outcome 1 is going
to occur, while the other half believes that Outcome 2 will occur. For Case 2, the
diffuse players all believe that Outcome 2 is going to occur. The atomic player, whose
wealth is equal to the collective wealth of the diffuse players, believes that Outcome
1 will occur.
Notice that the diffuse players’ total initial wealth is equal in Cases 1 and 2;
however, the wealth of the entire population in Case 2 is twice what it is in Case
19Over the course of many events, diffuse players may stop participating because of the atomic player, making this
intuition questionable in another context (see Section 6.1).
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1. This is consistent with our parameter selections in Examples V.12 - V.14. When
studying the house’s revenue here, we might have also chosen µ = 0.5 × µ100 and
w = 0.5 in Case 2, ensuring that the wealth of the entire population is identical in
both scenarios. We comment on this shortly.
One might suspect that Cases 1 and 2 are quite similar, but this is not true. In
Figure 5.8, we plot the diffuse players’ subjective expected profit. For κ ≈ 1, their
subjective expected profit is higher in Case 2 than in Case 1. Otherwise, it is lower
for all κ, and often, the drop is significant.
To explain this observation, we plot the implied probability of Outcome 1 in
Figure 5.9. The implied probability of Outcome 1 is about 0.5 for all κ in Case 1.
For Case 2, it is almost 1− κ for low κ but approaches 0.5 as κ ↑ 1.
Since the diffuse players believe that Outcome 2 will occur but the atomic player
believes that Outcome 1 will occur, the intuition appears to be as follows. Roughly,
the diffuse players are willing to tolerate unfavorable betting conditions more than
the atomic player. Despite the fact that each type of player is basically sure that the
outcome they are betting on will occur, the diffuse players in Case 2 raise the size of
their wagers much faster than the atomic player when κ is low. The diffuse players
do this at the expense of their own subjective expected profit, which is nearly zero
in Case 2 until κ ≈ 0.84. The atomic player does not substantially raise her wager
on Outcome 1 until the values of the implied probability of Outcome 1 and κ make
her subjective expected profit per unit bet very high.
One could argue that the atomic player’s strategy is superior to the strategies
employed by the diffuse players, although we have made no assumption about the
accuracy of her prediction. Perhaps the reason is that unlike the diffuse players,
she considers her individual impact on the other wagerers because of her substantial
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wealth.
In Figure 5.10, we plot the house’s revenue. We see that the house’s revenue
is higher in Case 1 for small κ but higher in Case 2 for large κ. After selecting
µ = 0.5 × µ100 and w = 0.5 in Case 2 (see our explanation above), we re-plot the
house’s revenue in Figure 5.11. Now the house’s revenue is higher in Case 1 for all κ.
Regardless of our normalization, the key point is that the house’s maximum revenue
is always much higher in Case 1.
Intuitively, the diffuse players appear to have a greater tolerance for poor betting
conditions than the atomic player, as discussed previously. They are willing to
bet even when κ ≈ 0.5, and consequently, about 99% of the diffuse players are
wagering in Case 1 when κ ≈ 0.51. The house loses revenue by raising κ, since the
entire population has already wagered almost everything that it can. In Case 2, the
atomic player’s reluctance to significantly raise her wager on Outcome 1 until betting
conditions improve means that the total amount wagered is low for most κ. The pool
is large only if κ is quite high, so the house does not collect much.
In Examples V.12 - V.14, the house’s revenue in Case 2 is at least as great as
the house’s revenue in Case 1 for all κ. Of course, the house’s maximum revenue is
then higher in Case 2 for these studies. Here, the pointwise analysis is not as clean,
leading us to more directly consider the house’s strategic behavior.
Thus far, we have understood the house take to be exogenously determined. One
way to relax this assumption is to break our game into two stages. In the first stage,
the betting organizer chooses a value for the house take in order to maximize her
revenue. The second stage is identical to our current setup.
Under the new framework, the house needs to account for more than the distri-
bution of initial wealth across the entire population. The house must also consider
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.8: Depiction of the diffuse players’ subjective total expected profit in Example V.15.
how the initial wealth is distributed across the population for each type of player.
Independent of our normalization of the entire population’s wealth, the house’s rev-
enue is maximized at κ ≈ 0.506 in Case 1 and at κ ≈ 0.839 in Case 2. Hence, the
house selects these values of κ in Cases 1 and 2, respectively.
In Figure 5.8, the diffuse players’ subjective expected profit is about 0.0085 when
κ ≈ 0.506 in Case 2, while it is about 0.023 when κ ≈ 0.839 in Case 2. These
numbers arise from our original parameter choices, ensuring that the total initial
wealth of the diffuse players is 1 in both scenarios. The diffuse players are not well
off in either Case 1 or Case 2. We could still argue that the setup of Case 2 is to
their advantage, in contrast to our earlier pointwise analysis. Roughly, because the
atomic player is less willing to bet under poor wagering conditions, the house more
easily preys upon the diffuse players when she is absent.
5.6 Appendix: Properties of P f
?,a?
We briefly revisit our discussion of Corollary V.10 by studying the properties of
P f
?,a? as a function of κ. We hope this highlights a few theoretical features of our
model, though we do not relate our findings in Section 5.6 to our central question.
To generate these figures, we use the approach and notation of Section 5.5.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.9: Depiction of Outcome 1’s implied probability in Example V.15.
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Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.10: Depiction of the house’s revenue in Example V.15 (before Case 2 wealth is normalized).
κ
















Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.11: Depiction of the house’s revenue in Example V.15 (after Case 2 wealth is normalized).
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Figure 5.12: Depiction of Outcome 1’s implied probability when all players effectively believe that
Outcome 2 will occur (cf. Section 5.6).
Recall our claim that in an extreme case where nearly all of the initial wealth is
held by those who believe that Outcome 2 is highly likely, P f
?,a? ≈ 1 − κ for all κ.
We illustrate this in Figure 5.12, which depicts the map κ 7→ P f?,a? when µ = µ100,
q = 0, and w = 1. Here, over 99% of the diffuse players’ initial wealth belongs to
those who believe that the probability of Outcome 2 is at least 0.99. The atomic
player believes that Outcome 2 is guaranteed to occur. As expected, the plot is
visually indistinguishable from a plot of the map κ 7→ 1− κ.
Often, it is more difficult to broadly describe attributes of the function κ 7→ P f?,a? .
We know that P f
?,a? ∈ (1− κ, κ), but our players’ heterogeneity allows for a wide
range of possibilities within these bounds. There is a rich interplay between their
differing beliefs, effects on (5.2), and wealth constraints. By plotting the map κ 7→
P f
?,a? under varying assumptions on q, w, and µ, Figure 5.13 displays a few of the
myriad possibilities. For instance, the density g of the µ used to generate Line A is a
linear combination of Gaussian densities with different means. Line A’s oscillations
arise because of g’s distinct peaks.
152
κ











A B C D
Figure 5.13: Depiction of Outcome 1’s implied probability under various parameter regimes (cf.
Section 5.6).
5.7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition V.6
We only prove (i). The argument for (ii) is similar, and as observed above, (iii) is
due to Isaacs ([138]).
















We get the first and third inequalities because κ ∈ (0, 1). The second inequality is
due to (5.14), while the last inequality is a rearrangement of (5.9). For now, the
critical observation is that the leftmost quantity is less than the rightmost, allowing
us to use the work of Isaacs ([138]).
Define the map
Φ : R2≥0 −→ R
by
Φ (b1, b2) = b1
(











Φ (b1, b2) is the atomic player’s expected profit, given that she wagers bi on Outcome
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Φ (b1, b2) .
Technically, strategy profiles (b1, b2) with
b1 + b2 > w
are not feasible, but this is unimportant.











This proves that (i) holds when w ≥ b?1.
The case where w < b?1 is handled with elementary calculus. First, observe that
(5.9) implies that q > 0 and
∂b1Φ (0, 0) =
κ (d1 + d2) q
d1
− 1 > 0.
Since ∂b1Φ (b
?
1, 0) = 0 and
∂b1b1Φ (b1, b2) = −
2κd1 (b2 + d2) q
(b1 + d1)
3
is always negative, it follows that ∂b1Φ (b1, 0) > 0 for 0 ≤ b1 < b?1. The interpretation
is that as long as the atomic player has not yet wagered on Outcome 2, she should
wager as much as she can up to b?1 on Outcome 1.
We only need to argue that she should never wager on Outcome 2, that is,
∂b2 (b1, b2) is negative whenever b1 + b2 ≤ w. Rearranging (5.22) implies that
∂b2Φ (0, 0) =
κ (d1 + d2) (1− q)
d2




1, 0) ≤ 020 and







is positive everywhere, so ∂b2Φ (b1, 0) < 0 for 0 ≤ b1 < b?1. Since
∂b2b2Φ (b1, b2) = −
2κd2 (b1 + d1) (1− q)
(b2 + d2)
3
is always non-positive, we conclude that ∂b2 (b1, b2) must be negative whenever 0 ≤
b1 < b
?
1. In particular, ∂b2 (b1, b2) is negative, if b1 + b2 ≤ w.
5.8 Appendix: Proof of Theorem V.7
Step 1: If (f ?, a?) is an equilibrium, then d?1, d
?
2 > 0.
We show that the total amount wagered on each outcome by the diffuse players
is positive in equilibrium: d?1, d
?
2 > 0. We use this result to complete the proof of the
only if direction of Theorem V.7 in Step 2. It also allows us to use Propositions V.5
and V.6 in the proof of the if direction.
Suppose instead that we can find a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (f ?, a?) with
d?1 = 0. It follows immediately that d
?
2 > 0: otherwise, (iii) of Definition V.3 implies
that a?1 = a
?
2 = 0, which contradicts (i) of Definition V.3. A consequence of Isaacs’
work is that q = 0 ([138]).21 Then (iii) of Definition V.3 implies that a?1 = a
?
2 = 0.
In particular, P f
?,a? = 0. By (i) of Definition V.3, f ?2 ≡ 0, which is impossible since
d?2 > 0.
Hence, d?1 > 0. It follows similarly that d
?
2 > 0.
Step 2: If an equilibrium exists, then κ > 0.5.















21If q > 0, then a?1 is undefined. Roughly, the atomic player needs to make an arbitrarily small bet on Outcome 1
but is not allowed to do so.
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We finish the proof of the only if direction of Theorem V.7 by formalizing the
heuristics given previously. Suppose that (f ?, a?) is an equilibrium. Step 1 implies
that d?1, d
?








by Proposition V.5. Rearranging (5.23) finishes the argument.
Step 3: Definition and discussion of p̄i (when κ > 0.5).
Due to Step 2, we assume that κ > 0.5 for the remainder of the proof (Steps 3 -
4). This assumption ensures that our discussions are not vacuous, as we implicitly
rely on the positive length of the interval [1− κ, κ].
We now define and discuss the quantities p̄1, p̄2 ∈ [1− κ, κ]. We use this notation
when we define our ζi maps in Step 4 and ϕ in Step 5. Roughly, p̄1 is a näıve lower
bound for the implied probability of Outcome 1 when the atomic player wagers on
Outcome 1. Similarly, p̄2 is an upper bound for the implied probability of Outcome
1 when the atomic player wagers on Outcome 2. Both are derived from Propositions
V.5 and V.6.





















is decreasing and continuous on [1− κ, κ]. Its value is 1/κ at p = (1− κ) and 0 at





















Clearly, p̄1 = κ, or equivalently, (p̄1, κ] is empty, if and only if q = 0. Regardless
156








































)) if p ∈ (p̄1, κ]
. (5.26)





















is increasing and continuous on [1− κ, κ]. Its value is 0 at p = (1− κ) and 1/κ at


























































)) if p ∈ [p̄2, κ]
. (5.28)
This comment relates to (5.11) and (5.13), as reflected in our definitions of ζi and ϕ.
We conclude by observing that we have p̄2 < p̄1 since κ ∈ (0.5, 1). This is another
key remark for our future definition of ϕ.
Step 4: Definition and discussion of ζi (when κ > 0.5).
We define and discuss the functions ζ1 and ζ2. We use this notation in our defini-
tion of ϕ in Step 5. Intuitively, ζi (p) represents the amount that the atomic player
wagers on Outcome i when she makes a positive wager on Outcome i, does not face
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a budget constraint, and the implied probability of Outcome 1 is p (cf. (5.10) and
(5.12)).





























0, 1− 1− p
κ
)




















for p ∈ (p̄1, κ). It follows as in (5.14) that ζ1 is positive on (p̄1, κ). We also have
ζ1 (p̄1) = ζ1 (κ) = 0
from (5.25).





















Using the techniques from our discussion of ζ1, we see that ζ2 is positive on (1− κ, p̄2)
and
ζ2 (1− κ) = ζ2 (p̄2) = 0.
Step 5: Definition and discussion of ϕ (when κ > 0.5).
We introduce the implied probability map ϕ. We see in Steps 3 and 4 that a fixed-
point of ϕ corresponds to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in an obvious way and
vice versa, which ultimately allows us to complete Theorem V.7’s proof.
ϕ’s domain is the set of candidates p for the implied probability of Outcome 1.














are the total amounts wagered by the diffuse players on Outcomes 1 and 2, respec-






















that is, p ∈ (p̄1, κ], then the atomic player wagers nothing on Outcome 2 and
min {w, ζ1 (p)}
on Outcome 1. Recalculating the implied probability of Outcome 1 using these bets,
we get












0, 1− 1− p
κ
)
from Definition V.2. We set ϕ (p) to this value. In some sense, this procedure is only
potentially meaningful when p is equal to ϕ (p), leading to our focus on fixed-points.
















0, 1− 1− p
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) if p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]












0, 1− 1− p
κ
) if p ∈ (p̄1, κ]
.
Observe that ϕ is continuous on [1− κ, κ] since µ has a positive density and
ζi (p̄i) = 0 (see Step 4). This helps us prove that ϕ has a unique fixed-point in Step
7.
Step 6: ϕ is decreasing (when κ > 0.5).
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We show that ϕ is decreasing. We use this property in Step 7 to argue that ϕ has
a unique fixed-point.
Since µ’s density is positive everywhere, ϕ is decreasing on [p̄2, p̄1]. It suffices to
show that ϕ is decreasing on both [1− κ, p̄2) and (p̄1, κ] because ϕ is continuous.
The proofs are similar, so we consider the former case.
We are done, if [1− κ, p̄2) is empty. Suppose that it is not. Recall from Step 3
that this is equivalent to assuming that q < 1. Define two functions ϕ2 and ϕ
w
2 on





































The point is that
ϕ (p) = max {ϕ2 (p) , ϕw2 (p)}
on [1− κ, p̄2), so it is enough to show that ϕ2 and ϕw2 are both decreasing.
Clearly, ϕw2 is decreasing. Denoting the positive and continuous density of µ by
g, we see that ϕ2 is decreasing because














































































Step 7: ϕ has a unique fixed-point (when κ > 0.5).
We show that ϕ has a unique fixed-point. We use the existence of ϕ’s fixed-point
to prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Step 3, while we use
the uniqueness of ϕ’s fixed-point to demonstrate that the equilibrium is unique in
Step 4.
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The proof is simple: ϕ (1− κ) = 1 and ϕ (κ) = 0. Since ϕ is continuous and
decreasing (see Steps 5 - 6), it must have a unique fixed-point.
Step 8: An equilibrium exists (when κ > 0.5).
We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Based on Step 7, we need
only describe how to construct an equilibrium from a fixed-point of ϕ.
Suppose that P̂ is a fixed-point of ϕ. The proofs for each case are similar, so we




1 if p ≥ P̂ /κ
0 if p < P̂/κ
, f2 (p) =



























and d2 = µ
[




(5.28) implies that (5.11) is satisfied. Since ϕ (1− κ) = 1, we know that P̂ 6=
(1− κ). Hence, d1, d2 > 0 because the density of µ is positive everywhere. We then
have (iii) of Definition V.3 by Proposition V.6.






















0, 1− 1− P̂
κ
) = P f,a.
From Proposition V.5, we see that (ii) of Definition V.3 holds.
This completes the proof, as (i) of Definition V.3 is obviously satisfied.
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Step 9: The equilibrium in Step 3 is unique (when κ > 0.5).
We conclude Theorem V.7’s proof by showing that the equilibrium in Step 3 is
unique. The key observation is that ϕ’s fixed-point is also unique (see Step 7).
First, we describe how to construct a fixed-point of ϕ, given an equilibrium








> 0 and d?2 = µ
[





In particular, P f
?,a? ∈ (1− κ, κ). By Proposition V.6, there are three possibilities
for a?.
Assume that a?1 > 0 and a
?
2 = 0. The other cases can be handled similarly. By
Proposition V.6, (5.9) holds. Hence, P f






























































that is, P f
?,a? is a fixed-point of ϕ.
Now suppose that we have another equilibrium (f , a). Using the method just
described, we see that P f
,a is a fixed-point of ϕ. Since there is exactly one fixed-
point of ϕ by Step 7, P f
,a = P f
?,a? .
By Step 1 and Proposition V.5, f ? and f  necessarily agree everywhere, except
when
p = P f













Proposition V.6 implies that a? = a.
CHAPTER VI
Mini-Flash Crashes, Model Risk, and Optimal Execution
6.1 Overview
Amidst the violent market disruption on May 6, 2010, the infamous Flash Crash,
“Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at prices
more than 60% away from their values just moments before. Moreover,
many of these trades were executed at prices of a penny or less, or as high
as $100,000, before prices of those securities returned to their ‘pre-crash’
levels” ([3]).
Today, this particular event remains so memorable due to its remarkable scale.
In fact, lesser versions of the Flash Crash, or mini-flash crashes, happen quite
often. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be over a dozen every day ([102]).
A rigorous empirical analysis uncovered “18,520 crashes and spikes with durations
less than 1,500 ms” in stock prices from 2006 through 2011 ([142]). The exhaustive
documentation on Nanex LLC’s “NxResearch” site offers further corroboration as
well ([10]).
A popular definition characterizes a mini-flash crash as an event in which the price
of some security changes at least 0.8% and ticks ten times consecutively in a single
direction ([142]). Price swings need not be so mild, though. Johnson et al. noted that
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“both crashes and spikes are typically more than 30 standard deviations larger than
the average price movement either side of an event” ([142]). The SEC also recently
described several 99% plunges as “mini-flash crashes” ([17]). Price surges can also
fit these requirements. For example, the share price of Kraft Foods underwent a
mini-flash crash on October 3, 2012 when it rocketed up 28% in less than a minute
([199]).
Now, it is true that the most irregular trades executed during some mini-flash
crashes are eventually nullified and removed from the consolidated tape. For instance,
when shares of the network security firm Qualys, Inc. jumped from $10 to $0.0001
and back during a 300ms period on April 25, 2013, all trades below $10.15 were
ultimately canceled ([9]). The idea is that these transactions were clearly erroneous,
that is, there was “an obvious error in [a] term, such as price, number of shares or
other unit of trading, or identification of the security” ([13]).
Regardless of whether they are reflected in final data feeds, why do such phenom-
ena occur?
Several answers have been proposed. Roughly, most point to human errors, en-
dogenous feedback loops, the nature of modern liquidity provision, fundamental value
shocks, or market fragmentation. These ideas can be viewed as different ways to ra-
tionalize how an extreme (local or global) dislocation in supply and demand can arise
in modern markets. We will thoroughly review them all in Subsection 6.2.1.
One of our contributions in the present paper is the development of a model which
captures aspects of the first three theories. The remaining explanations are plausible
sources of a subset of mini-flash crashes, and we discuss their relationship to our
framework in Subsection 6.2.1.
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Our model also appears to exhibit features of historical mini-flash crashes. For
instance, there are periods in which extreme price moves will not manifest. If they
do, accompanying trade volumes can be high or low. Some market participants may
partially synchronize their trading during a mini-flash crash. Our agents may not
know that a mini-flash crash is about to begin even just before its onset.
Our results seem to be aligned with intuitive expectations as well. For example,
our mini-flash crashes can begin if some of our agents are too uncertain about their
initial beliefs, inaccurate in their understanding of price dynamics, slow to update
their models and objectives, or willing to take on risk.
Subsection 6.2.1 contains details on where to find the proofs and figures corre-
sponding to these claims.
We construct our model beginning with a finite population of agents trading in
a single risky asset, each of whom must decide how to act based upon his own
preferences, beliefs, and observations. Our specifications are drawn from ideas in the
price impact and optimal execution literature and are given in Subsections 6.4.2 -
6.4.4.
We imagine that our agents’ orders are submitted to a single venue, where they
are executed together with trades from other (unmodeled) market participants. This
naturally compels us to make an explicit distinction between how the risky asset’s
price actually evolves and our agents’ beliefs about its future evolution (see Section
6.5).
Since we view our agents as simultaneously solving their own optimal execu-
tion problems, we avoid certain strong assumptions that would have been implicitly
needed, if we had used a classical equilibrium-based approach instead. An additional
consequence is that we precisely describe the errors in our agents’ beliefs. Potentially,
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each agent could be wrong both about how his trades affect prices and how prices
would move in his absence. By appealing to theoretical and practical considerations,
we argue away the consistency issues that one might feel would arise.
To the best of our knowledge, this general setup appears to be a new paradigm
for modeling heterogeneous agent systems in the contexts of optimal execution and
mini-flash crashes.
Additionally, we feel that our general framework could be viewed as a novel
method for understanding, to some extent, model misspecification risks and Knigh-
tian uncertainty in optimal trading. The basic point is that “all models are wrong”
and some (most) risks may be “unquantifiable” ([59], [150]). Existing techniques for
managing these unknowns often involve position limits, sensitivity analysis, Bayesian
model averaging, the worst-case framework, and interpolations between the worst-
case and classical setups. We illustrate how employing our abstract process, poten-
tially in conjunction with these standard methods, may give a more robust perspec-
tive.
Our in-depth discussion of these contributions and connections to previous liter-
ature on optimal execution and model misspecification appears in Subsection 6.2.2.
We are ready to begin presenting our work in detail. We highlight key background
material and our paper’s contributions in relation to it in Section 6.2. Our definition
of mini-flash crashes is given and discussed in Section 6.3. Our agents and their
beliefs are described in Section 6.4. We characterize the correct dynamics of the
risky asset’s price in Section 6.5. General results on what unfolds when our agents
act as prescribed by Section 6.4 but prices actually move as in Section 6.5 are given
in Section 6.6. Using the material in Section 6.6, a broad particular case of our model
is investigated theoretically and numerically in Section 6.7. Our longer proofs are
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contained in Section 6.8 - 6.10.
6.2 Background & Contributions
In Section 6.2, we clarify our contributions and explain how they fit into the
current literature. Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 contain the relevant discussions for
our work on mini-flash crashes and model risk in optimal execution, respectively.
6.2.1 Mini-Flash Crashes
We already mentioned that existing theories on the causes of mini-flash crashes
could be viewed as falling into one of five categories (see Section 6.1). Here are
further details.
i) Human errors (and, relatedly, improper risk management) are among the most
commonly cited causes of mini-flash crashes ([139], [167], [17]). The SEC claims
that the majority of mini-flash crashes originate from such sources, in fact
([167]). When we read about fat finger trades, rogue algorithms, or glitches
in the media, typically human errors are indirectly responsible. For example,
due to a bug in the systems at the Tokyo Stock Exchange and a typo in a trade
submitted by Mizuho Securities, the share price of the recruitment agency J-
Com fell in minutes from U672,000 to U572,000 on December 8, 2005 ([2]).
ii) Mini-flash crashes may be caused by the rapid, endogenous formation of positive
feedback loops ([8], [142], [106], [139], [131], [140]). As Johnson et al. put it,
“Crowds of agents frequently converge on the same strategy and hence
simultaneously flood the market with the same type of order, thereby
generating the frequent extreme price-change events” ([142]).
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A separate empirical study on the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, specifically, de-
termined that at its peak, “95% of the trading was due to endogenous triggering
effects” ([106]).
iii) The nature of liquidity provision in modern markets is thought to cause some
mini-flash crashes ([149], [96], [92], [116], [143], [115], [97]). Today, the majority
of liquidity is provided by participants that are free from formal market-making
obligations ([92]). In particular, they can instantly vanish, effectively taking one
or both sides of the order book at some venue with them. A mini-flash crash
can arise either directly as bid-ask spreads blow out or indirectly when a market
order (of any size) tears through a nearly empty collection of limit orders. Such
a phenomenon has been called fleeting liquidity and may have contributed to
the occurrence of 38% of mini-flash crashes from 2006 - 2011 ([116]).
This proposed explanation is deeply intertwined with a crucial empirical obser-
vation: Mini-flash crashes occur in both high and low trading volume regimes.1
For instance, the trading volume during the 30s mini-flash crash of “WisdomTree
LargeCap” Growth Fund on November 27, 2012 was nearly eight times the aver-
age daily trading volume for this security ([17]). The empirical study by Florescu
et al. offers extensive evidence that mini-flash crashes often occur during low
trading volume periods as well.
Why modern liquidity providers might wish to briefly disappear at times is a
separate issue. Broadly, the idea is that liquidity providers choose to pull back
when they fear they will be adversely selected. Some suggest that the clearly er-
roneous trade regulations might discourage the submission of market-stabilizing
1Since market fragmentation may also contribute to local liquidity shortages (see (v)), it may be connected with
this observation as well.
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orders in the midst of a mini-flash crash ([92]). Gayduk and Nadtochiy propose a
mechanistic theory: As trading frequencies increase, the very design of auction-
style exchanges might ensure that markets become fragile and participants stop
offering liquidity ([115]). Adverse selection fears are also stoked by genuine order
flow toxicity, delays in consolidated quote feeds like the Security Information
Processor, or activities by spoofers and other market manipulators ([5], [96],
[97], [4]).
iv) Shocks to perceived fundamental values may lead to mini-flash crashes in some,
albeit not most, cases ([143], [239]). We reiterate that these shocks must be
perceived only: They may have no factual basis. For instance, a tweet sent
on April 23, 2013 after a successful hack on the AP’s Twitter account falsely
claimed that President Obama was injured in a series of explosions at the White
House. Within two minutes, $136 billion was erased from the S&P 500 Index
([147]).
v) Market fragmentation itself, as well as the current regulations concerning this
issue, may give rise to some mini-flash crashes ([92], [116], [78]). In present-
day markets, a particular security might be traded at a number of venues, and
liquidity need not be uniformly distributed. This injects sophisticated consid-
erations into the problem of optimal execution: How does one route an order
to achieve the best possible price? The SEC introduced Rule 611, as well as
various exceptions including intermarket sweep orders (ISOs), in an attempt to
ensure that traders would receive the most favorable prices available across all
venues ([16]). Some argue that, inadvertently, this regulation may have made
matters worse. For instance, Dick posits a scenario in which a trader receives
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an inferior execution because Rule 611 only protects quotes at the top of the
book ([92]). In their empirical analysis, Golub et al. find that most mini-flash
crashes are initiated by aggressive ISO-submission ([116]).
Aspects of (i), (ii), and (iii) are reflected in our work. For example, the human
error theory arises in each of the following ways:
a) Every agent believes that a mini-flash crash is a null event (see Remark VI.10).
On the contrary, there are cases in which one will occur almost surely (see
Lemmas VI.39 and VI.42).
b) Every agent thinks that his trades affect prices through specific temporary and
permanent price impact coefficients (see Subsection 6.4.2). His estimates for
these parameters might be wrong (see Section 6.5).
c) Every agent’s trades may also indirectly impact prices by inducing others to
make different decisions than they would otherwise (see Subsection 6.4.5 and
Section 6.5). This potential effect is not modeled by our agents (see Subsection
6.4.2). More generally, even if we have a single agent in our setup trading with
other unspecified market participants, the parameters in his fundamental value
model might be inaccurate (see Subsection 6.4.2 and Section 6.5).
d) No agent revises the general class of his beliefs, admissible strategies, or objec-
tives on our time horizon (see Subsections 6.4.2 - Subsection 6.4.4). In some
cases, a mini-flash crash will not occur if this period is fairly short but will if it
is too long (see Lemmas VI.28 and VI.34).
e) Every agent is averse to his position’s apparent volatility risks (see Subsection
6.4.4). In some cases, there will be no mini-flash crash when our agents are
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sufficiently averse to these risks; otherwise, there will be one (see Lemmas VI.28
and VI.34).
f) Every agent has the opportunity to update the drift parameter in his price model
based upon his observations (see Subsection 6.4.2). In some cases, a mini-flash
crash will unfold because our agents are too easily persuaded to revise their
priors (see Lemmas VI.28 and VI.34).
g) Every agent has a model for how prices are affected by the temporary impact
of trades (see Subsection 6.4.2). In some cases, there will be a mini-flash crash
if our agents sufficiently underestimate the role of aggregate temporary impact.
No such disturbance will occur otherwise. Our agents may be more prone to
induce mini-flash crashes in this way when there are many of them (see Lemmas
VI.28 and VI.34).
Notice that some of our agents’ human errors directly cause mini-flash crashes,
though not all (see Lemma VI.28). We highlight this observation in Figures 6.1
- 6.3. Implicitly, the occasional absence of mini-flash crashes also agrees with (i).
Despite the regularity of these disruptions on a market-wide basis, individual secu-
rities may rarely experience such an event. Similarly, traders’ models and strategies
do roughly achieve their intended goals much of the time, which we observe as well
(see Lemma VI.28).
Several key ideas from the endogenous feedback loop theory are present in our
paper. For example, if a mini-flash crash does occur, it almost surely does so because
of “endogenous triggering effects.” Specifically, our mini-flash crashes arise when
some of our agents buy or sell at faster and faster rates, which they only do because
they started trading more rapidly in the first place (see Section 6.5 and Lemma
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VI.23). As predicted by this theory, some of our agents also “converge on the same
strategy” during mini-flash crashes: In certain cases, the agents driving these events
all buy or sell together with the same (exploding) growth rate (see Lemmas VI.39 and
VI.42). Figures 6.5, 6.8, and 6.11 graphically illustrate this partial synchronization.
We do not explicitly model liquidity providers in our framework, as we view our
agents as submitting market orders to a single venue (see Section 6.5). We still view
our paper as reflecting (iii), at least in some sense, since our mini-flash crashes can
be accompanied by both high and low trading volumes (see Corollary VI.15 and
Lemmas VI.39 and VI.42). Visualizations of this point are provided in Figures 6.4,
6.6, 6.7, 6.9, 6.10, and 6.12.
The fundamental value shock theory is beyond the scope of our work. To study
it, we could extend our model, say, by including a jump term in our specification
of the actual price dynamics (see Section 6.5). Provided these jumps were almost
surely finite, we suspect that they would not induce a mini-flash crash in the sense
of our definition (see Section 6.3). This point is left for future work.
For the sake of tractability, we chose to model our agents as trading at a single
venue (see Section 6.5). This puts the market fragmentation theory also beyond the
scope of our paper. Especially since routing decisions are inextricably linked with
optimal execution problems in practice, we hope to return to this topic in the future
([1]).
6.2.2 Model Risk & Optimal Execution
Problems in which agents make their decisions based upon misspecified models are
well-studied in the economics and behavioral finance communities ([55], [60], [111],
[35], [101], [24], [210], [100]). To the best of our knowledge, such an approach has not
been directly pursued in the financial mathematics literature on optimal execution.
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Much of the previous work in this area assumes that agents have complete and
correct knowledge of all model parameters ([54], [19], [20], [22], [178], [113], [187],
[45]). Others consider the possibility that their agents’ models have the correct form;
however, the agents must gradually learn the values of certain unobserved features
([21], [44], [75], [98], [110], [88]).
It is understood that anyone using the resulting strategies would be highly exposed
to model (misspecification) risks. The concern is partially mitigated since methods
including position limits, sensitivity analysis, Bayesian model averaging, the worst-
case framework, and interpolations between the worst-case and classical setups may
help to manage these issues. Agents that explicitly take model risks into account,
say, by using one of these techniques, are typically called ambiguity averse ([73], [74],
[76]).2
The idea with a control like a position limit is that although a model or strategy
may never be perfect, their errors cannot cause ruinous damage. In practice, there
are many related risk limits. Key differences among these variants tend to lie in
what, specifically, is being limited in size and how its size limit is implemented
([171]). For example, the sizes of single positions, sector positions, market bets,
market capitalization bets, and leverage might all be limited. The limits themselves
might be inflexible constraints or appear as penalty functions.
Sensitivity analyses attempt to precisely measure how aspects of a strategy or its
performance would change, if model assumptions are varied. Here, a model’s parame-
ters or probabilistic structure are often modified ([108], [107], [114]). If a strategy and
its performance are found to be sufficiently stable, one might be somewhat assured
that model risks are contained.
2Such agents appear throughout the literature, not just in the financial mathematics strand on optimal execution.
The seminal book by Hansen & Sargent offers a comprehensive discussion ([120]). There have been many more recent
developments as well (see [95], [203], [58], [51], [42], [40], [41], [43], [18], and the references therein).
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Agents using the final three techniques above can be viewed as having several
candidate models (not one). Alternatively, they can occasionally be interpreted as
trying to reduce their exposure to Knightian (or unquantifiable) uncertainty ([150]).
Possibly after assigning seemingly appropriate weights, such agents simultaneously
measure the performance of their admissible strategies under all candidate models
([212], [89], [73]).
Despite the protection afforded by these methods, they do not offer complete
inoculation against model risk.
Due to practical flaws in design or implementation, position limits may not always
avert disaster. For example, the SEC found that in some cases, Merrill Lynch’s
controls allowed single orders to be placed with sizes that were over fifty times larger
than a security’s average daily trading volume ([17]). The SEC further claimed that
these allegedly ineffective limits contributed to the onset of several mini-flash crashes,
and Merrill Lynch was fined $12.5 million.
Certain types of sensitivity analysis, e.g., differentiating a strategy or its perfor-
mance with respect to some parameter, may have shortcomings. For instance, they
may be most useful when an agent’s model is a slight perturbation of the actual price
dynamics. Efficacy might be further lowered, if optimal strategies in one regime are
only compared against optimal strategies in another (rather than studying how a
single proposed strategy would perform under a new framework).
Safeguards provided by Bayesian model averaging, the worst-case framework, and
interpolations between the worst-case and classical setups may be weakened if the
agent’s
i) candidate models all poorly represent the actual price dynamics,
ii) designated model weights are assigned inappropriately,
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iii) or conceptions about future outcomes and their payoffs are mistaken.
Now, in much of the optimal execution literature with ambiguity averse agents,
the sources of uncertainty are driven by Brownian motions, Poisson processes, or
Poisson random measures, and the agent’s candidate models are characterized by a
suitable class of equivalent measures ([73], [74], [76]). Even when candidate models
are allowed to be mutually singular, e.g., in the separate body of work on option
pricing under volatility uncertainty ([165], [28]), they are philosophically similar, say,
in the sense that they might have the same general form but differ in their parameter
specifications. These points heighten the possibility of (i).
Weights corresponding to candidate models are typically determined in a Bayesian
fashion or according to a chosen notion of distance from the candidate to the agent’s
reference model. (ii) may then arise, if either the agent’s priors or belief metrics are
not reflective of the actual price dynamics.
Historical examples of (iii) are abundant. Though not in the context of optimal
execution, Taleb recounts an especially striking anecdote involving a casino ([226]).
This organization put on a show which included a tiger. The firm insured against
a variety of incidents but did not envision that the creature would attack its star
performer. When this tragically occured, the casino lost $100 million and suffered
one of its largest losses ever.
While model risks in optimal execution can never be entirely eliminated, these
observations suggest that a new paradigm for managing them could be helpful. We
hope that our general procedure, possibly applied together with existing techniques,
might be such a paradigm. To clarify what we are introducing in the context of
optimal execution, note the following alternative interpretation of our setup:
We have a single agent trading in a risky asset over a finite time horizon.
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In part, he has the beliefs and objectives described in Subsections 6.4.2
- 6.4.4; however, he is also concerned about model misspecification risks.
Before he begins trading, he wishes to have a more robust understanding
of how the strategy he derives in Subsection 6.4.5 might perform. To get
this, he imagines a new plausible way that the price might evolve and tests
his strategy’s performance in this scenario. He first hypothesizes that there
might be other market participants who stumbled upon the basics of his
strategy and might be planning to use these ideas. He is then led to consider
the possibility that the actual price dynamics are as given in Section 6.5.
He studies what might unfold in Sections 6.6 - 6.7. He concludes that
since it seems like his original strategy might lead to mini-flash crashes
and devastating losses at times, he would like to reconsider his trading
plans.
In short, instead of emphasizing mathematical similarity when checking his strategy’s
performance in additional models, we could view our agent as emphasizing his human
similarity with other market participants. By doing so, he seems to test his ideas
in alternative settings which are both plausible and yield a different perspective on
his model risks (compared to the insights offered by more traditional approaches).
Observe that the idea that our agents, real or fictitious, individually solve their
optimal execution problems and are not in a classical equilibrium state is crucial
here.
The concept that strategy replication among market participants may significantly
affect the future and, hence, may bring unforeseen risks is not limited to the context
of optimal execution. For example, there is growing concern that the dramatic rise in
index investing may have unanticipated, detrimental effects on the broader economy
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([61], [99], [29], [30]).
Also, when we consider our setup from this new viewpoint, the consistency issues
which may arise in conjunction with some of the human errors in our framework are
not worrisome (see (a) - (g) in Subsection 6.2.1). After all, our agent is deliberately
falsifying his beliefs to better discern his model risk exposure.
Even if we retain our initial finite population system view, we feel that these
concerns may not be significant. While we could directly attempt to fit our framework
into one of the modern equilibrium notions in the model misspecification literature,
there may not be a need to do so: It appears that there are simple, practically-
oriented reasons why the apparent issues might naturally come about in our setting.
First, we think of our agents as having the opportunity to witness just a single
realization of the price, meaning that each agent believes that null events (including
the price path itself) must occur. This seems to reflect the non-stationarity of mar-
kets: Models, parameters, and strategies which work quite well in one period may
fail in the next.
Second, in practice, agents do not necessarily notice all of the ways in which their
models are wrong. If they do, they may not want or be able to fix them. These
behavioral arguments seem especially valid over the short time horizons that we con-
sider and are supported by general observations from both the philosophy of science
and psychology communities ([79], [23], [118], [222], [169]). For a specific example
verifying these claims, recall the circumstances which engulfed Knight Capital on
August 1, 2012: A bug arose in a critical piece of software. It has been alleged that
the firm did not detect the glitch themselves; rather, they only became aware of it
after being notified by the New York Stock Exchange. Supposedly, it then took 30
to 45 minutes for the firm to implement corrections, leading to a $440 million loss
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and Knight Capital’s subsequent acquisition by Getco LLC ([198]).
6.3 Mini-Flash Crashes
In Section 6.3, we introduce and discuss our definition of mini-flash crashes.
Definition VI.1. We say that a mini-flash crash occurs, if the risky asset’s price
tends to either +∞ or −∞ on our time horizon.
For now, while this definition communicates our broad notion, its details are fairly
vague.
We say more about our time horizon and price in Sections 6.4 - 6.5. The former
is finite and deterministic, while the latter is a particular stochastic process.
We precisely describe the sense in which the price explodes and at what kinds
of times3 mini-flash crashes can occur in Sections 6.6 - 6.7. Roughly, we analyze
the occurrence of mini-flash crashes pathwise. In the cases that we consider, they
happen (or not) almost surely; however, their direction is random. If a mini-flash
crash unfolds, it does so at a deterministic time; yet, none of our agents have enough
information to compute this time or even know that a mini-flash crash is imminent.
We said nothing about the classification of unbounded price oscillations as well. In
the scenarios that we investigate, unbounded price oscillations occur with probability
zero (see Sections 6.6 - 6.7), but this may be an artifact of our technical choices. Such
an oscillation appears to reflect the practical duration of mini-flash crashes, and we
hope to explore this point in a future work.
Clearly, there are many reasons why mini-flash crashes would be non-existent, if
Definition VI.1 were used in practice. For instance, the SEC has instituted the “Limit
Up-Limit Down Mechanism” to temporarily suspend trading in individual securities
3We thank Shige Peng for this observation.
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whose prices escape certain upper and lower bounds in specified short periods ([15]).
Market-wide circuit breakers might be employed as well, which temporarily halt all
trading when the S&P 500 Index declines sufficiently in a single trading day ([15]).
Our intuitive justification for this approximation is four-fold: First, though finite,
price swings during a mini-flash crash can be quite extreme and shocking (see Section
6.1 and Subsection 6.2.1). Second, in our setting, we roughly view that trading would
be suspended just before the occurrence of the event in Definition VI.1: A mini-flash
crash is more appropriately understood to be the local behavior of the price near such
a disruption. Third, since there are cases in which prices explode almost surely in
our framework, Definition VI.1 avoids seemingly more arbitrary cut-offs that might
have been necessary, if we included finite disturbances (see Sections 6.1 and 6.7).
Finally, when we view our setup from the model risk-averse single agent perspective
explained in Subsection 6.2.2, it might be reasonable to hypothesize that our agent
would consider the possibility of exploding prices, even as only a limiting case which
must be averted.
6.4 Agents
In Section 6.4, we describe our agents and their individual optimal execution prob-
lems. Important preliminary details are given in Subsection 6.4.1. We present our
agents’ models and beliefs in Subsection 6.4.2. Each agent’s admissible strategies
are characterized in Subsection 6.4.3. We discuss the agents’ objectives in Subsec-
tion 6.4.4. We prove Lemma VI.9, the main result of Section 6.4, in Subsection
6.4.5. Lemma VI.9 prescribes optimal strategies for our agents given their beliefs
and preferences. Our agents attempt to trade according to these plans on our time




We consider a population of N agents: Agent 1,. . . , Agent N . The intuition
underlying our agent’s models suggests that N should be interpreted as a large
number (see Subsection 6.4.2). Mathematically, its qualitative size does not matter
(see Lemma VI.23).
There is a special nonnegative parameter ν2j associated to Agent j (see Subsection
6.4.2).
Definition VI.2. If ν2j > 0, then we call Agent j an uncertain agent. If ν
2
j = 0,
then we call Agent j a certain agent.
The reason for choosing these particular words will become clear in Subsection
6.4.2, and the distinction between these two types of agents will be crucial throughout
the rest of the paper. For now, we assume that there are K ∈ {0, . . . , N} uncertain
agents, namely, Agents 1 through K. A critical role is played by the value of K (see
Lemma VI.23).
All agents attempt to trade in a single risky asset over a time horizon [0, T ]. Our
arguments proceed as long as T is deterministic and finite; however, our rationale is
reasonable only when this period is short, say, no more than 1 day (see Subsection
6.4.2).
6.4.2 Models
Our agents trade continuously by optimally selecting a trading rate from a par-
ticular class of admissible strategies. To motivate our specifications of their choices
and objectives, we first define their models and beliefs.
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All trades submitted at time t are executed immediately at the price Sexct . At
each time t, every agent observes the correct value of Sexct . No agent knows the true
dynamics of the stochastic process Sexc, though.
Instead, prior to t = 0, Agent j has developed a model Sexcj,θj for S
exc. Sexcj,θj evolves
on (
Ωj,Fj, {Fj,t}0≤t≤T , Pj
)
, (6.1)
a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions.4 Every agent models Sexc
on a different probability space, despite the fact that their observations of Sexc will
be identical. Our point is that Agent j interprets his observations as a sample path
of his individual model for Sexc, which may be unrelated to the process that Agent
k uses to interpret the same data.
The space (6.1) comes equipped with Wj, an Fj,t-Wiener process under Pj. There
is also an Fj,0-measurable random variable βj, which is independent of Wj and nor-
mally distributed with mean µj and variance ν
2
j under Pj.
Recalling Definition VI.2, we see that Agent j is certain if he believes that he
knows the correct value of βj at t = 0. Otherwise, he is uncertain. Regardless of
whether he is certain or uncertain in this sense, we will soon see that Agent j can
always be viewed as certain about many things, e.g, he will not change the form of
his models, objectives, or admissible strategies on [0, T ].5
Definition VI.3. Following ([21]), Agent j defines an Fj,t-adapted process Sunfj by
Sunfj,t = Sj,0 + βjt+Wj,t, t ∈ [0, T ] . (6.2)
4From a technical perspective, we will soon see that there is no need to introduce the filtration {Fj,t}. It would




(see Subsections 6.4.3 and 6.4.5). The basic observation is that Agent j believes
he can correctly reformulate his original optimal execution problem with partial information as one with complete
information. Keeping the first problem seems to help motivate our setup.
5From this perspective, one might partially connect our work on mini-flash crashes to explanations of longer term
financial bubbles based on overconfident investors ([211]).
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Sunfj,t is Agent j’s estimate of the unaffected or fundamental price of the risky asset
at time t. The drift term represents the price pressure that Agent j believes will
arise due to the trades of (other) institutional investors. Agent j approximates the
average behavior of uninformed or noise traders using the Brownian term.6
After a fashion, Agent j believes that he can compute Sunfj,t at t (see Subsection
6.4.3). Implicitly, he believes that his observations of Sunfj,t will be independent
of his trading decisions. Agent j knows which deterministic constant Sj,0 he has
selected in (6.2). Unless ν2j = 0, he does not assume that he can determine the
realized values of βj or Wj,t. Instead, Agent j will attempt to learn the value of βj
by computing its expectation conditional on his accumulated observations as time
passes (see Subsection 6.4.5).
Intuitively, Agent j’s selection of (6.2) makes the most sense when N is large and
T is short. Notice that Agent j makes no attempt to precisely estimate the number
of other market participants, nor their individual goals or beliefs. That he believes
he cannot improve the predictive accuracy of (6.2) by doing so appears to suggest
that the population of traders is of sufficient size.7 In practice, many securities’
prices must be positive.8 Together with the fact that real drifts and volatilities are
non-constant, (6.2) only seems even potentially plausible over short periods.
We now are ready to discuss Sexcj,θj .
Definition VI.4. Let θj,t denote Agent j’s trading rate at time t (see Subsection
6Almgren & Lorenz provide further details regarding the interpretation and limitations of (6.2) ([21]). A possible
extension of our work could replace (6.2) with one of the more recent models considered in the literature on optimal
trading problems with a learning aspect ([21], [98], [75], [113], [187], [110], [88]).
7Alternatively, one could argue that there are only a few agents, all of whom are effectively hidden from one
another; however, the securities for which our framework seems most reasonable would probably be traded by a large
population anyway.
8Certain commodities have traded at negative prices ([11]).
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6.4.3). He defines Sexcj,θj as the Fj,t-adapted process








ηj,temθj,t, t ∈ [0, T ] . (6.3)
Agent j has chosen the deterministic positive constants ηj,per and ηj,tem in (6.3) prior
to time t = 0.
There are two primary rationales behind (6.3). First, Agent j could be viewed
as taking into account his own effects on the execution price via an Almgren-Chriss
reduced-form model ([20], [19], [22]). ηj,per would denote Agent j’s estimate for his
permanent price impact parameter, while he would approximate his temporary price
impact parameter with ηj,tem. There is an alternative explanation in which Agent j
believes he submits market orders to a limit order book with certain characteristics.
We present further details for both viewpoints in Section 6.5.
While Agent j can use his prior for βj, as well as his observations, to improve his
estimate for the realized value of βj, all model parameters in (6.2) and (6.3) are fixed
(see Subsection 6.4.3). He cannot change the form of these models either, e.g., by
making βj time-dependent in (6.2) or including a transient impact term in (6.3). The
idea is that T is short and, in practice, the time scale for developing an appropriate
class of models for trading some instrument is often much longer than the time scale
for revising parameters to better reflect current market conditions.
6.4.3 Admissible Strategies
Agent j selects his trading rate θj from Aj, a class of admissible strategies that
we will now define precisely.
Recall that Agent j does not observe the realizations of either βj or Wj. Hence,
it would not make sense for Agent j’s trading rate to be Fj,t-adapted. Agent j does
watch Sexc, though, which he interprets as Sexcj,θj . Working with the filtration gener-
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ated by Sexcj,θj is somewhat cumbersome, as Agent j believes that it depends on his
choice of trading rate. The key is to notice that when Agent j selects a continuous




, the filtration generated by Sunfj , he believes that
this filtration describes the same flow of information as his execution price observa-




is independent of his
trading decisions (see Subsection 6.4.2).
Intuitively, the idea is that at each time t, Agent j observes the correct value of
Sexct . He views this value as the realization of S
exc
j,θj ,t
. Using his knowledge of his
past trading rate, he determines Sunfj,t as in (6.3). Agent j thinks that these steps
can be effectively taken all at once due to the (perceived) continuity of each process
involved in the calculations.
Agent j also believes his trades suffer from transaction costs due to both tempo-
rary and permanent price impact (see (6.3)). It seems reasonable to assume that he
would never adopt a strategy that he thought would saddle him with infinite costs.








Costs arising from permanent impact do not depend on Agent j’s trading rate, if
his terminal inventory is deterministic. In fact, for reasons discussed in Subsection
6.4.4, we specify that Agent j’s terminal inventory must be zero, i.e., Agent j solves
an optimal liquidation problem.9
Formalizing these comments leads to the following definition.
Definition VI.5. Let Aj be the space of Funfj,t -adapted processes θj such that θj,· (ω)
9Why would Agent j produce the estimate ηj,per? After all, he believes that its value will not affect his trading
decisions. Roughly, we feel that Agent j might have such an approximation for business purposes, e.g., he may hope
to accurately forecast P&L, even if he believes some components are uncontrollable. Unbeknownst to Agent j, ηj,per
is quite important for additional reasons (see Subsection 6.7.1).
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θj,t dt = 0 Pj − a.s. (6.5)











j is our notation for Agent j’s inventory: When he trades according to θj,
Agent j holds X
θj




j,T = 0 Pj − a.s..




j,t -adapted due to our con-
struction of Aj.
6.4.4 Objective Functions
Agent j would like to trade such that, on average, his realized trading revenue
will be as high as possible. He is also concerned about the various risks he might
encounter while trading and hopes to take some of these into account. Since Agent
j proxies Sexc with Sexcj,θj , he believes that the expected revenue corresponding to












Now Agent j must consider how to manage several risks. First, there are volatility
risks associated with delayed liquidation. Since he uses (6.2) and (6.3), he believes















In (6.8), Agent j selects the deterministic risk aversion parameter κj > 0 based upon
his appetite. On the other hand, Agent j presumably believes that as he observes
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the execution price’s path, he can better estimate βj’s realized value. He might
then think that he is more likely to regret earlier trades than later trades. A simple,
though admittedly ad-hoc, way that Agent j could adjust for this risk is to artificially
lower κj. Similarly, it might be possible for him to partially account for his other
risks including those arising from model misspecification with such an approach. In
fact, in a slightly different setting, Jaimungal et al. show the equivalence between
certain forms of ambiguity aversion and quadratic inventory penalties ([73]).
This discussion suggests the following objective for Agent j.





















over θj ∈ Aj.
As mentioned in Subsection 6.4.3, (6.9) motivates our requirement that Agent
j must liquidate by T (see (6.5)). Although the permanent impact term in (6.9)
disappears, regardless of the deterministic value of X
θj
j,T , non-zero values of X
θj
j,T
could perversely incentivize Agent j via (6.8). For example, if Agent j started with
a large inventory and needed a larger terminal inventory, he might be inclined to pay
unnecessary round-trip (sell early/buy later) costs induced by temporary impact.
In Lemma VI.9’s proof, we see that (6.9) can be equivalently formulated as the

























over θj ∈ Aj. It can also be thought of as an optimal tracking problem, in which


















Variants of both the former and the latter have been previously investigated, although
not, to the best of our knowledge, with our intentions ([113], [34]).
6.4.5 Results
Before proving Lemma VI.9, we introduce the following notation. It will be useful
throughout the paper.





(T − t) , t ∈ [0, T ] .
Remark VI.8. For our purposes, the key point in Definition VI.7 is that τj strictly
decreases to 0 as t ↑ T .
Lemma VI.9. (6.9) has a unique10 solution θ?j ∈ Aj. When ω ∈ Ωj is chosen such
that Wj,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ], X
θ?j
j (ω) satisfies the linear ODE



















1 + ν2j t
) , t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ?j
j,0 (ω) = xj. (6.10)
Remark VI.10. In conjunction with Subsections 6.4.2 - 6.4.3, Lemma VI.9 implies
that Agent j believes that a mini-flash crash is a null event. More precisely, under
his setup, Sexcj,θj , hence S
exc, will remain finite on [0, T ] Pj-a.s. Of course, he believes





Remark VI.11. Agent j believes that (6.10) characterizes his optimal trading rate
almost surely. Therefore, it seems reasonable to view that he would always attempt
to implement this strategy: He thinks it is nearly impossible for this approach to be
flawed, after all.
10Here, uniqueness holds up to dPj ⊗ dt-a.s. equality on Ωj × [0, T ].
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Remark VI.12. The first term in (6.10) arises from our constraint that Agent j must












remain finite as t ↑ T is that Xθ
?
j
j,t tends very rapidly to zero.
Agent j thinks that he learns about βj’s realized value over time, which is captured








1 + ν2j t
Pj − a.s. (6.11)
([162]). The factor
tanh (τj (t) /2)√
ηj,temκj
is bounded by 1/
√
ηj,temκj and tends to zero as t ↑ T .
The second term may either dampen or amplify the effects of the first. Agent j
believes that the weighting factors reflect that his need to liquidate must eventually
overwhelm his desire to profit by trading in the direction of the risky asset’s drift.
Remark VI.13. As anticipated, Agent j’s permanent impact parameter estimate ηj,per
is absent in (6.10) (see Subsection 6.4.3).
Remark VI.14. Lemma VI.9’s proof has five steps.
First, we introduce an auxiliary problem in which Agent j can select a trading rate
from a larger class of admissible strategies. Our original formulation did not consider
these, as they may not be aligned with the intuition underlying our framework. For
instance, some of them suggest that Agent j could peak into the future or that he
might knowingly select a trading rate that would cause Sexcj,θj to explode.
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We then show that Agent j does not believe that he can benefit from the auxiliary
problem’s new informational structure. This part of the argument uses (6.11), as well
as the Vitali convergence theorem and uniform integrability.
The third step is to find a suitable complete information equivalent for Agent j’s
auxiliary problem. We have effectively discussed this in Subsection 6.4.4. The idea
is to use integration by parts and an innovation process.
Next, we use a result from Bank et al. to determine the unique solution to our
auxiliary problem ([34]). The introduction of our auxiliary problem was motivated
by this step. Admittedly, this means we use a tool which seems to be far more
powerful than our problem demands. For instance, the result of Bank et al. applies
to a broad class of optimal tracking problems with a non-Markovian target, while
(6.11) suggests that we track a Markovian one (see Subsection 6.4.4). We still adopt
this approach, as it may allow us to extend our work in the future.
We conclude by demonstrating that the trading rate identified in the previous
step is actually in our original set of admissible strategies. Much of the work to




comes from our second step, while
the remaining ideas are taken care of by Bank et al. ([34]).
Proof. See Subsection 6.8.1.
Corollary VI.15. If ν2j = 0, then X
θ?j
j does not depend on S
unf
j . In particular, it is








µj tanh (τj (t) /2)√
ηj,temκj
, t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ?j
j,0 = xj. (6.12)
Remark VI.16. Corollary VI.15 confirms that there are significant differences between
our certain and uncertain agents, as expected: If Agent j feels completely certain of
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βj’s realized value, he would not glean profitable information and modify his trades
based upon his observations of the execution price (see Subsections 6.4.3 - 6.4.4).
Mathematically, it is also especially evident from (6.37) and (6.38).
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma VI.9.
6.5 Execution Price
In Section 6.5, we specify how Sexc actually evolves. While each agent observes the
same realized path of this process, in general, no agent knows the correct dynamics.11
An agent’s trading decisions are entirely determined by his beliefs, preferences, and









be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions. The space is equipped
with an F̃t-Wiener process under P̃ , which we denote by W̃ . We also have the
following deterministic real constants:
β̃, S0, η̃1,per, . . . , η̃N,per, and η̃1,tem, . . . , η̃N,tem.
β̃ can be arbitrary; however, the remaining constants are strictly positive.
Definition VI.17. The true execution price Sexc under P̃ is the F̃t-adapted process
















i,t + W̃t, t ∈ [0, T ] . (6.13)
(6.13) can be viewed as a multi-agent extension of the Almgren-Chriss model
([20], [19], [22]). Models of this form, particularly when the η̃j,tem’s (η̃j,per’s) are all
identical, have been applied in the context of predatory trading ([69]).
11There is a single trivial case where this is not true. If N = 1, β̃ = β, ν21 = 0, η̃1,tem = η1,tem, and η̃1,per = η1,per,
our lone agent’s model would be exactly right.
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From this perspective, η̃j,per and η̃j,tem are the correct values of Agent j’s perma-
nent and temporary price impact parameters, respectively. We allow these quantities
to have arbitrary relationships to Agent j’s corresponding estimates ηj,per and ηj,tem.
For instance, Agent j might underestimate his permanent impact (ηj,per < η̃j,per)
but perfectly estimate his temporary impact (ηj,tem = η̃j,tem). Similarly, Agent j’s
prior βj for the correct drift β̃ may be accurate or severely mistaken. Comparing
our descriptions of Sexcj,θj in (6.3) and S
exc in (6.13), we see that Agent j proxies each








































Heuristically, we could also interpret (6.13) through the lens of a single order
book. This connection was observed by Kallsen & Muhle-Karbe ([144]). The process
S0 + β̃t+ W̃t
would be viewed as the fundamental price, while the sum of the fundamental price
and the permanent impact terms









would be the reference price. We would set the η̃j,tem’s to a single value, and do
the same for the η̃j,per’s. Our agents would submit market orders, and only the
net agent order flow would be executed in the book (remaining orders would be
matched together). All agents would receive the same average execution price at
each time. The bid-ask spread would be infinitesimally small, while the book would
be infinitely resilient and block-shaped with height 1/η̃j,tem. That is, agents would
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trade in an Obizhaeva-Wang book which instantly recovers to the reference price
after each execution (no transient impact) ([178]) .
6.6 General Results
When our agents implement the strategies that they believe are optimal (see
Lemma VI.9) but Sexc has the dynamics in (6.13), what happens? The goal of
Section 6.6 is to offer some general answers to this question.
To simplify our presentation, we begin by introducing and analyzing additional
notation (see Definition VI.19 and Lemma VI.21). We find that our agents’ invento-
ries and trading rates evolve according to a particular ODE system with stochastic
coefficients (see Lemma VI.23). Under certain conditions, the system can have a
singular point (see Lemma VI.24). For convenience, we study what unfolds when
this singular point is of the first kind (see Lemma VI.27). We also examine the case
in which there is no singular point (Lemma VI.28). Due to tractability issues, in
order to determine whether or not mini-flash crashes arise, we consider a particu-
lar, though broad, class of examples (see Remark VI.30). While we present these
findings in Section 6.7, we provide a high-level summary of them in Theorem VI.31.
In particular, we see that in some cases, mini-flash crashes occur P̃ -a.s. at the first
singular point of our system. Again, our agents still believe that a mini-flash crash
is a null event.
First, observe that our assumptions in Section 6.5 do not affect our certain agents’
trading decisions (see Corollary VI.15). It remains to characterize our uncertain
agents’ strategies.
We will have an even mix of deterministic and stochastic maps. In what follows,
we always explicitly indicate ω-dependence to distinguish between the two. Our
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equations are solved pathwise, so we do not encounter probabilistic concerns.
Notation VI.18. Fix ω ∈ Ω̃ such that W̃· (ω) has a continuous path.
Definition VI.19. Define the maps
Φi : [0, T ] −→ R
A : [0, T ] −→ MK (R)
B : [0, T ) −→ MK (R)
C (·, ω) : [0, T ] −→ RK
by
Φi (t) ,
tanh (τi (t) /2) ν
2
i√





(η̃i,tem − ηi,tem) Φi (t) if i = k
−1
2
η̃k,temΦi (t) if i 6= k
Bik (t) ,





coth (τi (t)) if i = k
η̃k,perΦi (t) if i 6= k
Ci (t, ω) , Φi (t)





















k,t + W̃t (ω)
]
.
Here, i ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Remark VI.20. Observe that we can now write the dynamics in (6.10) as














when Agent j is uncertain.
We frequently reference various easy properties of the functions in Definition
VI.19. We collect these below for convenience.
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Lemma VI.21. Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. We have the following:
i) Φj is a strictly decreasing nonnegative function on [0, T ] with Φj (T ) = 0.
ii) The entries of A are analytic on [0, T ] and A (T ) = IK.
iii) If detA has a root on [0, T ], we can find the smallest one which we denote by
te. In this case, te < T and the zero of detA at te is of finite multiplicity.
iv) The entries of B are analytic on [0, T ) but
lim
t↑T
Bjj (t) = −∞.
v) C (·, ω)’s entries are continuous on [0, T ].
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are clear. After recalling that the zeros of an analytic
function are isolated and of finite multiplicity, we get (iii) from (ii). The singularity
in Bjj at T arises from the coth term, yielding (iv). Corollary VI.15 and our choice
of ω give (v).
Definition VI.22. When detA has a root on [0, T ], we let te denote the smallest
one (see Lemma VI.21).
Up to some deterministic time, the uncertain agents’ inventories evolve according
to a particular first order linear ODE system when ω is fixed. Lemma VI.23 makes
this precise when this time is positive. We leave the investigation and interpretation
of the case when it is zero for future work. Also, note that our agents effectively
assume that this time is T almost surely.




j (ω)’s and the θ
?
j (ω)’s are all uniquely defined and continuous on [0, te). More-
195
over, letting the u-superscript signify restriction to the uncertain agents,12 the un-
certain agents’ strategies are characterized by
A (t) θu,?t (ω) = B (t)X
u,θ?
t (ω) + C (t, ω) , t ∈ (0, te)
Xu,θ
?
0 (ω) = x
u. (6.14)
When detA does not have a root on [0, T ], the same statements hold after replacing
te with T .
Proof. See Subsection 6.9.1.
Lemma VI.23 does not address the behavior of our uncertain agents’ inventories
and trading rates as t ↑ te or t ↑ T . The difficulties are that A is non-invertible at
te, while B’s entries explode at T (see Lemma VI.21).
The approach for resolving these issues is well-established (see Chapter 6 of [87]).
We sketch the key points when detA has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0. Analyzing the
effects of B’s explosion at T is similar (see Lemma VI.28).
We begin by considering the homogeneous equation corresponding to (6.14):
A (t) Ẋut (ω) = B (t)X
u
t (ω) , t ∈ (0, te)
Xu0 (ω) = x
u. (6.15)
We change notation to emphasize that (6.15) no longer describes the uncertain
agents’ optimal strategies. We next write (6.15) in a more convenient form.
Lemma VI.24. Suppose that detA has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0. Near te, the
solution of (6.15) satisfies
(t− te)m+1 Ẋut (ω) = D (t)Xut (ω) . (6.16)




In (6.16), m is a nonnegative integer such that the multiplicity of the zero of detA
at te is (m+ 1). D is a particular analytic map for which D (te) has rank 0 or 1 (see
(6.47)).
Proof. See Subsection 6.9.2.
Definition VI.25. If detA has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0, we let m, D, and f be
defined as in Lemma VI.24’s proof (see (6.46) and (6.47)). Also, D (te) has at most
one non-zero eigenvalue (see Lemma VI.24’s proof), which we denote by λ.
Remark VI.26. Unless D (te) = 0, D (te) has rank 1 (see Lemma VI.24’s proof).
Hence, we can find v, v̂ ∈ RK such that
vv̂> = D (te) and v̂
>v = λ.
Moreover, v is an eigenvector of D (te) corresponding to λ. While v and v̂ are not
unique, algorithms are available to compute an example of such a pair ([200]). In
future work, we may use this decomposition to investigate the occurrence of mini-
flash crashes in broader cases than those considered in Section 6.7.
Suppose that D (te) 6= 0. Since te < T , the coefficients of (6.15) are analytic in a
neighborhood of te (see Lemma VI.21). It follows that (6.15) has a singular point of
the first kind at te when m = 0 in Lemma VI.24 (see Chapter 6 of ([87])). Otherwise,
the singular point is of the second kind.13 In the former case, the fundamental
solution of (6.15) near te is the product of a certain analytic function with a matrix
exponential.
The analysis of solution behavior when there is a singular point of the second
kind at te is significantly more difficult. For instance, while we may be able to find a
formal series solution for (6.15) near te, it may converge at just one point.
14 We do
13We adopt the nomenclature from Coddington & Carlson ([87]); however, other sources refer to such points as
regular and irregular singular points, respectively ([137]). There are nonequivalent definitions of these terms too.
14See the books by Wasow ([233]) and Ilyashenko & Yakovenko ([137]) for detailed discussions on these issues.
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not consider scenarios with such singularities in the present work, as our examples
in Section 6.7 do not exhibit them (see Lemma VI.34).
As soon as we have the fundamental solution near te, we use variation of pa-
rameters to solve (6.14). This gives our uncertain agents’ optimal inventories. We
immediately get their optimal trading rates by differentiating and the corresponding
execution price by plugging all agents’ strategies into (6.13).
This discussion is made precise in the next result.
Lemma VI.27. Suppose that detA has a root on [0, T ], te > 0, and m = 0. If
λ 6∈ Z,15 then for some small ρ > 0,
Xu,θ
?

























for t ∈ (te − ρ, te). Here,
• {v1, . . . , vK} is an eigenbasis for D (te) (vK corresponds to λ);
• P is a (non-singular-)matrix-valued analytic function on [te − ρ, te] such that
P (te) = IK (see (6.48));
• {y1 (ω) , . . . , yK (ω)} are constants (see (6.51));
• and {F1 (·, ω) , . . . , FK (·, ω)} are continuous real-valued functions on [te − ρ, te]
(see (6.51)).
15In Section 6.7, we can always slightly perturb our parameters, if necessary, to ensure that λ 6∈ Z (see Lemma
VI.37).
Generally, the λ ∈ Z case may or may not be more difficult to avoid. We leave this point for future work. In
principle, there could be three additional scenarios to consider: D (te) = 0, D (te) is a non-zero nilpotent matrix,
and λ 6= 0.
When D (te) = 0, the matrix exponential in the fundamental solution of (6.15) can be dropped (see Sections
2.3 and 5.6 of [87]). If D (te) is a non-zero nilpotent matrix, the series representation of the matrix exponential
terminates after (K − 1) terms, maybe fewer, as the degree of D (te) is no higher than K.
In the last case, the argument is less transparent. A crucial recursion used in the determination of P is no longer
valid, necessitating an intricate change of variables (see Chapter 6 of [87]). Consequently, the fundamental solution
of (6.15) is that in (6.48) but with D (te) replaced by a more opaque matrix, which significantly complicates further
analysis.
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We get θu,? (ω) and Sexc (ω) on (te − ρ, te) by differentiating (6.17) and by substitut-
ing Xθ
?
(ω) and θ? (ω) into (6.13), respectively.16
Proof. See Subsection 6.9.3.
Lemma VI.28. Suppose that detA does not have a root on [0, T ]. Then Sexc (ω), the
X
θ?j
j (ω)’s and the θ
?





t (ω) = 0. (6.18)
Remark VI.29. Each agent believes that his terminal inventory will be zero almost
surely (see (6.5)). Lemma VI.28 specifies conditions under which the agents are
effectively correct in this regard.
Proof. See Subsection 6.9.4.
Remark VI.30. For general parameter choices, using Lemma VI.27 to investigate the
occurrence of mini-flash crashes may be difficult. Here are the key challenges:
a) Transparent conditions governing the existence of a root of detA on [0, T ] are
not immediate.17
b) It is not yet obvious when, if ever, the multiplicity of detA’s root at te will be
1.
c) It is unclear that we can ensure that λ 6∈ Z, even after a perturbation of our
parameters.





t as t ↑ te.
16Recall that the certain agents’ inventories and trading rates were found in Corollary VI.15.
17Once we have such conditions, easily checking whether or not te > 0 would be presumably trivial but could be
troublesome as well.
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e) Determining whether or not Sexc explodes requires a more thorough study of
(6.13) and (6.17).
Resolving (a) and (b) is rather intractable, unless K is small or our uncertain
agents are fairly similar (see Definition VI.19). Completing the studies suggested by
(c) and (d) requires further knowledge of λ and the eigenbasis {v1, . . . , vK} of D (te).
Even then, the yj’s and the Fj’s in (6.51) may be quite opaque and pose obstacles.
These observations further restrict the size of K or the differences among our agents.
After all of these restrictions, finishing (e) may still not be straightforward, as in




t might explode at the same rates but in
opposite directions.
Hence, we investigate mini-flash crashes only in the context of a particularly
tractable class of examples (see Section 6.7). We offer a rough summary of our
mathematical findings in Theorem VI.31; however, the details and practical connec-
tions to mini-flash crashes are in Section 6.7.
We leave the study of other scenarios for future work. For instance, it would be
interesting to know whether or not we could observe unbounded price oscillations
near te or mini-flash crashes in the absence of synchronized trading (see Section 6.3).
Theorem VI.31. When our agents are as characterized in Section 6.4 but the risky
asset’s price evolves as in Section 6.5, at least three cases emerge (see Lemmas VI.28,
VI.34, VI.39, and VI.42 for precise statements): There are broad sufficient conditions
on our deterministic parameters such that
i) Sexc, the X
θ?j
j ’s and the θ
?






t = 0 P̃ − a.s.;
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ii) Sexc, the X
u,θ?j
j ’s, and the θ
u,?
j ’s explode as t ↑ te P̃ -a.s.;
iii) or all coordinates of Xθ
?
have a finite limit but Sexc and the θu,?j ’s explode as
t ↑ te P̃ -a.s.
In scenarios (ii) and (iii), all explosions occur in the same random direction: +∞
or −∞. The P̃ -probability of infinite spikes (crashes) tends to either 0 or 1 as t ↑ te;
however, it is positive for any fixed t < te.
While our conditions are deterministic, no agent knows the critical parameters in
these calculations. In particular, our agents believe that a mini-flash crash is a null
event.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemmas VI.28, VI.34, VI.37, VI.39, and
VI.42.
6.7 Semi-Symmetric Uncertain Agents
In Section 6.7, we thoroughly analyze a broad but tractable class of scenarios.
This will enable us to both theoretically and numerically investigate the occurrence
of mini-flash crashes.
Based on Remark VI.30, we specify that our uncertain agents’ parameters are
identical, except for their initial inventories xj, means of their initial drift priors µj,
and their initial estimates for the fundamental price Sj,0. Such agents are nearly
symmetric, so we call them semi-symmetric.
Definition VI.32. We say that our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric when there
are positive constants
η̃tem, ηtem, η̃per, ηper, ν
2, and κ
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such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , K}
η̃i,tem = η̃tem, ηi,tem = ηtem, η̃per = η̃i,per,
ηi,per = ηper, ν
2
i = ν
2, κi = κ.
Definition VI.32 implies that the diagonal entries of A are identical, as are the off-
diagonal entries. The same is true for B (see Definition VI.19). Such a simplification
considerably reduces the difficulties in computing detA, λ, and an eigenbasis for
D (te) (see (6.61) and Lemma VI.37). The xj’s, µj’s, and Sj,0’s only enter in C,
which also has a nice structure (see (6.71)).
For the rest of Section 6.7, we assume that our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric
but place no restrictions on the certain agents. Our theoretical results are contained
in Subsection 6.7.1. In Subsections 6.7.2 - 6.7.4, we provide figures for key conclu-
sions on mini-flash crashes (see Subsection 6.2.1). With these plots, our goal is to
highlight the features of our model, not to recreate any specific historical scenario.
6.7.1 Results
Notation VI.33. If our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric, the τj’s and the Φj’s
are the same for j ≤ K (see Definitions VI.7, VI.19, and VI.32). We denote these
functions by τ and Φ, respectively.
Lemma VI.34. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric. Then detA
has a root on [0, T ] and te > 0 if and only if
(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (0) > 2. (6.19)
In this case, the zero of detA (·) at te is of multiplicity 1.
Remark VI.35. Definitions VI.7 and VI.19 enable us to re-write (6.19) as












By varying our parameters in (6.20) one at a time, (6.19) can be interpreted as
discussed in Subsection 6.2.1:
i) (6.19) holds when ν2 is high. Since ν2 is the variance of the uncertain agents’
drift priors, we are led to (f) in Subsection 6.2.1.
ii) (6.19) holds when (Kη̃tem − ηtem) is high. A given uncertain agent believes
that his own temporary impact parameter is ηtem, while the actual collective
temporary impact parameter induced by the uncertain agents is Kη̃tem. Then
(Kη̃tem − ηtem) is large whenever each uncertain agent severely underestimates
his own temporary impact or there are many uncertain agents, giving (g) in
Subsection 6.2.1.
iii) (6.19) holds when T is high. Since [0, T ] is our time horizon, we get (d) in
Subsection 6.2.1. Note that T must be small enough for our agents’ modeling
rationale to hold (see Section 6.4); however, T need not be too large here, as
the value of tanh reaches 95% of its supremum on [0,∞) for arguments greater
than 1.8.
iv) (6.19) holds when κ is low. We conclude (e) in Subsection 6.2.1, as κ measures
our uncertain agents’ aversion to volatility risks (see Subsection 6.4.4). Observe
that both the numerator and the denominator of the LHS in (6.19) roughly look
like
√
κ for small κ; however, when κ is large, the whole LHS looks like 1/
√
κ
since tanh is bounded by 1 on [0,∞).
Proof. See Subsection 6.10.1.






No agent would think to compute te since they all believe that a mini-flash crash
is a null event; however, (6.21) makes it especially clear that they could not do so
anyway.












(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ̇ (te)
(6.22)
and the corresponding eigenvector is vK = [1, . . . , 1]
>. By slightly perturbing η̃per
and/or ηper, if necessary, we can ensure that λ 6∈ Z. In this case, D (te) is diagonal-
izable and the remaining vectors in an eigenbasis for D (te) (all with the eigenvalue
zero) are
v1 = [−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]> , . . . , vK−1 = [−1, 0, . . . , 0, 1]> .
Remark VI.38. With the exceptions of η̃per and ηper, all parameters in (6.22) deter-
mine whether or not detA has a root on [0, T ] (see Lemma VI.34). They also fix the
value of te (see Remark VI.36). Hence, to interpret (6.22), we only consider the roles




Intuitively, (6.23) can be viewed as the ratio of two terms: The numerator mea-
sures how far a given uncertain agent’s estimate of his own permanent impact is
from the uncertain agents’ actual collective permanent impact. The denominator,
which must be positive due to Lemma VI.34, is the corresponding measure for the
temporary impact. One might call (6.23) a mistake ratio.
Since Φ̇ (te) < 0 by Lemma VI.21, λ is positive only when (6.23) is high enough.
We have λ < 0 when the uncertain agents’ total permanent impact and a single
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uncertain agent’s’ estimate of his own permanent impact are too close or when his
estimate exceeds the cumulative permanent impact. More precisely,







coth (τ (te)) (Kη̃tem − ηtem) < Kη̃per − ηper
}







coth (τ (te)) (Kη̃tem − ηtem) > Kη̃per − ηper
}
. (6.24)
Whether a mini-flash crash is accompanied by high or low trading volumes is effec-
tively determined by which inequality in (6.24) holds (see Lemmas VI.39 and VI.42
and Subsections 6.2.1, 6.7.3, and 6.7.4).
Proof. See Subsection 6.10.2.
Lemma VI.39. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric and (6.19)
holds. Assume that λ 6∈ Z and λ < 0 (see Lemma VI.37). Let ρ, yK (ω), and FK (·, ω)
be defined as in Lemma VI.27. Then{















t (ω) = lim
t↑te
θu,?t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]
> , lim
t↑te
Sexct (ω) = +∞
}
and{















t (ω) = lim
t↑te
θu,?t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]
> , lim
t↑te




i) The integral limits in (6.25) and (6.26) exist and are finite.
ii) Either (6.25) or (6.26) holds P̃ -a.s.
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iii) At te−ρ, the events (6.25) and (6.26) both have positive P̃ -probability; however,
the P̃ -probability of one event tends to 1 (while the other tends to 0) if we let
ρ ↓ 0.
Remark VI.40. Although we fixed ω in Notation VI.18, by abuse, we view it as
varying for our probabilistic statements in Lemmas VI.39 and VI.42.
Remark VI.41. Since P (te) = IK (see Lemma VI.27), (6.51) and Lemma VI.37 imply
that yK (ω) will be large and positive when the uncertain agents hold significant,
similar long positions. yK (ω) will be of high magnitude but negative, if the uncertain
agents carry substantial, similarly-sized short positions. Hence, a spike in Sexc (ω) is
more likely when the uncertain agents are synchronized aggressive buyers, while the
odds of a collapse improve when they are synchronized heavy sellers. These effects
play the deciding role as t ↑ te, as the integral limits in (6.25) and (6.26) are finite.
Still, due to how we can decompose FK in our case (see (6.74)), large fluctuations
in the fundamental price can make the mini-flash crash’s direction unclear until just
before te (see Figure 6.9).
Proof. See Subsection 6.10.3.
Lemma VI.42. Suppose that the uncertain agents are semi-symmetric and (6.19)






exists in RN . If any coordinates of θu,?t (ω) explode, then Sexct (ω) and all coordinates


















θu,?t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]
> , lim
t↑te





















θu,?t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]
> , lim
t↑te




i) Either (6.27) or (6.28) holds P̃ -a.s.
ii) At te−ρ, the events (6.27) and (6.28) both have positive P̃ -probability; however,
the P̃ -probability of one event tends to 1 (while the other tends to 0) if we let
ρ ↓ 0.
Remark VI.43. We make no rigorous statement regarding the λ ∈ (0, 1) case. Most
of Lemma VI.42’s proof would still be valid (see Subsection 6.10.3); however, the
final estimates are especially convenient when λ > 1 (see (6.85) - (6.89)). The over-
arching purpose of Lemma VI.42 is only to illustrate that mini-flash crashes can
occur in low trading volume environments (see Subsection 6.2.1). Nevertheless, we
suspect that mini-flash crashes might unfold when λ ∈ (0, 1), e.g., see Subsection
6.7.3 and (6.85) - (6.89).
Proof. See Subsection 6.10.3.
6.7.2 Example 1: No mini-flash crash
Our mini-flash crashes do not always occur (see Lemmas VI.28 and VI.34). In
Subsection 6.7.2, we illustrate this by numerically simulating a scenario in which
detA has no root on [0, T ].
By Lemma VI.34 and (6.61), we know that detA is non-vanishing on [0, T ] if and
only if
(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (0) < 2. (6.29)
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One selection of parameters for which (6.29) is satisfied is
N = 3, K = 2, T = 1, S0 = 100,
β̃ = 1, η̃tem = 1, ηtem = 0.75, η̃per = 1,
ηper = 1, ν
2 = 2, κ = 5, x1 = 2,
x2 = −2, µ1 = 15, µ2 = −10, S1,0 = 100,
S2,0 = 100, η̃3,tem = 1, η3,tem = 1, η̃3,per = 1,
µ3 = −3, ν23 = 2, κ3 = 5, x3 = 2.
(6.30)
In fact, the LHS of (6.29) then equals 1.1095. Observe that there is no need to
specify η3,per and S3,0 as they are irrelevant (see Corollary VI.15, Definition VI.19,
and Lemma VI.23). Again, our purposes are only illustrative here, and we leave the
reproduction of a specific practically meaningful scenario for a future work.
Since K = 2 and N = 3, we have two uncertain agents and one certain agent
in the coming plots. We label the corresponding curves with U1, U2, and C1. For
example, the label U1 will signify a quantity for Agent 1, the first uncertain agent.
In Figures 6.1 and 6.2, we plot inventories and trading rates. The execution price is
depicted in Figure 6.3.
The diagrams exhibit all of the important qualities that we expect based upon
our theoretical results. Here are a few key features:
i) All agents liquidate their positions by the terminal time T (see (6.18) and Figure
6.1).
ii) Sexc (ω), the X
θ?j
j (ω)’s and the θ
?
j (ω)’s are all continuous on [0, T ] (see Lemma
VI.28 and Figures 6.1 - 6.3).
iii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates appear to exhibit a Brownian component
(see Lemma VI.9 and Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.1: Depiction of the agents’ inventories in Subsection 6.7.2.















Figure 6.2: Depiction of the agents’ trading rates in Subsection 6.7.2.
iv) The certain agent’s trading rate appears to be smooth on [0, T ] (see Corollary
VI.15 and Figure 6.2).
v) The agents need not either strictly buy or strictly sell throughout [0, T ] (see
Subsection 6.4.3, Lemma VI.9 and Figure 6.2).
vi) Even so, the agents may decide to strictly buy or strictly sell throughout [0, T ]
(see Subsection 6.4.3, Lemma VI.9 and Figure 6.2).
vii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates do not appear to synchronize (see Figure
6.2).
209









Figure 6.3: Depiction of the execution price in Subsection 6.7.2.












Figure 6.4: Depiction of the agents’ inventories in Subsection 6.7.3.
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6.7.3 Example 2: A mini-flash crash with low trading volume
Our mini-flash crashes can be accompanied by low trading volumes (see Lemma
VI.42). In Subsection 6.7.3, we visualize this by studying a concrete scenario in which
detA has a root on [0, T ]; te > 0; the zero of detA at te is of multiplicity 1; λ 6∈ Z;
and λ > 0. The behavior of the X
θ?j
j (ω)’s is then characterized by Corollary VI.15
and Lemma VI.42. Lemma VI.42 would rigorously describe Sexct (ω) and the θ
?
j,t (ω)’s
as t ↑ te, if λ > 1. To improve the quality of our plots, we consider a situation where
λ ∈ (0, 1) instead (see Remark VI.43).












(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ̇ (te)
(6.31)
is a positive non-integer. We can keep most of our choices in (6.30) the same and
only make a few revisions:
η̃tem = 0.5, ηtem = 0.2, η̃per = 0.8,
ηper = 0.025, ν
2 = 3, κ = 1.
(6.32)
As in Subsection 6.7.2, we do not seek to replicate a particular historical situation.
We immediately get (6.19), as its LHS is 4.3302. Using Remark VI.36 and (6.31),
we can show that
te = 0.2691 and λ = 0.5939.
Again, we have two uncertain agents and one certain agent. We retain the
{U1, U2, C1}- labeling system from Subsection 6.7.2. The inventories, trading rates,
and execution price are plotted in Figures 6.4 - 6.6. To aid our illustration, we








0, te − 10−6
]
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Figure 6.5: Depiction of the agents’ trading rates in Subsection 6.7.3.
for the left and right plots, respectively.
The qualities that we expect based upon Corollary VI.16, Lemma VI.42, and
Remark VI.43 are all present. We offered some applicable comments in Subsection
6.7.2, so we only add a few new observations here.
i) All agents’ inventories approach a finite limit as t ↑ te (see Lemma VI.42 and
Figure 6.4).
ii) The execution price and the uncertain agents’ trading rates explode as t ↑ te
(see Lemma VI.42, Remark VI.43 and Figures 6.5 - 6.6).
iii) The uncertain agents’ trading rates synchronize as t ↑ te (see Lemma VI.42,
Remark VI.43, and Figure 6.5).
iv) That an explosion in Sexc (ω) will occur as well as its direction becomes increas-
ingly obvious as t ↑ te; however, it is not necessarily clear at first (see Lemma
VI.42, Remark VI.43, and Figure 6.6).
6.7.4 Example 3: A mini-flash crash with high trading volume
Our mini-flash crashes can also be accompanied by high trading volumes (see
Lemma VI.39). We illustrate this in Subsection 6.7.4 by simulating a case in which
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Figure 6.6: Depiction of the execution price in Subsection 6.7.3.
detA has a root on [0, T ]; te > 0; the zero of detA at te is of multiplicity 1; λ 6∈ Z; and
λ < 0. The behaviors of Sexc (ω), the X
θ?j
j (ω)’s, and the θ
?
j (ω)’s are then described
by Corollary VI.15 and Lemma VI.39.
We especially wish to emphasize the stochastic explosion direction and do this in
two ways.
First, we choose the same deterministic parameters to create Figures 6.7 - 6.12.
The difference is that one realization of W̃· is used in Figures 6.7 - 6.9, while another
is used in Figures 6.10 - 6.12. We denote the corresponding ω’s by ωup and ωdn, since
there are spikes and crashes in the former and latter plots, respectively.
Second, Figures 6.7 - 6.9 themselves suggest that the explosion direction is ran-
dom. This is particularly true in Figures 6.8 - 6.9, since we initially notice that the
price rapidly rises as the uncertain agents’ buying rates synchronize. Only moments
before the mini-flash crash do we see the price collapsing and the uncertain agents’
aggressively selling together.











(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ̇ (te)
is a negative non-integer due to Lemmas VI.34 and VI.39. Compared to Subsection
213
6.7.3, we set
η̃per = 0.5, ηper = 0.5
and keep every other parameter the same. As in Subsections 6.7.2 - 6.7.3, we do not
have in mind a special historical example here. Since we have only changed η̃per and
ηper, the values of (Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (0) and te do not differ from Subsection 6.7.3;
however, λ is now negative:
(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (0) = 4.3302, te = 0.2691, and λ = −0.4531.
The numbers of uncertain and certain agents are still two and one, respectively.
We also retain the {U1, U2, C1}-labeling system from Subsections 6.7.2 - 6.7.3. Fig-
ures 6.7 and 6.10 depict the agents’ inventories. We plot the agents’ trading rates
in Figures 6.8 and 6.11. The execution price appears in Figures 6.9 and 6.12. To
help with our visualization, the time domains in the left plots in Figures 6.7 - 6.9
and Figures 6.10 - 6.12 are truncated to [0, 0.94 (te − 10−6)] and [0, 0.75 (te − 10−6)],
respectively.
Our observations regarding Figures 6.7 - 6.12 are in agreement with Corollary
VI.15 and Lemma VI.39. We have already made note of many important aspects in
Subsections 6.7.2 - 6.7.3 and only remark upon the new details.
i) The execution price, as well as the uncertain agents’ inventories and trading
rates, all explode in the same direction as t ↑ te (see Lemma VI.39 and Figures
6.7 - 6.12).
ii) The explosions take place at the deterministic time te (see Lemma VI.39 and
Figures 6.7 - 6.12).
iii) The explosion direction depends on ω ∈ Ω̃ (see Lemma VI.39 and Figures 6.7 -
6.12).
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Figure 6.7: Depiction of the agents’ inventories for ωdn in Subsection 6.7.4.
































Figure 6.8: Depiction of the agents’ trading rates for ωdn in Subsection 6.7.4.
iv) The explosion direction cannot be known with complete certainty before te (see
Lemma VI.39 and Figures 6.7 - 6.12).
v) The explosion rates in the price and uncertain agents’ trading rates in Subsection
6.7.3 are slower than in Subsection 6.7.4 (see Figures 6.5 - 6.6, Figures 6.8 - 6.9,
and Figures 6.11 - 6.12). We did not explicitly state this previously; however,
this is to be expected since trading rates are integrable in Subsection 6.7.3 but
not in Subsection 6.7.4.
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Figure 6.9: Depiction of the execution price for ωdn in Subsection 6.7.4.
























Figure 6.10: Depiction of the agents’ inventories for ωup in Subsection 6.7.4.































Figure 6.11: Depiction of the agents’ trading rates for ωup in Subsection 6.7.4.
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Figure 6.12: Depiction of the execution price for ωup in Subsection 6.7.4.
6.8 Appendix: Section 6.4 Proofs
6.8.1 Proof of Lemma VI.9
We now implement the steps outlined in Remark VI.14.











Let Ãj be the space of F̃unfj,t -progressively measurable processes θj such that (6.4)
and (6.5) hold. We, again, define the process X
θj
j by (6.6) for any strategy θj ∈ Ãj.





















over θj ∈ Ãj.




∣∣∣F̃unfj,t ] = EPj [βj∣∣∣Funfj,t ] Pj − a.s.
(Ωj,Fj, Pj) is Pj-complete by hypothesis (see Subsection 6.4.2). Suppose that t ∈





















∣∣∣F̃unfj,t ] = EPj [βj ∣∣∣Funfj,t+ ] Pj − a.s. (6.34)
Since Funfj,t ⊆ F̃
unf
j,t , it suffices to show that








for all U ∈ Funfj,t+ . Pick U ∈ F
unf
j,t+ and any positive decreasing sequence (εn)n≥1 in





∣∣Funfj,t+εn] Pj−a.s.−−−−→ 1UEPj [βj ∣∣Funfj,t ] . (6.35)









(6.35) also hold in the sense of L1-convergence. This finishes the argument, as








for n ≥ 1.


































W j,t , S
unf








is an Funfj,t -Wiener process under Pj19 and






∣∣Funfj,s ] ds+W j,t. (6.36)

































































j,T = 0 Pj-a.s. by the definition of Ãj in Step 1. Since xj, Sj,0 and S
unf
j,T do
not depend on Agent j’s choice of θj ∈ Ãj, Step 2 implies that θ?j maximizes (6.33)






























∣∣∣F̃unfj,· ] is F̃unfj,t -predictable and in L2 (dPj ⊗ dt). Clearly, θ?j maximizes (6.37)

























filtration generated by W j .
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Step 4: After defining






cosh (τj (t))− 1
)















∣∣F̃unfj,s ]Kj (t, s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F̃unfj,t
]
, t ∈ [0, T ) ,
(6.39)
we see from Theorem 3.2 of [34] that (6.38) has a unique solution θ?j ∈ Ãj. Moreover,
the corresponding optimal inventory process X
θ?j
















j,0 = xj (6.40)
dPj ⊗ dt-a.s. on Ωj × [0, T ).













∣∣∣Funfj,t ] , Pj − a.s. (6.41)





















1 + ν2j t
) , t ∈ (0, T )
X
θ?j
j,0 = xj. (6.42)
Step 5: We know that θ?j satisfies (6.4) and (6.5), as all strategies in Ãj have
these properties. Now Wj,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ] for Pj-almost every ω ∈ Ωj.
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When such an ω is chosen, (6.42) becomes (6.10). The latter is a first order linear
ODE with continuous coefficients, so θ?j,· (ω) is continuous on [0, T ) (e.g., by Chapter
1.2 of [231]).




exists and is finite from (28) and (29) in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [34], as well
as (6.41) in Step 4. In particular, we can view the paths of θ?j on [0, T ] as Pj-a.s.
continuous.20 We conclude by noting that θ?j is also F
unf
j,t -adapted by (28) and (29)
in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [34], (6.11) in Step 2, and (6.41) in Step 4.
6.9 Appendix: Section 6.6 Proofs
6.9.1 Proof of Lemma VI.23
Let j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. At each time t, Agent j observes the correct value of Sexct (ω),




(6.3), it follows that















j,t (ω) . (6.43)
20Alternatively, we could give an argument using singular point theory as in Section 6.6.
21By abuse of notation, we evaluate Sexc
j,θ?j ,t
and Sunfj,t are evaluated at ω; however, Agent j would evaluate these
quantities at some ωj ∈ Ωj . We adopt similar conventions in the sequel without further comment.
221
After substituting (6.13) into (6.43), we have
Sunfj,t (ω)− Sj,0












































(η̃j,tem − ηj,tem) θ?j,t (ω) + W̃t (ω) . (6.44)
The quantity on the LHS of (6.44) plays a role in determining Agent j’s strat-
egy (see Lemma VI.9). Substituting (6.44) into (6.10) and applying the half-angle


















i,t (ω) + Cj (t, ω) .
It follows that the uncertain agents’ strategies are characterized by the ODE system
A (t) θu,?t (ω) = B (t)X
u,θ?
t (ω) + C (t, ω)
Xu,θ
?
0 (ω) = x
u. (6.45)
Corollary VI.15, Lemma VI.21 and a standard existence and uniqueness theorem
(see Sections 1.1 and 3.1 of [36]) finish the argument.
6.9.2 Proof of Lemma VI.24
As t ↑ te, {











Here, adj denotes the usual adjugate operator.
We can find a non-negative integer m such that the multiplicity of the zero of
detA at te is (m+ 1) by Lemma VI.21. Hence, there is a unique non-vanishing
analytic function f such that
detA (t) = (t− te)m+1 f (t) (6.46)
on a small neighborhood of te. Note that f is non-vanishing, as the zeroes of detA
are isolated and detA (T ) = 1 (see Lemma VI.21). We then define the analytic (see
Lemma VI.21) map D by
D (t) , [adjA (t)]B (t) /f (t) (6.47)
and arrive at (6.16).
Since detA (·) has a root at te, the rank of A (te) is no more than K − 1. We
conclude by observing that adj A (te) has rank 1 when A (te) has rank K − 1; oth-
erwise, adj A (te) must be the zero matrix. The comments about the rank of D (te)
immediately follow.
6.9.3 Proof of Lemma VI.27
D (te) 6= 0 since λ 6= 0. Then (6.15) has a singular point of the first kind at te
(see our discussion above). λ 6∈ Z by hypothesis, so Theorem 6.5 of [87] implies that
a fundamental solution of (6.15) on [te − ρ, te) for some ρ > 0 is given by
P (t) |t− te|D(te) . (6.48)
In (6.48), P (·) is an analytic MK (R)-valued function with P (te) = IK . Moreover,
P (t) is invertible for all t ∈ [te − ρ, te) and22(
P (t) |t− te|R
)−1
= |t− te|−R [P (t)]−1 . (6.49)
22Any fundamental solution of (6.16) is invertible everywhere, as are matrix exponentials.
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The solution of (6.14) satisfies
(t− te) θu,?t (ω) = D (t)X
u,θ?
t (ω) +
adj [A (s)]C (s, ω)
f (s)
.
near te (argue as in Lemma VI.24). Since
P (t) |t− te|D(te) ρ−D(te) [P (te − ρ)]−1
is also a fundamental solution of (6.16) on [te − ρ, te)23 and equals IK at te − ρ, we




= P (t) |t− te|D(te)
[











P (te − ρ) ρD(te) |s− te|−D(te) [P (s)]−1
)(adj [A (s)]C (s, ω)






We can find an eigenbasis {v1, . . . , vK} for D (te) such that vK corresponds to λ
(see Lemma VI.24 and Remark VI.26). We then define the continuous real-valued
functions {F1 (·, ω) , . . . , FK (·, ω)} on [te − ρ, te] and the constants {y1 (ω) , . . . , yK (ω)}
as certain eigenbasis coordinates:
K∑
j=1
Fj (s, ω) vj ,




yj (ω) vj , ρ
−D(te) [P (te − ρ)]−1Xθ
?
te−ρ (ω) . (6.51)
Taken with (6.50), these definitions immediately give (6.17) after recalling that for
any matrix Q ∈MK (R) with eigenvalue γ and corresponding eigenvector v, we have
|t− te|Q v = |t− te|γ v.
23See Theorem 2.5 of Coddington & Carlson ([87]).
24See Theorem 2.8 of Coddington & Carlson ([87]).
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6.9.4 Proof of Lemma VI.28
We know that Sexc (ω), the X
θ?j
j (ω)’s and the θ
?
j (ω)’s are all uniquely defined and
continuous on [0, T ) (see Lemma VI.23). Corollary VI.15 implies that X
θ?j
j (ω) and





j,t (ω) = 0





t (ω) = 0 and lim
t↑T
θu,?t (ω) ∈ RK . (6.52)
As discussed above, one difficulty is that the diagonal entries of B in (6.14) explode
at T (see Lemma VI.21); however, the approach for resolving this issue is similar to
that used to analyze solution behavior near te.
First, we show that (6.15) (after replacing te with T ) has a singular point of the
first kind at T . Now sinh (τj (·)) has a zero of multiplicity 1 at T since
















Hence, there is a unique non-vanishing analytic function gj such that





on a small neighborhood of T . Near T , it follows that the entries of (t− T )B (t) are
given by
(t− T )Bik (t) =










if i = k
(t− T ) η̃k,perΦi (t) if i 6= k
(6.54)
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(see Definition VI.19). On this region, the solution of (6.15) satisfies
(t− T ) Ẋut (ω) = A−1 (t) (t− T )B (t)Xut (ω) . (6.55)
By (6.54) and Lemma VI.21, (6.55) has a singular point of the first kind at T .
Second, we find a fundamental solution of (6.55) near T . We know that




by (6.53), (6.54), and Lemma VI.21. Theorem 6.5 of [87] implies that a fundamental
solution of (6.55) on [T − δ, T ) for some δ > 0 is given by
Q (t) |t− T |IK = Q (t) |t− T | . (6.56)
In (6.56), Q is an analytic MK (R)-valued function with Q (T ) = IK . Also, Q (t) is
invertible for all t ∈ [T − δ, T ).25
Finally, we use our fundamental solution to solve (6.14) and conclude the proof.
Notice that tanh (τj (·)) also has a zero of multiplicity 1 at T since


















There is a unique non-vanishing analytic function hj such that
tanh (τj (t) /2) = (t− T )hj (t) (6.57)









ηi,temκi (1 + ν2i t)





















k,t + W̃t (ω)
]
. (6.58)
25Any fundamental solution of (6.55) is invertible everywhere.
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Since
Q (t) |t− T | δ−1Q−1 (T − δ)
is also a fundamental solution of (6.16) on [T − δ, T )26 and equals IK at T − δ, we













Q (T − δ) δ |s− T |−1Q−1 (s)
)
A−1 (s)C (s, ω) ds
]
. (6.59)
By (6.58), (6.59), and Corollary VI.15, we get (6.52).
6.10 Appendix: Section 6.7 Proofs
6.10.1 Proof of Lemma VI.34





(η̃tem − ηtem) Φ (t) if i = k
−1
2
η̃temΦ (t) if i 6= k
. (6.60)










(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (t)
]
. (6.61)
The first term in (6.61) is always at least 1. The second term is non-zero at 0 but
does have a root on (0, T ] if and only if (6.19) holds.28 Both of these observations
come from Lemma VI.21.




(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (te) = 0. (6.62)
26See Theorem 2.5 of Coddington & Carlson ([87]).
27See Theorem 2.8 of Coddington & Carlson ([87]).
28In fact, te is the unique root of detA in this case.
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6.10.2 Proof of Lemma VI.37















Φ̇ (te) . (6.64)











[(K − 1) η̃tem − ηtem] Φ (t) if i = k
1
2




























[(K − 1) η̃tem − ηtem] Φ (t)− 1 if i = k
−1
2
η̃temΦ (t) if i 6= k
. (6.66)















(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ̇ (te)
(6.67)
with corresponding eigenvector vK as above. We get (6.22) from (6.67) after applying
(6.21).
Recall that Φ (te) > 0 and Φ̇ (te) < 0 by Lemma VI.21. Since te, Φ, and τ do not
depend on η̃per or ηper, we can ensure that λ 6∈ Z by perturbing the latter parameters.
D (te) is then diagonalizable as observed in Lemma VI.27, and v1, . . . , vK−1 can be
computed using (6.66).
6.10.3 Proof of Lemmas VI.39 and VI.42
Since our uncertain agents are semi-symmetric,






















µiν2 + (S0 − Si,0)−∑
k≤K
k 6=i
η̃perxk − xi (η̃per − ηper)
 (6.68)
for t ≤ te by Definition VI.19. For convenience, we introduce the following deter-







































η̃perxk − xK (η̃per − ηper)

. (6.69)
29The function c is deterministic by Corollary VI.15.
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Using (6.68), we get that












(Kη̃tem − ηtem) Φ (t)
]
(6.71)







corresponds to vK .
By (6.51), it follows that
K∑
j=1
Fj (t, ω) vj
=






















(c (t) + cK)
f (t)





















It follows that we can find analytic deterministic functions Fj,1 and Fj,2 such that
Fj (t, ω) , W̃t (ω)Fj,1 (t) + Fj,2 (t) (6.74)
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , K}.30 Since P (te) = IK (see Lemma VI.27), (6.64) and Remark
30Note that c is continuously differentiable on [0, te] by Corollary VI.15.
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VI.36 further imply that
Fj,1 (te) = Fj,2 (te) = · · · = FK−1,1 (te) = FK−1,2 (te) = 0 (6.75)
and
FK,1 (te) = −
Φ2 (te)
Φ̇ (te)
> 0 and FK,2 (te) = −
Φ2 (te)
Φ̇ (te)
(c (te) + cK) . (6.76)
While FK,1 (te) > 0, determining the sign of FK,2 (te) is difficult, in general, as it
depends upon the sign of c (te) + cK (see (6.69)).

















and its time derivative are bounded near te for such ω as well.
Since P (te) = IK , the vK-coordinate of P (t) vK tends to 1 t ↑ te. For j < K, the
vj-coordinate of P (t) vK tends to 0 as t ↑ te. In each situation, we can also obtain
Lipschitz bounds on the convergence. Due to (6.17) and (6.74), potential explosions
in the coordinates of Xu,θ
?





















t (ω) exists in RK
}






t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]
>
}











To finish the proof, we separately consider the λ < 0 and λ > 0 cases.
λ < 0 Case.

































































t (ω) = [−∞, . . . ,−∞]
>
}















respectively.31 Conditional on F̃te−ρ, the RHS of the inequality in (6.80) (and 6.81)
is deterministic. Since FK,1 (te) > 0 (see (6.76)), we finish our proof of Lemma VI.39.
λ > 0 Case.
Assume that λ > 0. We can find a constant R0 (ω) such that∣∣∣∣∣yK (ω)−
∫ t
te−ρ
W̃s (ω)FK,1 (s) + FK,2 (s)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ R0 (ω)|t− te|λ . (6.82)
31In particular, the coordinates of θu,?t (ω) will asymptotically explode at the rate |t− te|
−λ−1.
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exists in RK by our previous comments.
By our discussion surrounding (6.77), we see that explosions in the coordinates of
























θu,?t (ω) = [+∞, . . . ,+∞]
>
}



















+ λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
FK,2 (s)− FK,2 (t)
|s− te|1+λ
ds
− λ |t− te|λ−1 yK (ω)










+ λ |t− te|λ−1
∫ t
te−ρ
W̃s (ω) [FK,1 (s)− FK,1 (t)]
|s− te|1+λ
ds
+ λ |t− te|λ−1 FK,1 (t)
∫ t
te−ρ
W̃s (ω)− W̃t (ω)
|s− te|1+λ
ds (6.85)
Let R1 and R2 be the deterministic Lipschitz coefficients for FK,1 and FK,2. The first
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ρ1−λ |t− te|λ−1 − 1
)
(6.86)
In (6.85), the third line is deterministic conditional on F̃te−ρ. Lines 4 - 6 of (6.85)
are stochastic conditional on F̃te−ρ. Letting R3 (ω) be the maximum of
∣∣∣W̃t (ω)∣∣∣ on

























ρ1−λ |t− te|λ−1 − 1
)
. (6.87)






























Asymptotically, the variance in (6.89) grows like |t− te|−1 as t ↑ te, completing the
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[186] , G-martingale representation in the G-Lévy setting, ArXiv e-prints, (2014).
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[203] D. Possamäı, G. Royer, and N. Touzi, On the robust superhedging of measurable claims,
Electron. Commun. Probab., 18 (2013), pp. no. 95, 13.
[204] J. Potters and J. Wit, Bets and bids: favorite-longshot bias and winner’s curse, CentER
Discussion Paper, 1996-04.
[205] R. E. Quandt, Betting and equilibrium, Quart. J. Econom., 101 (1986), pp. 201–207.
[206] A. R. Villegas and J. P. Torres-Mart́ınez, On pure strategy equilibria in large gener-
alized games. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46840/. Accessed: 2016-04-15.
[207] K. P. Rath, A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a
continuum of players, Econom. Theory, 2 (1992), pp. 427–433.
[208] L. Ren, On representation theorem of sublinear expectation related to G-Lévy process and
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